Introduction to Security Studies

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PREFACE

Dear readers and colleagues,

It is my great pleasure to introduce to you our new publication dedicated to the Georgian National Defense Academy. CENAA leads the international effort of experts from six countries in creating a modern, relevant, and up-to-date publication to serve as a study material for future professionals. For this endeavor, we have included the most relevant topics of current security discourse, such as Security Sector and its reforms, Armed Forces in the 21st century, Cyber security, International organizations and security, and many more. We also covered specific topics related to the regional security of South Caucasus in order to make the publication more relevant and tailor-made for Georgian experts. The ultimate goal is to contribute with our small part to professional development of our colleagues from Georgia, to strengthen their expert potential necessary for fulfilling the country's basic strategic goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. This publication is a part of a broader strategic South Caucasus program of the Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), which includes research, publication, policy recommendations,as well as organization of the annual South Caucasus Security Forum in partnership with the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS). We appreciate the professional and personal involvement of our colleagues and friends from GFSIS and National Defense Academy, as well as the approach and high level of expertise of all the authors. Without their enormous effort and friendship this book would be only a dream.

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INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY STUDIES

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INTRODUCTION

As for the concept of security, there is no consensus in opinion on it or its explanation. The international environment is changing, the states that were not exposed to specific types of threats become more vulnerable and the states that were vulnerable, become safer through the elimination of threats. The determination of a research scope is one of the approaches we should adopt when conducting research of security. When specifying the concept of security in detail, authors often apply a military and political conception (the specification here is more strict), and when the main object of research is focused on the state as a major actor (and only as one major actor). Broader conception of security also directs attention to other areas of social life, such as economic, societal, environmental, energy or information (this sectoral classification/approach highlights the breadth of security problems). Hence, security is not only perceived from a singular point of view – the state, but from several basic views: individual security, security of internal groups, security of the state, security of regional groupings, security of international environment (according to some authors, the more actors involved, the deeper the concept for its study) (Lasicová, 2006, Danics 2007).

In the following parts of this chapter, we will attempt to define a basic terminological framework for the study of security. Prior to approaching the description of development and formation of the concepts of strategic and security studies and their off-shoots, it is necessary to summarize and characterize methodological procedures, thus, to define the concept of an international environment and its specific component part(s) determined by security – a security environment and actors acting within, as well as to define the basic theoretical approaches that create a basis for practical application of

individual concepts and schools for research of security. Everything depends on our ability to take into consideration the whole hierarchy of the security transactions so that it corresponds with reality, in other words, so that we could be able to distinguish the essential from the non-essential and to arrange each content into a structure that is an adequate reflection of reality – an arrangement of security relations in the system.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY RELATIONS ACTORS

We can describe the arrangement of relations between actors and states through an international political system. The state represents a fundamental building block in a society and the international political system is a summary of its relations with other actors. For broader definition, we may use a term "worldwide political system," which consists of the following basic components: countries, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Some authors also include supranational corporations (as a specific kind of international non-governmental organizations) (Krejčí, 2007). In recent decades, these basic components are supplemented by other relevant components that transpose international political system into less than expected positions. They include especially: global trade and finance, global security defined through international and interstate organizations,[1] communication and information networks (often operating without rules), social and religious movements, cultural changes and motions, as well as the starvation, poverty and related problems (Rheingold, 2002; Barnet, Cavagh, 1994).

Thus, the world political system consists of several actors and can have

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[1] Global, (as well as regional) security defined through international and interstate organizations is based on international law which makes the state responsible for their maintenance or violation. The principles, parameters, tasks, aims, as well as sanctions are designed for the states. However, actual global security is endangered by elements that are not under the control of a state, and international law does not impose any sanctions on them.

several models of operation (bipolarity, multi-polarity, hegemony and their derivatives). In the 21st century, there is no fixed bipolar system with determined features and character of participation of actors not only in terms of structure of international policy (problems of security and its control, war, conflicts) but as well as in related areas (the issues of economic cooperation, cultural exchange, scientific and professional contacts). Accordingly, it is determined not only by the action of traditional actors – the states and international organizations, but also by new participants – subnational and supranational structures. It is these new participants, which became much more of a decisive factor in the agenda for security in the 21st century. Subnational structures, transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations of various types and orientation, various types of as power-wielding associations, groups (including mafia structures), as well as the new ones being formed (anti-globalists, neo-monarchists, etc.)

The analysis of the security environment assesses the specific dimensions of social environment with focus on security and creates space for the analysis the processes running within and serves for the identification of threats and dangers, as well as of actors. However, since the end of the cold war, the international environment has undergone key changes. The national country does not appear any longer as a supreme holder of sovereignty in all areas, some of it has passed to higher actor(s) (e.g. upon NATO accession, the state defense were transferred to allies – NATO member states). For the purpose of description of a state security environment, the external security environment and internal security environment is defined from the geographical and geopolitical points of view (Hofreiter, 2004). They encourage the localization of the approach to the problems from various theoretical sources, from various spatial levels, ranging from the smallest to the biggest ones. The security environment, thus, includes several analytical levels, by which we can approach the assessment of actors in the security environment: International systems (global), which comprise mutually interacting and depending units without any superior level, are determined by major trends, including globalization, uneven development, demographic

factors and new generation of threats and dangers (terrorism, proliferation of light arms and WMD, international organized crime, narcotics-related activities, money laundering, and so on);

- International subsystems (continental) which can be differentiated by their specific character or intensity of their mutual or system interaction. The subsystems can be territorially coherent (ASENA, OAU), territorially inherent, or dependent (NATO, OBSE, OSN) or structured (OPEC, OECD);

- Units (regional), which refers to actors that are composed of various subgroups, organizations, associations, e.g. sovereign states, and nations with historical awareness of their nationality, and also supranational companies and trans-border groupings that operate within a specific area – however, the living environment, economic cooperation and other factors, do not have the status of international organization;

- Subunits (local) which include organized groups operating within the system units, often connected with higher structures, while bureaucratic apparatus, lobby groups, and various political and civil movements the activities of which remain at the level of units, e.g. (Greenpeace, Amnesty International, as well as supranational companies) which enables them to increase their own local influence;

- Individuals ― this level comprises individual as well as human security that ranges from secure life of an individual, through protection of his/her property, rights and freedoms up to the protection of life environment, the devastation of which can impair the quality of an individual's life (Lasicová, 2006).

At particular levels, it is possible to identify more accurately the causal relations from below towards the top or vice-versa, or to determine them on the basis of identity. Now, a change of the international environment climate is influenced by the actors who can be identified as non-organized groups, or those whose impact can be characterized as one-off. Moreover, the turn of 20th and 21st century was also characterized by the increase of non-governmental

actors, the role of which is increasingly important in the process of coming together of various nations, with the same attitudes. Although they do not possess institutional tools (compared with states) to influence the behaviour of states, they have gained an indirect influence on an extensive range of issues. Compared with states, they have a comparative advantage, while the state must fulfill a complex scope of issues, the non-governmental actors focus on only one (Winterbourne, 2007). The operation of those actors itself may not bring direct danger (e.g. private security service), however, some groups (terrorist organizations) represent danger which is not negligible, therefore it is necessary to pay increased attention to them, especially since they operate with "irrational conduct" (terrorist groups, operations "without return address," an operations carried out against regimes by militant separatist and religious movements).

The analytical levels allow us to identify many actors, forums and other elements that trickle down to lower levels or conversely, in international security relations they grow out from lower levels to higher ones. Although it is not possible to uniquely define every actor – the levels often mingle and change positions. The nature of analytical levels relatively accurately defines the security environment (global, continental, regional, local, and individual ones). In formulating the various types of security environment, the criticism of analytical levels is based especially on an impossibility to accurately define the actors of particular levels (Lasicová, 2006). From this point of view, the units which do not fit the pre-determined image are often unfairly marginalized. The security research began to form through the application of theories of international relations to security research that forms particular views on and definitions of security as a concept through various schools and conceptions.

APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES TO RESEARCH IN SECURITY AGENDA

As we have shown, the approved approaches to security research include the option to use the established theories in international relations as the methodological tools. The basic classification of these approaches can also be applied to the sphere of research of the security agenda research in the international environment, which S. M. Walt bases on four basic paradigms: realism, liberalism, social constructivism and critical theory (Walt, 1991: 219; Walt, 1998: 38).

Political realism

The theory of realism was a dominant theory during the cold war period and it belongs especially to traditional approaches to security research. It was based on the power of countries, which base their power and influence on the international world system. The main aim of those countries is to reach their national interests expressed in particular by a country survival – a preservation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty, while the means for reaching those interests is the determination of countries to use military power (Eichler, 2006). Earlier representatives of realism (H. Morgenthau, R. Niebuhr) base their theories on the assumption that countries have inherent desire that forces or leads them to wage wars. Morgenthau wrote that the most important interest of a country is to realize its national interests. On the other hand, in the later transformation of realism to neorealism (K. N. Waltz) argues that a country may use various tools so as to reach its interests, but in the upshot, it is readily prepared to also use military means. In the anarchistic environment, each country may only rely on own power and means, since, as opposed to liberalism, realism and neorealism contests that there could be any international community which would be able to prevent such efforts (Walt, 1998). The realistic paradigm applies the view that countries are the principal actors in the international system, while the security correction is primarily in their hands and is based only on their domination over the others, thus the

countries utilize their means and power for reaching the basic aim of the country survival. While the country's power increases, its interests may be reassessed and changed. But these interests do not necessarily have to mean that countries cooperate, quite the opposite, they can contradict the national interests of other countries, which, in the upshot, can result in a war. The realists consider especially military tools, or certain economic tools through which the countries try to reach the same aims to be the means of "correcting" the security environment. Accordingly, realism, due to its own principal category – the national interests – considers not only cooperation as hard to reach, but it also doubts the effectiveness of international organizations as the means for reaching and keeping worldwide peace. This approach was applicable especially during the cold war, where the countries tried to reach a balance of power, among other means, through continuous armament.

Political liberalism

The theory of liberalism is based on the assumption that the countries function in the peaceful environment and that the countries endeavor for cooperation and peaceful handling of disputes, as the basis for prevention of conflicts and wars. As opposed to realism, liberalism holds the country is not only an actor, but also an institution. The liberal theory of international relations is a theory, which is a non-ideological and non-utopian vision of empirical social science and is based on the relations country-society and between countries, which take place in internal as well as transnational social context and are based on the fact that the fundamental position of the country is always reflected in the world policy (Moravcsik, 1997: 513). The basis is Kant's teaching about peaceful coexistence of the countries and the effort of a country to ensure welfare for the society and citizens' development, since exacting expenses of a country during war results in a reduction of this prosperity of countries engaged in the conflict. Another assumption is the spread of democracy, which contributes to building of worldwide peace, because, the countries with democratic political system tend to be inclined more toward peace that the countries with authoritative political system (Walt, 1998). Also

continuous increase of economic dependency of countries, controlled through organizations such as International Monetary Fund, World Bank, contributes to reduction of tensions between countries and is a very important factor, since the benefits that the country obtains through those organizations are more valuable than following their egoistic national interests.

The basis of the liberal theory is collective security. The cooperation between countries that is led by international community results in reduction of danger and prevents the occurrence of war conflicts. In the spirit of Kant, the cooperation is perceived as a natural harmony of interests in political and economic sphere (Krokosová, 2014). However, there is a long way from natural harmony of interests to collective security, which can be illustrated by a century from Kant up to the end of World War I. The European area became "a testing territory" for collective security and economic cooperation based on peace without contributions and annexations.[2] The failure of the League of Nations and the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., a state based on the communist ideology is perceived today as brought on by a lack of pragmatic conception of liberalism. The declarations that were supposed to result in a new perception of country/countries had a sophisticated moral basis oriented toward economic and security cooperation. However, practically, all engaged countries (also members of the League of Nations and other countries) did not free themselves from the constraints of the national interests (Fukuyama, 1993: 265-275), which still influenced the residues of the colonial policy of 19th century.[3] In the upshot, we can classify the period between the two world wars as a crisis of liberalism, which despite the twenty-year-long activity of the League of Nations did not manage to create control levers so as to prevent another world war.

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[2] This idea was initiated by landmark documents adopted on both, the western and eastern hemispheres. There were "Woodrow Wilson's 14 points" that became the basis of the League of Nations (1920) and Lenin's "Peace Decree" (1917).

[3] They include the activities of the U.S.S.R. in the eastern block towards the Caucasian region, it also relates to Trans-Carpathian region, Finland and so on. In the western block, there were continuing efforts of Germany to reoccupy Rhineland, also Ethiopia and later the Sudetenland problem (Geiss, 1999).

The revitalization and revision of liberalism came only after the end of the World War II. Although ideologically-driven bipolarity arose, the systems of collective security through the U.N. and later through organizations such as N.A.T.O. or the Warsaw Pact were sufficiently effective to prevent another world war. However, they did not prevent local wars from taking place during the Cold War. The security inside the blocks was strengthened during this period also by economic integration based, virtually, on the projects of liberalism (functionalism, neo-functionalism, theory of convergence) (Hoffman, 1987: 390-394). The liberalism presented by these theories and, at the same time, through their real implementation in founding countries, enforces especially the following ideas: although there is ideological bipolarity, existing and developing transnational cooperation will gradually break down the bipolarity; the cooperation is sectoral, thus economic and will gradually become political in nature, thus it may lead to security cooperation, not only in defense organization; liberal cooperation will strengthen the pluralistic perception of the international community (NGO, interest groups, movements); centralism and hegemony of some countries will gradually decrease for the benefit of other actors such as interest groups, international organizations and integration groups of countries.

Social constructivism

When   can conducting security relations research we can employ social constructivism as a balancing, or a middle way between the positivist epistemology and post-positivist ontology. According to J. Mowith, the social constructivism itself is searching for answers to questions connected with human social existence. There are narrower constructions – only social sphere, or broader – multidimensional ones (Mowith, 1999), depending on the school that presents them, but always we are talking about theories with global context. These theories are influential – the results of research of the Copenhagen School, Minnesotta School or Aberystwyth School – and have met with lively response from the international scientific community, especially when it comes to their contribution to understanding of regional security.

Thus, social constructivism, as the basis of security theories forms two aspects: broader – general one and narrower, specific one both of them representing the type of survey that can be termed constructivist security – the typical example is the Copenhagen School. Social constructivism as a methodological procedure is of considerable significance, in particular because it "constructs" a more differentiated view of looking at the actors. The countries that social constructivism regards to be abstract are no longer considered to be the sole actors. The actors become those elements of reality (a nation, ethnic group, social group, ecology movement, differently culturally-oriented group, military lobby, etc.) that enter the discursive process of the security construction. The social constructivism in security relations   means that security is perceived as a matter outside the country, formed in interstate relations and then transferred to countries. Social constructivism as a whole, however, does not explain how the countries create their legal and moral rights and duties that, on one hand, connect them with other countries, an, on the other hand, separate them from those other countries. Social constructivism is not focused on, for example, the fourth option of security violation (war declaration) that concentrates on a transformation of international community (globalization) and on drawbacks when this community does not respond to the needs of those, whose rights are systematically excluded from the community.

Although the theories influenced by social constructivism also include the Copenhagen School, this school builds its own security theory on the basis of interesting compromise between two meta-theoretical positions – neorealism and post-positivism, which is also underscored by a certain type of terminology used, for example the concept of "interaction capacity" used by the school. It includes factors such as communication, institutionalization, technology spread, which already incorporates a neorealist position.

Social constructivism is "constructed" from the position that world and its international relations are the result of our social interactions and the research and scientific analysis conducted in this sphere is used to explain also the

political relations on the international scene. Political and international relations are, therefore, built as subjective and ontological (world as a social construction of subjects), objective and epistemological (this world, this construction can be scientifically analyzed).

Critical theory

Critical theory with its methodology is a result of belief that world and international relations as such cannot be analyzed just by scientific means (used in social sciences), since the nature of the science itself questions their existence. Thus, critical theory is based on objective ontology (a world is here as is – described by use of given facts) and on subjective epistemology (not recognizing absolute and universal objectivity of scientific cognizance), which is also reflected in a contradiction between universal and private interests in a modern country, which a modern science is not able to explain (Kováčik, 2004: 92) and which results in an inter-social alienation, permanent threat of a war and social exclusion.

Critical theory of international relations has the influence on security theories creation especially with regards to change in view on the subject of security, with special emphasis on emancipation efforts introduced by some security studies. By forming the critical theory in the Frankfurt School with a certain dependency on Marxism, it had the impact on the research of security in a relatively orthodox manner.

Critical theory tried to reveal some of the epistemological and conceptual bases of the orthodox concept of security. It is especially noticeable in the book of A. Linklater *Beyond Marxism and Realism* (1990). The critical theory was introduced by scientists as a projection of an evolution and scientific cognizance that is also the basis for neo-realism. The basic idea of critical theory of international relations and security studies is that the security is always to be surveyed as security for someone specific and from the point of certain specific intention. Thus, security is a generalization of certain

efforts that serve the goals of a certain group of persons (or countries) in the environment of international relations. From this point of view, it is possible to divide the research of security into two parts, as it is seen by critical theory – critical security studies and radical security studies (Linklater, 2007). Nevertheless, an opinion is justified that critical theory also relates to the behavioral revolution that made it possible to analyze the behaviour of people and countries on the basis of various criteria, resulting in the formation of various theoretical schools, but especially various types of strategic and security studies.

STRATEGIC SECURITY STUDIES AS A BASIS FOR RESEARCH OF SECURITY

Strategic and security studies, as a whole, represented the most important contribution to the research of security at the beginning of the second half of 20th century. Even today, some authors (Kříž, Mareš, Suchý, 2007) consider them to be the only one real research platform in the area of research of security. But other authors hold the opinion that security could be the subject of a separate scientific discipline. Authors J. Baylis, J. J. Wirtz, E. A. Cohen and C. S. Gray argue that strategic studies are the component part of international relations and international relations form a component part of political sciences. This classification is not to be understood as a hierarchical classification but as an interconnection of concentric circles (Baylis, Wirtz, Cohen, Gray, 2007). Buzan and Hansen acknowledge, in principle, the same classification of the security agenda, except for one difference – they state that every part of this agenda can be perceived as a separate research area while it depends on the fact, whether we perceive the security agenda as a national security or as international security (Buzan, Hansen, 2009). From this point of view, basic classification of security system is grounded in the division into strategic studies and security studies as separate groups that have their own subjects of research and their own schools and theoretical approaches (although they are mutually significantly interconnected).

Strategic studies

The period of cold war demanded from theorists as well as practitioners who dealt with security to solve (nowadays) a relatively unambiguous situation: The political and military rivalry of the two blocs was the dominant phenomenon, thus the research agenda was more or less reduced to developments of strategic studies. "This type of security agenda helped superpowers to transform mutual rivalry from direct military confrontation towards peaceful coexistence" (Ondrejcsák, 2005: 17). In methodology, the strategic studies were based on behavioralism, since it was needed to document factually a military readiness, armament costs and other empirical data that relates to the strategies. Thus, the military aspects of security were linked with the national interest of a specific state, with security and defense policy of a country as well as the block, the country was a part of, and it dominated the area of strategic studies. The strategic studies were characterized by data accuracy and had certain value added, especially for determination of then threats and dangers on both sides of the block system. At present, some theorists hold that military aspects of security are no longer important, since there are other types of global threats and dangers that literally exclude military interventions. However, we assume that this opinion can be criticized, since the military aspects of security still exist as a distinct factor influencing the internal as well as international security environment. Likewise, military defense policy is a dominating component part of military alliances and other integration groupings, such as the E.U., and so on. Therefore the strategic studies remain the significant component part of the security research, irrespective of the fact that a distinct transformation comes up in the relation of soft power and hard power in international policy. According to some authors (Baylis, Wirtz, Cohen, Gray, 2007), the strategic studies are, from the point of view of scientific accuracy, still unsurpassed methodological action, since they strictly specify the area of security, deal with specific threats and how to handle them and they are able to predetermine aims and tools of foreign and security policies of the states also at present. The strategic studies have also their branches in the conflict and peace studies that enlarge the security problems by theoretical

issues related to the research of conflicts and wars (types, causes, solutions, consequences, scenarios for future), as well as theoretical issues related to the research of peace (positive and negative definition of peace, the ways of negotiation, consequences of peace agreements), considered to be the most important.

Security studies

The security studies cover the agenda that has been modified more dynamically especially over two recent decades. The research of security studies was originally restricted to so-called non-military threats and dangers. Since the definition of a non-military threat was not specified in the end of the '60s of the 20th century, security studies began to take up the agenda related to enlarging and deepening of security. Initially, it was focused on research of interconnection of military aspects with non-military aspects of security, which led to the formation of various theoretical schools built on differentiated approaches (the Copenhagen School, Aberystwyth School, and Paris School). Later on, security studies were influenced by the splitting of the security agenda into a sectoral security as well as by the entry of a concept of human security. At present, the security studies are most of all influenced by the gradual increasing of requirements for an incorporation of other social, natural and technical science into the research, which is a trend that is irreversible. Nevertheless, it is this development that is cause of criticism of the security studies agenda, since according to some authors, security studies have become too widely oriented, they have very differentiated analytic levels, as well as reference objects that reach not only into other scientific disciplines, but also into reaching pragmatic conclusions (often shaped by an attitude of the public and governments to terrorism, to a state terrorism, private armies, environmental issues, where various, literally conflicting standpoints come to a head). The scope of the agenda of security studies, according to these authors, results in a situation when searching for security connotations in all spheres of life may dangerously relativize research results, which makes them useless in practice. This criticism is justified to certain

extent, but on the other hand, the spectrum of security threats and dangers expands to such areas in the recent two decades, which needn't be included in the research in the past. However, at present it is necessary to subject them to scientific discourse, since they can present existential dangers and threats for human population and society (food shortages, pandemics, cyberterrorism, religious issues, identity problems and so on). The security studies spectrum includes: the Copenhagen School and Critical security studies as the types that began to develop along with strategic studies.

Nowadays, the Copenhagen School is the most developed and as an applicator of social constructivism brought the new concept as one of its work outputs, as a response to the splitting of security studies to sectoral security, i.e. the sectoral approach in security studies. The sphere of security studies was dichotomously branched, where it used the basic concepts such as "war" and "non-military conflict" (non-military threat). All non-military aspects of security were pushed outside the agenda's attention, to the periphery. By the securitization process,[4] the Copenhagen School brought a novelty to the study of international relations, according to the paradigm of social constructivism and it also assigned the existential character exactly for non-military threats (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998). The Copenhagen School deals with the usefulness of definition of threats by splitting the study of security into particular sectors – military, political, economic, societal and environmental, while current development tendencies show the need of enlarging the concept of sectoral security by at least, further sectors, such as cyber, food or energy which are already developing separately today.

Considering the newly arisen problems the new world political system and, of course, the particular countries, must cope with at the turn of 20th and 21st century, new approaches to the research of security issues and security agenda began to spring up. Many of them are based especially on the criticism of

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[4] Security has, as the only one concept in the world policy, the power to move originally neglected topic to the top of political agenda, where it can be discussed quickly, regardless of democratic rules and regulations   (Taureck, 2006).

the existing approaches (from transformation of critical security studies, behavioral theory and from human rights problems) and they are bringing to the forefront the research of new facts – human security, crisis management, new sectors of security, humanitarian assistance, and so on.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have outlined the basic variables and approaches to the definition of security relations, however, it is necessary to add that the analysis of factors that influence this definition is an inexhaustible topic. The enlargement and deepening of the security concept began by the Copenhagen School in the 80s of the previous century, appears to be a permanent trend. Therefore, the formation of transformed security studies as a new trend in the research of security is increasingly discussed nowadays. This new trend may be assigned to the turn of the millennium and a change in international security climate. It is connected to the Frankfurt School and political theories that are often linked with Marxism and neo-Marxism. There is an outstanding question regarding concepts of security in use today, whether they include new theories of global security or just a re-animation of earlier theories which still apply because they are based on universal values, which create the basis for the theory of cooperative security, theory of democratic peace, human security and so on. On the other hand, theorists and security analysts are increasingly afraid that the security agenda will be developed in the manner which modifies the research focus, i.e. that it will proceed from the structures to concepts, from actors to interactions and discoursing constructions. There are also fears that the research of security could transform into a survey of socio-linguistic processes and as a result, the interconnection to empirical reality will be lost. It is exactly for these reasons for increasing requirements for a more detailed specification of terminological custom in security, and quality of interpretation of ideas of various researchers. This could mean a return to traditional topics which are considered to be explained and linguistically exhausted.

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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
- CRISIS, WAR AND PEACE

Peter Bátor

The current political system is to a large extent dependent on how predictably its actors behave. The more predictable and more stable the system is, the easier it is to maintain. So how to make the system stable and predictable? This can be achieved by ensuring its actors respect the rules.

The current system of international relations is based on norms and rules defined mostly after the World War II. Peoples and states devastated after two wars were exhausted enough to be willing to agree on a new system that would limit the use of force against each other as much as possible.

The main principles of the new world order after 1945 are anchored in the United Nations Charter. Among them equal sovereignty of states and non-use of force in international relations are seen as the most important principles. The second principle (non-use of force) commits states to settle their disputes in a peaceful manner.

Against this background, the international law, when regulating the right to use force, is based first and foremost on the UN Charter. It has an impact also on the settlement of disputes and conflicts that may arise among states themselves, and/or in the relations with other international or national actors. This set of norms is also known as *ius ad bellum* – law on the use of force - that seeks to limit resort to force between states.

This was the first time in modern history that use of force, and even threat to use force had been completely outlawed. The only exception is an inherent right of every state to self-defense – *"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security*

Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security" (Art. 51 of the UN Charter). In cases other than that, the UN has reserved the right to use force in international relations for itself as a collective action of the international community, based on a mandate given by the Security Council of the United Nations – the principal decision-making body of the UN. Many today doubt the effectiveness of this body. One of the main principles in decision making of the UN Security Council is unanimity of votes of its five permanent members – USA, UK, France, China and Russia. This principle had not taken into account situations in which one of the five permanent members would have been one of the parties of the conflict. This inherent problem has been evident particularly in the crises of the last 10 years – Russian invasion of South Osetia and Abkhazia, or the most recent occupation of Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea. In these cases the UN proved to be unable to address these alleged breaches of the very basic norms of international law.

However, even if the UN Charter clearly regulates the use of force in international relations and in a broader sense, also the conflicts as such, it has not clearly defined the means of conflict prevention and settlement. Agenda for Peace, a comprehensive initiative brought up by at-that-time Secretary General of the UN – Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 outlines such set of tools and instruments.

Although the use of force in international relations is (almost) entirely forbidden, it does not mean the international legal order is blind and over-idealistic.

The conduct of military operations, the use of force and all related aspects are governed by a separate set of legal norms – The Hague and Geneva Conventions. These norms (the Hague Conventions) are older than the UN-based system. This branch of international law – the international humanitarian law – does not judge whether the actors/partiers had the right to use force, but once the force was used, to make sure it is used in accordance with this law – *ius in bello* – meaning law regulating the way warfare is conducted.

All these international norms have an impact also on settlement and regulation of tensions, crises, or conflicts. Conflicts in international affairs may have numerous forms, causes, actors and means of settlement. To understand how to regulate conflicts, how to approach them and how to restore peace, it is necessary to know the basic facts, typology and forms of conflict. We also need to distinguish between conflicts and other disputes.

WHAT IS PEACE? WHAT IS CONFLICT?

What is peace? Simply and rather cynically - it is the time between two wars. But is it really so? Does peace mean that there is no tension, no conflict, nor crisis? Or does it refer to any situation without violence, use of force or weapons, or without victims? Is there something between these two "worlds"?

There is a wide range of situations that can be described as neither peace nor war. They may include tensions, crisis or conflict, or all of them. Tensions may be a part of peace, but may be a part of war as well. A crisis can be an isolated situation or just a stage in the conflict. All these categories are interlinked and their classification depends to a great extent on the selected methodology. And what are the stages before and after the conflict? Is it just tensions or latent conflict that may escalate into a "real armed conflict?" Is the peace immediately restored once the hostilities are over and is it really a lasting peace? What should be done to end the conflict and what are the

steps to take afterwards? Is it necessary to rebuild the state once the conflict is over? If we can answer these questions, it would mean that we understand the roots of the conflict, its nature, lifecycle and the means of its settlement.

Conflict. The roots of the word "conflict" are from Latin – conflictio, originally "con fligo." Con meaning "with" and fligo meaning "to hit" (Tesař, 2007: 24). The very general definition of conflict, as provided by Webster's dictionary, is a competitive or opposing action of incompatibles: antagonistic state or action (divergent ideas, interests or persons). The foundation of this definition is incompatibility and mutual rivalry. Conflict can also be more broadly and generally characterized by 4 main elements: 1. actors, who 2. act to 3. pursue their interests/values/goals, which 4. are incompatible (Waisová, 2005: 35). The aim of a conflicting behavior is a subjective need to pursue own interests and goals against the will of other opponents. When analyzing conflicts, we will further elaborate just on those that do occur in the socio-political sphere of human endeavor – the political conflict. In the context of international politics, the political conflict will be understood as a conflict that is international, or has the potential to be transformed into international, or it influences international developments.

Given the aforementioned, conflict is defined as the clashing of opposing interests or differences in position pertaining to national values and issues (independence, self-determination, borders and territory, access to or distribution of domestic or international power).

A conflict has to be of some duration and carried out between at least two parties (states, groups of states, organizations or organized groups) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their case. At least one such party is the organized state.

DISPUTES VS. CONFLICTS

Many people, including scholars have a difficulty distinguishing between disputes and conflicts. Can every dispute be described as a conflict or vice versa? Generally, disputes refer to short-term disagreements that are relatively easy to resolve. They are usually considered to be disagreements that involve negotiable interests, are generally short-term in duration and, given the right process of their settlement, lend themselves to the development of mutually satisfactory resolution.

Conflicts, on the other hand, can be characterized as deep-rooted problems that involve seemingly non-negotiable issues and are resistant to easy resolution. Even though both types of disagreement can occur independently of one another, they may also be connected. In fact, one way to think about the difference between them is that short-term disputes may exist within a larger, longer conflict. A similar concept would be the notion of battles, which occur within the broader context of a war (Sprangler, Burges, 2012).

Conflict classification

Conflicts differ in their nature, root causes, intensity, geographical location and impacts, the number and nature of the parties to the conflict, and means used to pursue the interest(s) of the conflicting parties.

Classification based on the **causes of conflict** is as follows: Conflicts can be **territorial** (when the cause is the territory), **power-political** (conflict in which one or both parties strive to gain or maintain power), **fight for freedom or ideological conflicts** (conflicts rooted in ideology and its confrontation with reality, or pursuing the goals defined by ideology), **economic conflicts**/ conflicts over resources (conflicts in Africa, regarding mineral wealth etc.), **ethnic or religious** conflicts (Waisová, 2005: 39-40).

Classification based on the conflicting sides and their role in the system focuses primarily on the actors (parties to the conflict). Based on international law and recognition of parties subject to it, we define them as states, international organizations, nations and, individuals. Beside these traditional actors, we can also add those who do not have legal subjectivity, or their legal subjectivity is limited – rebel groups, political or military organized groups, supranational companies or non-governmental organizations.

As to **the number of parties**, we can classify conflicts as **bilateral** (with two parties only), **multilateral** (more parties − it may include two states and an international organization or an organized group, or two organized groups and one state etc.), and **bi-multilateral** (state vs. more states organized in one international organization – state vs. international organization, or more states on both sides organized in international organizations).

As to **the relation of the conflict to the international system** we can distinguish **intra-state and inter-state** (international) conflicts, **non-state conflicts and one-sided violence**.

Intra-state conflict
Intra-state conflict is characterized as a conflict between the government or other state authorities and other organized group within the borders of this state, without an intervention from abroad. It can take different forms – **civil war** (one party is a government or its agents, armed forces or other officially organized armed groups, and the other is a non-state group that seeks to take control of a government, take power in the region or use violence to bring about a change in the governmental policies), **or inter-community conflicts** (see non-state conflict below) (Gleditsch, 2007: 7, Sarkees, Wayman, Singer, 2003: 59).

One of the most typical forms of intra-state conflict is **ethnic conflict.** Ethnic conflict is defined as one or more episodes of violence between governments

and national, ethnic, religious or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which these challengers seek major changes in their status (Gilley, 2004: 1155). Ethnic conflict occurs mostly in one state, but can occur also between two or more ethnic groups living in different states but sharing the same territory. By this, the conflict may evolve into a **regional or a cross-border conflict**. It may also take a form of **inter-communal or a non-state conflict**. As other conflicts, ethnic conflict has its own dynamics. It may take the form of non-violent protest(s), through social and political open conflict including demonstrations, riots, protests, property damages, and sabotage, to violent clashes between respective groups, killings, rebellion, terrorism, and deportations of citizens, guerilla or separatist wars, ethnic civil wars and ethnic cleansing and geno/politicide.

One of the most serious forms of intra-state conflict is **genocide or politicide**. Both can be defined as mass murder of unarmed members of a rebellious communal group. The promotion, execution and/or implied consent of sustained policies by government elites or their agents that result in the death of a substantial portion of the communal group or a politicized non-communal group. **In genocide** the victim groups are primarily defined in terms of their communal (ethnic, ethno-linguistic or religious) characteristics. In **politicides** groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups. Victims are unarmed civilians, not combatants (Esty, Goldstone, Gurr, Harff, Surko, Unger, Chen, 1998).

The Rome Statute of International Criminal Court defines genocide as a crime that involves "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to its members, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Inter-state conflict

Inter-state conflict is a conflict between two or more states, all members of the international system. It can also occur between a state and an international organization, or another actor with full or limited legal status. This actor must be located outside the state; otherwise it would be characterized as an intra-state conflict. In case of a conflict between a state on one side and an actor other than state − usually not a subject of international law (with no international law subjectivity – of the organized group, rebels etc.), the conflict is classified as **extra-state**. It still may be defined as an international conflict, since it crosses borders of one state, but it is not a conflict between two subjects of international law. These conflicts have been originally called extra-system, but later renamed to extra-state conflicts (Sarkees, Wayman, Singer, 2003).

Internationalized conflicts are mostly conflicts that started as intra-state conflicts, but have evolved into international conflicts, or in the meantime gained an international dimension. This category may also include conflicts that do not occur between parties outside the borders of one state, but the consequences of the conflict have an impact on other states or parts of their territories. It occurs when another state becomes involved in a violent conflict, either directly by invasion or indirectly by actively supporting a faction in the country. Indirect support can have many forms − sending arms, providing trainers and advisers or allowing rebels to use the territory of other state(s) from which to launch attacks. In this category, cases of secession or attempted secession where a seeding party was accorded international recognition are also included, even if it failed to win full independence (Stewart, 2003).

Other types of conflict

Non-state conflict is described as use of violence between two organized groups, neither of which is the government of a state. It usually has a quantitative qualifier (e.g. minimum 25 deaths etc.).

One-sided violence describes a situation in which armed forces by the government of a state or by a formally organized group is used against civilians. It usually requires a qualifier, as in the case of the non-state conflict. Although one-sided violence may be included in conflicts, it usually lacks the main element of the conflict definition – two parties.

As for the duration of a conflict, we distinguish among **short-term conflicts** (mostly conflict on issues that are negotiable, with parties more willing to find solution to the problem), **long-term conflicts** (the main causes of the conflict are usually basic values – national, religious or ethnic identity, security, territory, independence,, interests or material of which the possession or gain would mean a significant advantage for the party) (Short-Term and Long-Term Conflicts, 1998). **Frozen conflicts** are classified under the long-term conflict category. These are the conflicts that last long, sometimes even decades, and in which the parties are not able to find any solution, nor has the solution been found by other (external) actors. These are the types of conflict in which the parties, including the international community, got stuck on a certain issue and cannot find a way out (Cypress conflict, Nagorno Karabakh, etc.).

Conflicts based on their territorial location may be characterized as **local, regional and global**. When analyzing the territorial aspects of a conflict, we must distinguish between the location of a conflict and the territory of state. In case a conflict is situated within the borders of one state, it is almost exclusively referred to as a **local conflict**. Furthermore, within the borders of one state, we distinguish another type of local conflict (covering only part of the territory) and **nation-wide conflict** (covering the entire territory of a state). If the conflict covers part of the territory, but of more than one state, it can also be defined as a local conflict. This category also includes a conflict between two states conducted exclusively on their territories.

When the parties to the conflict are from one region and the conflict has an impact on part or whole of it, we define it as a **regional conflict** (conflict in

the Former Yugoslavia, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, etc.). Under the regional conflict, we can include also the above-mentioned internationalized conflicts that cross the borders of one state and have an impact on part or the whole region.

Global conflicts impact a major part of the international community in both its dimensions - political and geographical (world wars, in certain context also a global war on terrorism) (for territorial distribution see more in: SIPRI Yearbook).

CONFLICTS AND VIOLENCE

Conflict evolution. The conflict first starts by articulating the conflicting interests and by expressing a clear will to pursue these interests also at the expense of the other party(ies). In case of an armed conflict, the conflict usually starts with the first human victim, or with the first use of force against the other party. Conflict can also start by issuing a public statement, taking an action perceived by the other party as interfering in its sovereignty, rights or interests or directly by threat of force, display of force or use of force to pursue goals by one party at the expense of the other.

Conflict may evolve through various stages and can have different intensity in each of these stages. It may evolve from peace through latent conflict to a crisis. Crisis may evolve into a severe crisis, including armed conflict. If escalated yet further, the severe crisis may then evolve into war.

Non-violent conflicts - latent conflict, crisis
Based on the means used during the conflict, we can generally distinguish between **violent and non-violent conflicts**. Non-violent conflicts are disputes and disagreements, in which parties try to pursue their interest while avoiding the use of violent means. We can define (beside others) two stages of non-violent conflict:

Latent conflict is conflict that is not openly articulated, the hostility is not openly declared, but the perception of divergent positions is present. The clashing interests do become articulated into demands and claims. Further development of the latent conflict may lead to crisis.

Crisis is in this context defined as a tension below the threshold of violence. Tense relations between the parties can reach a turning point from where the use of force may become likely. Around this point, many decisions are based on incomplete information and taken under time pressure. For example, economic sanctions may turn a latent conflict into a crisis (Pfetsch, Rohloff, 2000: 382).

Turning violent

Crisis may turn into a **severe crisis**. Severe crisis can be defined as the threat to use force and the sporadic or unsystematic use of force. Military threats include the mobilization of regular troops, guerillas or liberation armies, the partial occupation of land, border territories or security zones and the threat or declaration of war. This phase is a shadow zone between non-violent and violent conflict. **Non-violent conflict turns into a violent one by using organized violence against the other party.** For the purposes of this text, violent conflict serves as a synonym for an armed conflict.

Crisis in the above-mentioned context refers to an escalation of the situation without the use of armed forces. Nevertheless, it can also have a different meaning. It may be a part of the conflict at any of its phases and signals a sudden change of situation (negative), sudden outburst of unexpected events or hostile acts caused by the existing conflict. Crisis can, in this context, be interpreted also as a sudden use of violence. It may have a potential to change the nature of the conflict at any of its stages and lead to further escalation.

There is no sharp division between non-violent and violent/armed conflicts. For that purpose, militarized inter-state conflicts have been added to the

classification scale. These disputes may include the threat of the use of force, the show of force, and the actual use of force (see Annex 1 at the end of the text). These disputes should not be necessarily understood as armed conflicts since the use of force may not be reciprocated by the other party or the intensity of the above-mentioned threats is very low.

Violent – armed conflict, war

Armed conflict is defined as a dispute (including war) that includes the use of force – deployment of armed forces or similar officially organized security forces. The armed conflict can take three forms in terms of severity (based on its scope and intensity): 1. Minor armed conflict (usually conditioned by a qualifier of 25 battle-related deaths per year); 2. Intermediate armed conflict (at least 25 battle-related deaths, and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths); and 3. War – more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, Strand, 1995: 619).

Clausewitz defines **war** as an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will (Clausewitz, 1946, chapter 24). More practically, it is defined as a systematic and collective use of force of some duration and extent between comparable opponents. War is also a violent mass conflict fulfilling three characteristics: 1. Two or more armed forces are involved in fighting, where at least one of them constitutes regular armed forces of a government power (military, police, paramilitary forces); 2. Both sides show a minimum of centrally directed organization of the battles even if this means only organized defense or strategically-planned attack; and 3. Armed operations show a degree of continuity and are not simply spontaneous occasional confrontations. The parties to the conflict are acting according to a reasonable strategy (Eberwein, Chwojnacki, 2001: 12).

War can have many forms and different reasons for its waging. The main forms of war are as follows: 1. Standard state vs. state war and armed intervention including significant loss of life, 2. State vs. nation war, including armed

resistance by ethnic, religious or language groups, often with the purpose of secession or separation from the state, 3. Internal wars based on ideological goals.

TOTAL VS. LIMITED WAR

Total War. This type of war is the most serious form of conflict. In this conflict, the parties employ the maximum force to achieve the maximum goals. Total war is characterized by high intensity, wide geographical range, and long duration. **Limited war –** the main difference between a total and limited war lies in the scope of the main political goals of the war. Because the goals are limited, therefore also the means used to pursue them are less extensive in scope (Krejčí. 1997: 295-296). **Civil War** is an armed conflict, which takes place within the territory of one state, the parties are politically and militarily organized, the government must be a principal combatant (through its armed forces or militias), the main insurgent organizations must be locally represented and must recruit combatants locally. However, there might be also groups operating from the neighboring countries, but must also have some territorial control over at least part of the state where the conflict takes place. Conflict must be characterized by sustained violence and the weaker party must be able to mount effective resistance.

HYBRID VS. ASYMMETRIC WARFARE

To understand **Hybrid warfare** (or often described as ambiguous warfare), we need to explain the difference between conventional and hybrid warfare. Conventional warfare is a non-nuclear conflict with rules of engagement formed by an agreement or compact. These rules for conventional warfare are spelled out in the Law of War and define acceptable weapons, treatment of prisoners, torture, surrender, and much more. Unconventional warfare is best described as guerilla and covert operations, typically in enemy-influenced

territory. Hybrid warfare is most commonly used to refer to conflict that has both conventional and unconventional elements. Although there is no universally agreed definition, it is well described through the nature and multi-modality of the conflicts in Afghanistan or Iraq, or recently in Ukraine. It is a cocktail of conventional military capabilities, insurgencies, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, organized crime, cyber warfare and advanced military technology, but also its repertoire includes propaganda or faked strategic communications. This kind of warfare may also include violations of international laws, and laws of war, and will often also include non-state actors and organizations, supported by states with dubious agendas. All these ingredients may be blended together, each contributing to the conflict's outcome. The magnitude of each ingredient may vary significantly during the war, depending on the phase of the war or its immediate effectiveness (Study more, 2012).

Asymmetric warfare. This form of warfare has attracted more attention with the shifting focus on the phenomenon of terrorism, particularly after the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington. Asymmetric warfare is war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly. Asymmetric warfare can describe a conflict in which the resources of two belligerents differ in essence, and who in the struggle interact and attempt to exploit each other's characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, with the weaker combatants attempting to employ a strategy in order to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality. Such strategies may not necessarily be militarized. This is in contrast to symmetric warfare, where two powers have similar military power and resources and rely on tactics that are similar overall, differing only in details and execution (Arreguin-Tof, 2001: 94).

INTERVENTION AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Intervention in an ongoing intra-state conflict is usually a precursor to the conflict becoming internationalized. The involvement of external players may be motivated by their interests in the respective state where the conflict takes place (helping or assisting one side of the conflict, clash or adverse relations with other parties to the conflict), or an aim to intervene in the conflict in order to stop violence with a primary goal to protect the civilian population (humanitarian intervention). The second reason for intervention in order of importance is that the conflict has crossed the borders of one state, the violence has been exported and/or it has serious security consequences in the region.

As defined by international lawyers, **intervention** is unsolicited interference by one state in the affairs of another. Intervention may be directed against a single state or factions within it, or it may involve interference with the interactions among a group of states. It may take the form of military action or economic or political pressure. This pressure forces states to act in a manner proscribed by the intervening state. Intervention therefore occurs when a state interferes in the relations of other states without the consent of one or all of them, or when it interferes in the domestic affairs of another state irrespectively of its will for the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual conditions in it.

In legal terms, intervention may be viewed as a violation of the principle of non-intervention. Non-intervention refers to an obligation to refrain from any direct or indirect interference in the internal or foreign affairs of any other state, which, based on the principle of sovereignty belongs solely within its jurisdiction. The exceptions to this principle are two – self-defense, as defined by article 51 of the UN Charter, and the actions taken in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter – Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression (Parekh, 1997: 54).

One of the most discussed, and at the same time, controversial forms of intervention is **Humanitarian intervention** is defined as a threat or use of force by a state or group of states aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals. It may be defined as a use of force in order to protect the people of another state from treatment which is so arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of authority within which a sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice. It has also been defined as a short-term use of force to exclusively re-establish respect for human rights, without affecting the political independence or the territorial integrity of the state (Parekh, 1997: 55).

Humanitarian intervention represents, in its nature, a contradiction of two principles of international law. The first one is the sovereignty and non-intervention; the second the protection of human rights. The principle of non-intervention and non-use of force in international affairs is defined in article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter - All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. The only exception is the use of force under Chapter VII (see above) and only in case the international peace and security have been endangered. The UN Charter does not provide a basis to intervene in case human rights are gravely abused. The defenders of humanitarian intervention argue that if a state abuses the human rights, this state automatically loses its sovereignty and right to non-intervention and the international community is obliged to intervene in order to save lives and quell the starvation of citizens.

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT VS. CONFLICT RESOLUTION VS. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Scholars and experts draw distinctions between dispute settlement, conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation. The first three terms are commonly used and have fairly straight-forward meanings, while conflict transformation represents a departure from the other approaches.

Dispute settlement. As we have mentioned earlier, disputes are generally considered to be disagreements that involve negotiable interests. Since they are negotiable, they provide enough flexibility and room for possible maneuvering and settlement. The dispute settlement therefore refers to the working out of a mutually satisfactory agreement between the parties involved. Dispute settlement is primarily aimed at bringing the dispute to an end, without necessarily dealing with its fundamental causes. If not tackling the root causes of the dispute, it may happen that although the particular dispute has been settled permanently, another similar or related dispute may arise again later (Sprengler, 2013).

Conflict resolution. If we follow the logic we have presented earlier, conflicts tend to last longer and are rooted more deeply than disputes. And since they tend to arise over non-negotiable issues, such as fundamental values or essential resources, their resolution is also more complex and demanding. To truly resolve a conflict, the solution must go beyond just satisfying the parties' interests as occurs in dispute settlement. To end or *resolve* a long-term conflict, a relatively stable solution that identifies and deals with the underlying sources of the conflict must be found. This is a more difficult task than simple dispute settlement, because resolution involves going beyond negotiating interests to meet all sides' basic needs, while simultaneously finding a way to respect their underlying values and identities. Conflict resolution requires identifying the causal factors behind the conflict, and finding ways to deal with them. On the other hand, settlement is simply aimed at ending a dispute as quickly

and amicably as possible. This means that it is possible to settle a dispute that exists within the context of a larger conflict, without resolving the overall conflict (Sprengler, 2013).

Conflict management involves control, but not resolution, of a long-term or deep-rooted conflict. This is the approach taken when complete resolution seems to be impossible, yet something needs to be done. In cases that are resolution-resistant, it is possible to manage the situation in ways that make it more constructive and less destructive. The goal of conflict management is to intervene in ways that make the ongoing conflict more beneficial and less damaging to all sides. One of the examples to illustrate conflict management is peacekeeping force deployment (for more on peacekeeping see the next subchapters). This force will calm down the situation and limit casualties. However, this force will not resolve the conflict. In many cases, where deep-rooted, fundamental values and/or non-negotiable human needs are at stake, management is the most feasible step (Sprengler, 2013, Swanstrom, Weissmann, 2005).

CONFLICT TERMINATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Based on the stages of conflict, different tools are used to settle or ease the conflict. War and armed conflict in general may be settled by a cease fire and if managed well, it can be stabilized and evolved into peace again. At each of the stages, a conflict can be settled and evolved back to peace or lower intensity conflict (for more explanation on the conflict cycle see also the "classification of conflict" above).

Conflict termination

Conflict can be terminated by different formal and informal procedures. There are several ways to terminate the dispute/conflict. Among them, a close attention is obviously paid to negotiations, formal and informal treaties and protocols. However, not all of these instruments are always successful;

some conflicts end without any explicit agreement or by any resolution of the issues. At the other end of the spectrum, some disputes may have multiple agreements, some or all of which may be honored by both sides. Some settlement terms are mutually agreed upon while others are forced upon a vanquished state. We can define four main methods of conflict settlement and two other outcomes (Jones, Breme, Singer, 1996: 172):

1. **Victory** - defined by the favorable alteration of the status quo by one state through the use of militarized action which imposes defeat upon the opponent. It denotes the attainment of a tangible piece of territory, the significant change in an adversary's foreign policy, or the successful downfall of another state's political regime by force. A victory can be identified whenever one or more state(s) are able to secure a favorable change through the application of successful military actions (or other action in case of un-armed conflicts) which directly leads to a forced alteration of the pre-dispute status quo;

2. **Yield -** defined by the coerced submission by one state to the demands made by another state but short of any clear alteration of the status quo directly attributable to the threat, display, or use of military force. Whenever a state offers concessions that alter the status quo in exchange for not being militarily threatened or to stop further military attacks, the "losing" state has yielded to the pressure imposed by the "winning" state. Yield can be identified whenever one state capitulates by offering concessions which appease the demands of another state before the militarized forces of either state have secured any substantial tactical gains on the battlefield.

3. **Stalemate -** defined by the lack of any decisive changes in the pre-dispute status quo and identified when the outcome does not favor either side in the dispute. Stalemates are usually produced when there was no alteration of the status quo. However, they can occur even if the status quo has changed as long as net balance results in a draw.

4. **Compromise -** a situation in which each side in the dispute agrees to give up some demands or make concessions with regard to the status quo. A compromise is identified whenever actors on both sides of a dispute agree to divide the spoils roughly equally, and hence, redefine the status quo, or agree to amicably settle their differences and accept the current status quo.

5. **Released -** a released outcome is applied only for situations in which a seizure of material or personnel defines the context of the dispute. It is identified whenever the seizure culminates with their release from captivity.

6. **Unclear -** an unclear outcome exists whenever the sources provided either conflicting interpretations or ambiguous information about post-dispute status quo and the parties cannot agree on the outcomes even long after the conflicts has been terminated.

Conflict settlement/resolution

Settlement of conflict may be reached in different ways. The most usual ones are (Jones, Breme, Singer, 1996: 174):

Negotiated settlement - characterized by the successful attempt to confer, bargain, or discuss an unresolved issue with a view towards reaching an acceptable settlement. It is identified by some type of agreement (formal or informal), the lack of any unconditional surrender or giving up concessions, and the absence of any attempt of external imposition of a settlement. Examples include the presence of a written agreement signed by official representatives of the state, reached in a situation unfettered by constraints; a joint communiqué stating their mutually accepted conditions for agreement; the exchange of letters stipulating mutually agreed upon terms; the formal acceptance of a cease-fire; or the existence of a verbal or tacit understanding by official representatives of all protagonists as noted in the historical sources;

None (unsettled) - a dispute is considered unsettled when none of the pre-conditions that fueled the conflict are resolved nor is there any agreement between the parties that the dispute should be terminated. No settlement is so identified when none of the conditions of negotiated settlement are present; there is no evidence of any attempt to impose a resolution of the conflict, and no evidence of any unconditional surrender;

Imposed - an imposed settlement is defined as an agreement that has been forced upon another state by means of overwhelming authority and without invitation. Instances of an imposed settlement can be determined by the presence of an unconditional surrender, the occupation of territory and failure to withdrawal prior to the termination phase of the dispute, or the evidence of being forced into accepting the terms of a termination by one or more protagonists;

MEANS TO PRESERVE PEACE AND SECURITY AND SETTLE CONFLICTS (UNITED NATIONS)

Means to preserve peace and security and settle conflicts can be divided into two principal groups – peaceful means and means using force. The first include negotiations, enquiry, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional arrangements or institutions, or other peaceful means that the parties to the conflict opt for; the second group includes means and measures that require or rely on the use of armed forces or force in general.

Preventive diplomacy
Preventive diplomacy aims to ease tensions before they result in conflict, or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain and resolve its underlying causes. Preventive diplomacy requires measures to create confidence; it needs an early warning, may also involve preventive deployment, and in some instances also demilitarized zones.

Confidence-building measures – measures aimed at building confidence, beside others through systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or sub-regional risk reduction centers (Brahimi Report, 2000).

Fact finding mission

Preventive steps must be based upon timely and accurate knowledge of the facts on the ground. Given the economic and social roots of many potential conflicts, the information needed by those who decide on the possible future course of action must also encompass economic and social trends as well as political developments that may lead to dangerous tensions. Formal fact-finding can be mandated by the Security Council or by the General Assembly of the United Nations, either of which may elect to send a mission under its immediate authority or may invite the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, including the designation of a special envoy. In addition to collecting information on which a decision for further action can be taken, such a mission can in some instances help to defuse a dispute solely by its presence (Agenda for Peace, 1992).

Early warning

In recent years, the United Nations system has been developing a valuable network of early warning systems concerning environmental threats, the risk of nuclear accident, natural disasters, mass movements of populations, the threat of famine and the spread of disease. There is a need, however, to strengthen arrangements in such a manner that information from these sources can be synthesized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyze what action might be taken by the United Nations to alleviate it

Preventive deployment

Preventive deployment can take place in a variety of instances and ways. For example, in conditions of national crisis there could be preventive deployment at the request of the government or all parties concerned, or with their consent; in inter-state disputes such deployment could take place

when two countries feel that such a presence on both sides of their border can discourage hostilities; furthermore, preventive deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate force/mission along its side of the border alone. Since such deployment would not be considered Chapter VII deployment, the mission would have to respect the sovereignty of the respective state(s) (Agenda for Peace, 1992).

Peacemaking

Peacemaking is the process of forging a settlement between the disputing parties. It has its natural place after the prevention has already failed and before the peacekeeping activities will have been started. While this can be done in direct negotiations with just the two disputants, it is often also done with a third-party mediator, who assists with the process and communication problems, and helps the parties work effectively together to draft a workable peace accord. Usually the negotiators are official diplomats, although citizens are getting involved in the peacemaking process more and more. While they do not negotiate the final accords, citizen diplomacy is becoming an increasingly common way to start the peacemaking process, which is then finalized with official diplomatic efforts. Chapter VI of the Charter sets forth a comprehensive list of such means for the resolution of conflict (negotiations, enquiry, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional arrangements or institutions, or other peaceful means that the parties to the conflict opt for) (Ouellet, 2003).

Sanctions

International sanctions are actions taken by countries against others for political reasons, either unilaterally or multilaterally. Their purpose is to pressure the target to comply with the sanctioner's demands. Sanctions can be divided into 4 main categories: **diplomatic** - political measures taken to express disapproval or displeasure with a certain action through diplomatic and political means, rather than affecting economic or military relations. Measures include limitations or cancellations of high-level government visits or expelling or withdrawing diplomatic missions or staff; **economic** – these

can vary from imposing import duties on goods from, or blocking the export of certain goods to the target country, to a full naval blockade of its ports in an effort to verify, and curb or block specified imported goods. One of the newer measures is to freeze the assets of individuals or state held in foreign financial institutions; **military** (see Peace enforcement).

Peace enforcement

The principal difference between peace-making and peace-enforcement lies with the tools and the consent of the respective state. Peace-making relies solely on peaceful means, while peace-enforcement may also use other tools, including the use of force. Peace enforcement entails the use of armed force to separate combatants and to create a cease-fire that does not exist. Force may also be used to create other peaceful ends such as safe havens for victims of the hostilities. The United Nations Secretary General also uses the term to refer to forceful actions to keep a cease-fire from being violated or to reinstate a failed cease-fire. These actions are based on Chapter VII. If thr measures mentioned above (Chapter VI of the UN) are considered to be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, such actions by air, sea or land forces may be taken as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security (Houben, 2005, p. 156-157). Legally-speaking, it is the only way (except for self-defense or collective self-defense) to use force in international affairs. All actions under Chapter VII must be approved by the UN Security Council. Peace enforcement activities may be implemented by the UN Forces (provided by the UN member states) or by other forces provided by other international actors and organizations, based on a UN mandate empowering these actors to act on behalf of the UN. The above-mentioned system of intervention is the one defined by the UN Charter. Interventions can have also different form, and although they are not considered to be in accordance with international law, they occur in international relations. The main form of these interventions is an intervention done by one state (unilateral intervention) or collective intervention (coalition of the willing in the framework of preventive or preemptive actions).

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping refers to activities aimed at creating conditions that favor lasting peace. Peacekeeping provides security and the political and peace-building support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace. It is guided by **three main principles**: consent of the parties, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate (Waisová, 2005: 139-141). Today's multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law. We recognize three generations of peacekeeping: 1st generation peacekeeping - classic understanding of peacekeeping as an instrument of stabilization in the period 1947-1992, with mandate and activities mostly focused on monitoring; 2nd generation peacekeeping – introduces multi-dimensional approach adding activities such as separation of adversaries, reconstruction of infrastructure, economic and political system of state. Additional activities usually include demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of the former combatants into society. The second generation peacekeeping operations are more active, dynamic and flexible; 3rd generation peacekeeping includes peacekeeping activities in an environment of non-existent or failing states (Conflict Management Toolkit Project, 2008). Activities are focused also on humanitarian assistance and ways of finding a political solution to the conflict.

Post-conflict peace building and reconstruction

Reconstruction often takes place at various times during and after conflict, but usually, the post- conflict reconstruction refers to a time and tasks between the cessation of violent conflict and the return to normalization, with normalization being the end state. The end state is reached, when: 1) extraordinary outside intervention is no longer needed; 2) the processes of governance and economic activity largely function on a self-determined and

self-sustaining basis; and 3) internal and external relations are conducted according to generally accepted norms of behavior.

In post-conflict reconstruction process, we can distinguish **three phases**: The framework is organized into three conceptual phases, defined as initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. While the primary responsibility for reconstruction must lie with indigenous actors, international intervention is often critical during the early stages of post-conflict transition. Not surprisingly, **initial response** is often characterized by military intervention for basic security, stability, and emergency services. **The second phase**, transformation, focuses on developing legitimate and sustainable indigenous capacity, often with special attention to restarting the economy, establishing mechanisms for governance and participation, and securing a foundation of justice and reconciliation. **The final phase**, fostering sustainability, consolidates long-term recovery efforts, often leading to the withdrawal of all or most of the international military involvement. It is this phase that also lays the foundation for the prevention of conflict and the reemergence of violence. These phases occur over a time span that varies according to local conditions and by each individual task (CSIS, AUSA, 2002).

To be able to adequately rebuild the state and its systems, the reconstruction should focus on **four main areas/pillars**: **security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, governance and participation** (Hamre, Sullivan, 2002: 91).

Security addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular establishment of a safe and secure environment and development of legitimate and stable security institutions. Security encompasses the provision of collective and individual security, and is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the other pillars. In the most pressing sense, it concerns securing the lives of civilians from immediate and large-scale violence and the restoration of territorial integrity.

Justice and Reconciliation addresses the need for an impartial and accountable legal system and for dealing with past abuses; in particular, creation of effective law enforcement, an open judicial system, fair laws, humane corrections systems, and formal and informal mechanisms for resolving grievances arising from the conflict. These tasks encompass the provision of mechanisms to redress grievances, exact appropriate penalties for previous acts, and build capacity to promulgate and enforce the rule of law. Incorporating the concept of restorative justice, they include extraordinary and traditional efforts to reconcile ex-combatants, victims, and perpetrators.

Social and Economic Well-Being addresses fundamental social and economic needs; in particular provision of emergency relief, restoration of essential services to the population, laying the foundation for a viable economy, and initiation of an inclusive, sustainable development program. Often accompanying the establishment of security, well-being entails protecting the population from starvation, disease, and the elements. As the situation stabilizes, attention shifts from humanitarian relief to long-term social and economic development.

Governance and Participation addresses the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions and participatory processes; in particular, establishing a representative constitutional structure, strengthening public sector management and administration, and ensuring active and open participation of civil society in the formulation of government and its policies. Governance involves setting rules and procedures for political decision-making, and delivering public services in an efficient and transparent manner. Participation encompasses the process of giving voice to the population through the development of civil society that includes the generation and exchange of ideas through advocacy groups, civic associations, and the media.

In order to make the four pillar work effectively and to avoid unnecessary duplications, a thorough preparation is necessary. The policy-makers need to

gather and analyze information to make assessments about the requirements of reconstruction. Planning and coordination must establish objectives, develop strategy, determine appropriate divisions of labor, mobilize the necessary resources and manage competing demands of multiple actors working together. Training is essential both for the development and maintenance of sustainable efforts. Finally, appropriate funding mechanisms and levels are integral to short-term and long-term reconstruction.

Annex 1 – Definitions of threat of force, display of force and use of force
1. Threat of Force

Threat to use force - threat by one state to use its regular armed forces to fire upon the armed forces or violate the territory of another state.

Threat to blockade - threat by one state to use its ships, airplanes or troops to seal off the territory of another state, so as to prevent either entry or exit.

Threat to occupy territory - threat by one state to use military force to occupy the whole or part of another state's territory.

Threat to declare war - threat by one state to issue an official declaration of war against another state.

Threat to use nuclear weapons - threat by one state to use all or part of its nuclear arsenal against the territory or forces of another state.

2. Display of Force

Alert - reported increase in the military readiness of a state's regular armed forces.

Mobilization - activation by a state of all or part of its previously inactive forces.

Show of troops - public demonstration by a state of its land-based military forces, not involving combat operations (e.g. maneuvers).

Show of ships - public demonstration by a state of its naval military forces, including a purposeful display of naval forces outside the territorial waters of a targeted state.

Show of planes - public demonstration by a state of its airborne capabilities (e.g. repeated air space violations).

Fortify border - explicit attempt to publicly demonstrate control over a border area through the construction or reinforcement of military outposts to defend or claim territory.

Nuclearalert - increase in military readiness of a state's nuclear forces.

Border violation - crossing of a recognized land, sea or air boundary for a period of less than twenty-four hours by official forces of one state, without any force being used on the territory (or population) of the targeted state or any significant public demonstration of military force capability.

3. Use of Force

Blockade - use of ships, planes or troops by one state to seal off the territory of another state so as to prevent entry or exit of goods or personnel. Boarding, stopping, or inspection of ships, land vehicles or the confiscation of goods is sufficient evidence for the erection of a blockade.

Occupation of territory - use of military force by one state to occupy the whole or part of another state's territory for a period of more than twenty-four hours. The immediate occupation after a war by the victorious side's army is not understood as an incident unless provisions of the treaty are violated by the occupying forces or further militarized incidents are undertaken by the state being occupied.

Seizure - capture of material or personnel of official forces from another state, or the detention of private citizens operating within contested territory. Seizures must last at least twenty-four hours.

Clash - outbreak of military hostilities between regular armed forces of two or more system members, in which the initiator may or may not be clearly identified.

Raid - use of regular armed forces of a state to fire upon the armed forces, population, or territory of another state. Within this incident type, the initiator can be clearly identified and its action is not sanctioned by the target.

Declaration of war - official statement by one state that it is in a state of war with another state.

Use of CBR Weapons - use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from the arsenal of one state employed against the territory or forces of another resulting in less than 1,000 total battle deaths per dispute (Jones, Breme, Singer, 1996: 172).

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INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS RELATED TO SECURITY (OSCE, NATO, EU, UN) AND ARMED CONFLICTS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

Zinaida Shevchuk

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War, the complicated and rather messy institutional security frameworks were the result of correlation of military, political and economic efforts to advance a preferred view of how to arrange security architecture in the evolving world. New security threats to address new security dimensions: creation of a modus vivendi with nationalistic Russian Federation, bloody conflicts and unrests in the Balkans, processes leading to disintegration of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, armed conflicts in the Caucasus, migration flows in the European periphery and overflow of illegal activities, as well as difficult political and economic transformation processes accompanied by mass demonstration in Central and Eastern European countries were on the top security agenda of Europe after the Soviet threat has diminished. Threat assessment and planning of the new viable strategies was the task ahead for many international organizations.

This chapter addresses the evolution of international organizations related to security matters – OSCE, NATO, EU and UN. South Caucasus has been a frontline for the collision of interest of many actors including these international organization, as well as state actors like the US, Russia, Turkey and Iran. Studying and comparing the role of selected organizations in these volatile regions contributes to our understanding of core principles and tools of the organizations to project security in this volatile region.

ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest European security organization counting 57 member states that spans "from Vancouver to Vladivostok" (Galbreath 2007: 1). The OSCE represents a framework for political dialogue on security matters. Its mandate deals with wide range of political and military issues, aiming to reduce tensions and promote peace. The major tasks include systematic and intensive cooperation on security matters; confidence, conflict resolution and conflict prevention measures and implementation of sustainable stability in conflict ridden regions. The organization also contributes to rehabilitation processes in post-conflict regions.

During the Cold War period, the predecessor of the OSCE was the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which served as a forum to find possible ways for cooperation between opposing blocks: NATO and the Warsaw pact countries. Its major objective was to enhance common goals in security matters. The CSCE has indisputably contributed to détente politics during the Cold War. Even more, the transformation from a "conference" to an "organization" has shown that OSCE has proved its relevance both in old and new European security architecture.

As it is documented in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, there were three major sectors known as "baskets." Basket I addressed basic principles, ranging from sovereign equality, inviolability of frontiers to right of self-determination, territorial integrity, non-intervention and confidence-building measures. Basket II issues addressed cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, as well as environmental and other issues. This was tightly interlinked with the Basket III concerning cooperation in humanitarian fields, including human rights and exchange of information and extension of cultural relations (CSCE Final Act: 1975). These commitments became

significant instruments leading to the end of the East-West strategic stalemate and liberalization of East European counties. The concept of cooperation was implemented by the series of "follow-up meetings" in Belgrade (1977-1978), Madrid (1980-1983), Stockholm (1984) and Vienna (1986-1989) (Kríž and collative 1998: 64).

The next milestone in history of this organization was the Summit in Paris in 1990, when member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact Countries signed the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe launched "a new era of democracy, peace and unity" (OSCE 1990: 3). This cornerstone of European security started the process of institutionalization of CSCE: the Council was created for political consultations, along with a Committee of Senior Officials and Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, CSCE Secretariat in Prague and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw. In 1994 the CSCE was renamed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The dynamic period after the end of the Cold War has underlined the relevance of OSCE. The process of transformation of this organization created seven mechanisms for resolution of the conflicts base on: 1. Human dimension; 2. Consultation and co-operation regarding unusual military activities, 3. Measures regarding hazardous incidents of a military nature, 4. Provisions relating to early warning and preventive action; 5. The Berlin Mechanism in the case of serious emergency situations that may arise from a violation of one of the Principles of the of the Helsinki Final Act; 6. The Valletta Mechanism for peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means and 7. Mechanisms of Politico- Military Dimension (Baňouch and Fedorko 2000: 160).

Along with the new wave of armed conflicts in the 90s OSCE increased its activities in different regions, as for example former Yugoslavia, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. In some cases OSCE was the only international

organization in conflict zones (Urbanovská 2014: 138). The new role of OSCE was constructed 1990 to 1994, when the mission of peacekeeping was to strengthen human dimension and restoration of rule of law. The peacekeeping missions of OSCE were sent to Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Ukraine and other conflict zones.

The decision-making process in OSCE is based on consensus. "Consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection expressed by a participating State to the adoption of the decision in question" (OBSE 2006: 1). The major decision making structures of the organization includes the Meeting of Heads of State or Government (Summit), the Ministerial Council, consisting of the ministers for foreign affairs of the participating States and the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC). Unlike other international organizations (NATO, EU, UN) all of the mechanisms mentioned above are not subjects of international law. Such commitments are often political and lead to big inconsistencies between declaration of OSCE and the real policies of each member state. Furthermore, the major principle of the OSCE not to involve into the internal affairs of a state also questions the ambition of OSCE to prevent conflicts. This leads to the situation, that OSCE finds itself in the mode of peacekeeping and conflict resolution, while lacking mechanisms and tools for conflict prevention.

If we evaluate the role of OSCE in the South Caucasus region it should said that OSCE belonged to one of the key security mechanism in this volatile region for long time. However its influence has diminished, because of the lack of consensus among its member states (especially among Russia and other member states). Furthermore, the major problem was that each conflicts party in this region used one of the basic principles of the organization. For example Armenia's position in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh was based on the principle of equality and self-determination of nations, while Azerbaijan pointed out the principle of the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity of states. OSCE faced a difficult task to make decision

whether the right of self-determination or the right of the state to preserve territorial integrity is more significant. Consequently, OSCE could not take a clear position regarding these issues.

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has become one of the key topics during the extraordinary CSCE Council meeting in Helsinki March 24, 1992. CSCE adopted a central role in resolving the conflict and held a conference in Minsk, which had to deal with the peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with CSCE principles and commitments. An ad hoc CSCE Minsk Group was created to facilitate negotiations. However, the further escalation of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh did not lead to any results.

The Intensification of CSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was adopted during the Budapest CSCE Summit, which took place on 5th-6th December 1994. Planning, support and oversight of peacekeeping operations was responsibility of the "high-level planning group" (HLPG) in Vienna, which was assisted by the co-chairmen of the Minsk Conference and by the Minsk Group (CSCE 1994: 6). The following meetings were marked by debates about the merits or the subordination of the particular principles of the OSCE. Azerbaijan underlined principle of territorial integrity, but this was unacceptable to the Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh representatives. In case of conflicts in Georgia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, CSCE supported territorial integrity of Georgia and welcomed the establishment of the Joint Control Commission (JCC) in which the CSCE Mission would take an active role (CSCE 1994: 8).

During the Lisbon Summit in 1996 OSCE adopted three major principles which was supported by the States of the Minks Groups: 1. Territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan, 2. Legal Status of Nagorno-Karabakh based on self-determination and highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan and 3. Guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population, including mutual obligations to ensure compliance by all the parties with the provisions of the settlement (OSCE 1996: 15).

The OSCE Astana Summit in December 2010 raised some expectation to achieve progress, however it did no bring any change and emphasize the need to "focus with renewed energy on the issues that remain in the Basic Principles" of a peaceful settlement. In case of Georgia this summit showed the bigger division lines inside the OSCE between Russia and the "west of Vienna". It demonstrated disagreement over the core principles inside OSCE: Russia criticized Georgia for using armed forces in South Ossetia, while the west supported Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity (Boonstra and Melvin 2011: 6).

Despite the failure to achieve any fruitful results both in conflict prevention and conflict resolution, the organization can be a useful forum for Eurasian security debates. Unlike other security related organizations, which are based on the "inclusive membership" OSCE can serve as a forum for discussing competing security architecture in conflict zones and promote human rights and rule of law.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

NATO was founded after the end of the World War II on 4 April 1949. The historical role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a military alliance to deter attack on its members and defend if necessary. NATO served as an instrument to build sustainable security on the supranational level. The Alliance proved to be the strongest and most reliable coalition of sovereign states seeking to maximize their security through a framework of the multilateral institution (Kříž 2012: 13). The major security function of the alliance was "to keep the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in". NATO was the institution, under whose security umbrella West European states were able to burry ancient hatreds and united together against a common threat. In order to strengthen the coherence of NATO member states, the notion of political unity had particular significance. NATO is collective security alliance providing mutual defense against military threats and it has

also serves as a tool for conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping in many conflict regions. The crisis management operations are carried out under the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

NATO has civil and military structures. The principal decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which is chaired by the Secretary General with headquarters in Brussels. The Military Committee (MC) makes decisions on security matters. The meetings of MC are chaired by Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in Mons and are held at the SHAPE. NATO decision-making process is based on three principles: consultation, consensus and indivisibility of Alliance security. This makes NATO an alliance of independent and sovereign countries in which none of the 28 member states "can be forced to approve a position or take an action against its will".

The role of NATO has evolved during and after the Cold War. Even after the Soviet threat "disappeared" NATO did not seize its existence. Contrary to that the Alliance transformed itself to one of the most significant actors dealing with security issues. The process of adaptation of NATO to the new security challenges is documented in strategic documents of the organization (see Kříž 2006: 19-33). After the demise of the Soviet Union, NATO had to re-conceptualize itself in order to project its identity and values. The "New Strategic Concept" of the 1990s involved military strategies such as the creation of the Rapid Reaction Corps, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), first Out of Area operations, but it was more than a military strategy. The bottom line was to create a political role for NATO, which was reinforced in three elements: dialogue, cooperation and collective defense capabilities.

Although it is often overlooked, NATO has always had a normative component. If identity driven hypothesis was not correct, we can hardly explain the role of NATO after the demise of the bipolar world order. Democratization of the

countries in Central and Eastern Europe meant a membership in the Western family and their commitment to receive its values and norms. The role of NATO moved "towards a European Security identity" (NATO 1991).

The role of NATO in democratization of aspirant countries after the end of the Cold War cannot be overlooked. Some scholars have argued that NATO's role in spreading democracy is marginal (Sjursen 2004). However, the Alliance proved to be a military institution as well as democratic political organization, which has "championed a set of values that run counter to military nationalism, chauvinism, and racism.... by promoting military subordination to elected officials, parliamentary control over defense budget, civilian expertise throughout the military-security apparatus, and respect for human and civil rights among conscripts" (Epstein 2004). The democratic standards were also established in the "Study on NATO Enlargement." It illuminates core principles and norms for each country that joined the Alliance in the three rounds of enlargement after the end of the Cold War.

The study defines requirements on future members of NATO, even though it avoids such an explicit formulation. Its main requirements are: 1) stab democratic political system; 2) support of the population for the country's accession to NATO; 3) military readiness 4) elimination of all unresolved territorial disputes with neighbouring countries and strengthening integration tendencies.

The overall emphasis of the Study is on political rather than military criteria, and the political readiness for the accession to NATO has also been given increased attention in all the three rounds that have taken place so far. Membership in NATO symbolized and supported democratic transformation in Georgia ― as the most attractive alternative to the armed conflicts in the 1990s. Membership in the Alliance means not only guarantee of stability, especially after the Russia-Georgia armed conflict in 2008, but also strong consolidated democracy after the Rose revolution (Kříž and Shevchuk 2011).

In other words, identity-related account of NATO's enlargement is more plausible than critical assumptions about the role of the Alliance.

In fact an increasing number of literature has argued that NATO has always been more than a military alliance and it combines democratic values and norms (Waterman and Zagorcheva2001; Checiu 2005).Even during the early days of the Alliance, the goal of its member states was to create an Atlantic "community," as it is emphasized in the 1956 "Report of the Committee of Three on non-military cooperation in NATO." Democratic values and principles are emphasized in the North Atlantic Treaty "determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." In words of Brian Beedham: "The curious fate of the Atlantic democracies, which thought during their struggles with Hitler and Stalin that they were the anti-ideologist, is to discover now that they are in fact the guardians of what may be the last and best of ideologies" (Smolansky and Smolansky 2001: 236).

The "democratic identity" of NATO can be identified in a key NATO documents such as the "Study on NATO enlargement" previously discussed. The NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act in 1996 emphasized the significance of the human rights in the candidate states (NATO 1996), democratic principles and individual liberty (NATO 2000). As U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott stated, NATO has "made respect for democracy and international norms of behavior explicit preconditions for membership, so that enlargement of NATO would be a force for the rule of law both within Europe's new democracies and among them."

The issue of efficiency of NATO to spread democracy outside its members lies outside of the bounds of this chapter. However, the history of NATO teaches us that the "one for all, all for one" ethos inside the Alliance, common history, and sharing common identity, are the reasons to explain how NATO proved its credibility and legitimacy. "Value hypothesis" has provided glue

for coherence of the Alliance and a sense of common identity among member states of NATO.

The terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 had a formative effect on the Alliance. At the2002Prague Summit "transformation" of NATO was among the key issues: "we commit ourselves to transforming NATO with new members, new capacities and new relationships with our partners" (NATO 2002). As Claudiu Alexandru Bolcu argued, NATO acquired a "global identity," throughout its objectives in the 2010 strategic concept, its intervention in Libya and identity-driven impulses (Bolcu 2012).

NATO's strategic concept passed in 2010 underlines the role of the Alliance on the international level, including the commitment of NATO "towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, and international partnership, open door policy towards further enlargement aims to maintain "international peace and security" (NATO 2010). The role of NATO rests in undertaking crisis management operations, post-conflict reconstruction missions, deepening cooperation within the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Being under the constant skepticism in different parts of the world, the strategic concept of NATO in Lisbon re-defined Alliance's significance and its role: "We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it is fit for the purpose in addressing the 21st century security challenges. We are firmly committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe's most successful political-military Alliance. Our alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule oflaw and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve" (NATO 2010).

Despite the proliferation of new institutions and missions for the alliance, the central military concern over Russia never went away. The principal military role of the alliance remained to secure members, especially new member states on Russia's periphery, against the Russian threat. Events in Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and again Ukraine today, demonstrate that the concern over the actions of Putin's Russia is significant, and thus NATO's military mission should remain in place.

NATO´s enlargement, US anti-terrorism campaign, as well as interests in energy resources of Caspian Sea contributed to increasing the scope of cooperation between NATO and the South Caucasus region. However, despite the fact that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia share some similarities – all of them are small countries undergoing the process of political transformation, they were under Soviet rule for the same period of time and they deal with unresolved armed conflicts – they have radically different strategic goals. While Georgia is a mostly Western-oriented country in the region, Armenia is more and more dependent on Russia, and Azerbaijan seeks a "balanced" approach. In practice, Georgia´s main goal is to become the member of NATO, while NATO membership has never been a priority for Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The history of the cooperation between NATO and the South Caucasus region had started long before the Rose Revolution. All of the three countries have been participating in the Partnership for Peace (PfP), Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and all of them were founding members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The dividing lines were vivid in 1999, when Azerbaijan and Georgia quit their membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), leaving Armenia as the sole member state of this Russian- led organization.

The process of forging closer ties between Georgia and the Alliance led to a confrontation with Russia. Russia considers the region of the Southern Caucasus an area of its vital interest, and that is why it has long been trying to prevent the penetration of any other power into that area. In case of Armenia and Azerbaijan IPAP remains the only tool to address the political-military issues. In case of Georgia, NATO is the key security partner. Despite the fact that NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC) is an important tool to implement practical steps toward membership-readiness, the prospects for introducing Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia remains unclear. NATO´s limited ambition in the region is demonstrated by the fact that the Alliance is not directly involved in the resolution of conflict in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Because of the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in 2008, Georgia has become a country without definite borders of its own territory, and hence it does not meet one of the key requirements for new NATO members declared in a NATO study on its potential expansion. Opponents of Georgian membership in NATO have been using this unquestionable fact intensively in recent years. However, it is only a secondary argument. The main problem lies in the lack of willingness in the West to provide Georgia with any security assurances.

This ideological confrontation stems from grand strategic interests of the Russian Federation. Russia is against the Georgian integration into NATO for several reasons. First, there is a fear of the domino effect: if Georgia enters NATO, it may serve as an example for Azerbaijan, which would then also seek to attain NATO membership. That would cause Armenia to become alienated from Russia and more inclined to turn to the United States for help; as a stronger power in the international system it would thus gain the ability to manage Azerbaijan. Consequently, Moscow would lose any leverage in Baku and become a footnote in Armenia.

THE EUROPEAN UNION

After two destructive world wars the goal of the European leaders was to establish a lasting peace and prosperity. The first step to achieving this goal was proposed by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman through the integration of the coal of steel industries in Western Europe. The European Union (EU) was born in the 1950s as the European Coal and Steel Community of six founding member states: Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands. In 1957 the Treaties of Rome established an "even closer union" by creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). After ten years all three communities united into one, the European Community (EC). As it is very rightly stated in the CIA World Factbook "the evolution of what is toady the European Union from a regional economic agreement among six neighboring states in 1951 to today's hybrid inter-governmental and supranational organization of 28 countries across the European continent stands as an unprecedented phenomenon in the annals of history." In other words, the EU is an institution of sui-generis, a supranational body of economic, political, defence and security community, to which each member states delegates some power of decision making and part of its own sovereignty.

The EU employs some elements of state, as for example flag, hymn, currency and institutions with legislative juridical powers. The EU's institutions include: the European Committee, the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Court of Justice, the European Ombudsman, the European Court of Accounts, the Economic and Social committee, the committee of the regions, the European bank of Investments and the European Central bank. The key principlesof the EU are based on commitment to peace, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights.

The role of EU is as one the key security actors in the European security architecture. The creation of a collective EU security and defense policy (ESDP) was designed by the Lisbon Treaty to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The "Petersburg tasks" in this treaty identified the new role of the EU including "joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories" (EU 2008: Article 43).

The process of establishing ESDP was set in motion in 1992 when the EU treaties established the EU´s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Relationship between the EU and NATO was defined within the framework of the European Security and Defense Identity in 1996. After two years, in 1998, the French-British Saint-Malo declaration established the ESDP and EU military actions outside NATO. The creation of ESDP has become a question of harsh debate for many scholars and policymakers. In accordance to many experts, ESDP was a threat to the trans-Atlantic security, establishedin order to balance against the US. According to one of the prominent scholars ''when it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways,Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.''

The empirical evidence shows that EU's performance as a security actor is based on cooperation rather than confrontation with NATO. As identified by some scholars "no real choice has yet been made on the nature of the transatlantic partnership and on the level of ambition and the degree of autonomy of the EU as strategic actor vis-a-vis NATO and the United States" (Biscop 2006: 6).   The EU and NATO have some separate, but also overlapping military capabilities. Cooperation between the two organizations takes place under the

Berlin Plus framework on the basis of regular meetings of foreign ministers and military representatives (Graeger and Haugevik 2011: 748). Furthermore, the EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP in December 2002 refers to "strategic partnership." The goal of the ESDP is to "add to the range of instruments already at the European Union's disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention." The crisis management operations of these organizations have to be "mutually reinforcing, while recognizing that the European Union and NATO are organizations of a different nature" (NATO 2002).

This interesting debate about the role of the EU as a security actor gained a new momentum in the South Caucasus region, especially after the events of August 2008. The complementarity of EU tools with other international organizations such as the United States (UN) and OSCE can determine not only strategic goals of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, but can also contribute to the internationalization and conflict resolution efforts.

The South Caucasus in 90s was a "distant neighbor" for the EU and it took long time for the South Caucasus "to creep on the EU's external relations agenda" (Stewart 2007: 6). Mutual cooperation at this time was based on regional funding programs within the Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS), the EU Food Security Program and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), as well as Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) and Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe (INOGATE). Despite all of these programs, EU considers the South Caucasus the "region of the frozen conflicts." Consequently, the EU is the late actor in the South Caucasus region. The first Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) enhancing political cooperation among high representatives of the EU and the South Caucasus countries came to force in 1999.

The increasing interest of the EU in the South Caucasus region came with the Commission's Wider Europe Communication in 2003. Furthermore,

incorporation of the region into the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has been a major tool for implantation of reforms in the economic sector and in rule of law in this volatile region. After the Russian-Georgian armed conflict, EU acquired a role of a security actor by enhancing the Russian-Georgian six point peace agreement, supporting territorial integrity of Georgia and established the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), which remains the only international mission in Georgia. The EU is also engaged in the "Geneva discussions." The signature of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement on 27 June 2014 contributes to the strengthening of democracy and to political, economic and institutional stability in Georgia and enhances gradual economic integration of Georgia into the EU Internal Market (EU 2014: 5).

On the one hand we can see that EU is more active in the South Caucasus, however as observed by one of the leading experts "the track record of this engagement is mixed: The peace agreement was vaguely formulated and is still only partially fulfilled; the non-recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was rather an act of passive resistance, but failed to produce any positive impact on the process of conflict resolution; and the EUMM remains a toothless tiger, only allowed to monitor the Georgian side of the boundary line and unable to stop the so-called "borderization" process, i.e. the build-up of fences and barbed wires especially at the boundary line with South Ossetia. In addition, the "Geneva discussions" have been stalled for months" (Druey and Fix 2013).

"Frozen" conflicts have a significant impact on the stability in the South Caucasus. In comparison to other organizations, the EU is in a unique position to contribute to the peaceful resolution of these conflicts through the "soft power" elements to enhance democratic institutions and create a common economic and energy space.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The core objective of the United Nations has been "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" (UN Charter: Preamble). This organization deals with the broad range of issues and its structures and instructions covers different sectors. In fact the UN has at its disposal variety of tools and mechanisms, which allow the organization to execute its ultimate goal –assist countries to create a lasting peace. These include the following:

The General Assembly (GA), the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Secretariat represent the "UN System." When a conflict breaks out the UN Security Council (UNSC) may decide on peace enforcement measures, as for example economic sanctions or collective military action (UN Charter: Chapter VII). Along with the Secretary General the UNSC plays the most significant role in conflict resolution. According to the UN Charter, the General Assembly can make recommendations on the general principles of cooperation for maintaining international peace and security. In accordance to the UN resolution "Uniting for Peace" dating back to November 1950 (resolution 377 (V), the General Assembly may also take action if the Security Council fails to do so (UN Charter: Article 11). But if the conflict actions are discusses by the UNSC, the General Assembly cannot take measures that are binding on States (UN Charter: Article 12). In practice it means that the resolutions and recommendations of the GA are not legally bindingacts.

Peace keeping is a core function of the UN. Originally UN peacekeeping missions were based on the principle of neutrality and self-defence. "However, the environment in which UN operations were performed was increasingly characterized by the presence of various militias, criminal gangs and other "spoilers" that jeopardized the civilian population and were active in undermining the peace process. The term self-defense was thus gradually broadened so as to include also defense against the forcible attempts to prevent the peacekeeping units from exercising the duties requested by the mandate of the Security Council" (Urbanosvká 2014: 94-95).

The UN faces many challenges in its goal to contribute to the wold peace. Some UN peacekeeping operations were successful, while otherswere the subject of criticism. The nature of the peacekeeping operations has transformed from traditional to multidimensional operations. UN had been one of the key security actors in the South Caucuses region for many years. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Armenia and Azerbaijan is focused on enhancing democratization processes, but are not directly involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The UNDP mission in Georgia was directed to prevent conflict escalation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, after Russian veto in the United Nations, the Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)came to an end on June 2009. Consequently, the role of the UN in the South Caucasus has declined.

CONCLUSION

Despite all the development and the role of the international organization in mediation, peacekeeping, peacemaking and confidence-building measures, as well as conflict prevention remains a very complex puzzle. Unfortunately, armed conflicts continue to emerge leading to devastating wars and instabilities across regions. The security deficit and fragile peace arraignment in the South Caucasus underlines the need for internationalization of conflict resolution efforts. This is especially significant now, during the crisis in Ukraine, because

as the crisis evolves the simmering tensions can lead to the transformation of "frozen" conflicts into the next series of new hostilities in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Unfortunately, the role of the OSCE, NATO and UN has considerably declined. However, the EU has a new momentum and can contribute to revival of multilateral security engagements in this region. In this regard, creation of multidimensional and coherent approach may keep the conflicts from escalating to "hot" wars.

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

Tomáš Čižik - Peter Novák

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a political and military organization originally constituted of twelve members from Europe and Northern America, with Washington Treaty as its cornerstone. The Treaty was signed by the founding members and contains of 14 Articles, where the main principles of the organization are listed. NATO was established as an organization of collective defence against the rising power of the Soviet Union. As Western European countries felt threatened by the Soviet Union´s conventional capabilities, they asked the United States to maintain its political and military presence in Europe beyond the end of Second World War. The result of the negotiations between the United States and the European countries was the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on April 4, 1949. NATO was the only multinational organization which institutionally bound the USA to the European security also with concrete security guarantees. "*The Alliance was so successful as a deterrent that it never resorted to Article 5 or deployed the substantial military forces under its umbrella during the Cold War*" (Lindley-French, 2007). NATO since its establishment had to undergo many changes and face many challenges. The dissolution of the Soviet Union led to the "reassessment" of the role of the Alliance. As Lindley-French argues, it was important to keep the United States and non-European members (Canada) engaged in Europe. Another breaking point in NATO's development were the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In order to adapt to the new security challenges, NATO has broadened its mission, reformed all its structures, established new partnerships, and developed new tools to achieve its strategic goals (Ondrejcsák and Rhodes, 2014). At the time of this writing (2014), NATO is facing another breaking point, the Ukrainian Crisis or Russian-Ukrainian War. Currently, NATO consists of 28 member states and is the most powerful regional military and political organization in the world.

NATO'S PRINCIPLES

North Atlantic Alliance is based on collective defence and mutual assistance among the member states. The collective defence is considered as a main principle or cornerstone of the Alliance. The right to self-defence is considered as a basic right of each state and is enshrined in the Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nation (1945): "*nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of collective or individual self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.*"

If an armed attack occurs against one of the NATO member states, each member state will consider this as an act of violence against all member states and consider if they will take the actions necessary to help the attacked member states. Here is important to state that each member state of the Alliance should build and possess its own defence capacities against the aggression. Collective defence of NATO member countries is enshrined in the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As Bátor (2013: 105) states: "*the Treaty commits each member to share the risk, responsibility and benefits of collective security. It also states that NATO members form a unique community of values committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.*" Article 5 was invoked only once, on 12th September 2001 after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the North Atlantic Council "*decided unanimously to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, saying that the attack on 9/11 was not just an attack on the United States, but an attack on all the members of NATO*" (Daadler, 2011).

Besides the collective defence, NATO serves also as a place for discussion about political and military issues or threats under the Article 4. Article 4 allows each member state to consult mostly political issues with its partners. Bátor (2013: 106) argues that Article 4 "*gives NATO its political dimension and also because of this principle NATO is characterized as a political-military organization.*"

After the end of the Cold War the security situation in Europe has changed and therefore NATO made some necessary steps in order to ensure its further develop and to accommodate the newly arisen situation. There were three main changes in European security: first, the dissolution of the Soviet Union practically temporarily diminished the conventional threat it constituted for the Western Europe; second, the former Soviet satellites in the Baltic Region and Central and Eastern Europe have started on their incremental transition to democratic countries and integration into European and NATO structures. Third, the emerging security challenges outside the territory of NATO became considered a threat for the Alliance's members (Carpenter, 2013).

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NATO

The development of the Alliance can be fully understood only after the analysis of its history. The historical development of NATO can be divided into the following four periods (with certain level of methodological simplifications for the aims of this publication) – Cold War period (1949-1989), Post-Cold War period (1989-2001), Post-9/11 period (2001-2014) and Post-Ukrainian Crisis/Russian-Ukrainian War period (2014-ongoing).

Cold War Period (1949-1989)
The Cold War period can be characterized as a permanent competition between the West and East blocs, or between the United States and its allies, and the Soviet Union and its satellite states. As Eichler and Laml (2010: 23) argue, the creation of NATO can be best characterized as the "*strategic*

revolution," because Western European countries openly admitted that they were unable to protect themselves in the case of strategic Soviet attack on Western Europe. It is important to say that during the Cold War, there was no direct confrontation between the main actors, the United States and the Soviet Union. All confrontations took place as proxy-wars (Korean War, Vietnam War, etc.). NATO successfully fulfilled its role, in deterring the Soviet Union from open confrontation with the West.

The Cold War period can be divided into the following 3 areas: first - military competition and nuclear deterrence. According to Rearden (1984: 5), at the start of the Cold War the army of the Soviet Union's Red Army, excluding its satellite states, "consisted of 4, 100, 000 men and had stabilized at about 175 line divisions, all effectively organized for combat and supported by substantial tactical air force" all of which could be used in the armed attack against Western Europe. On the other side, the advantage of conventional forces of the Soviet Union over the West was balanced by the nuclear deterrence capabilities of the United States. This competition created the security dilemma. It "*refers to a situation in which actions by a state intended to heighten its security, such as increasing its military strength or making alliances, can lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict, even when no side really desires it*" (Jervis, 1978: 167-174). The tactics of both actors were aimed at deterring the other side from armed attack.

Second - the Cold War represented the ideological confrontation between the Western and Eastern bloc or between democratic values and communism. The Western bloc promoted free trade, human rights, democracy and freedom of speech, while the Eastern bloc promoted centrally planned economy, collective ownership, and the rule of one party. In addition, the media in the Easter bloc were under strong censorship.

Third - economic isolation. The Cold War period is also characterized by the economic isolation of the Western and Eastern bloc. Each bloc tried to weaken its opponent by economic sanctions and to support their allies or satellite states. The United States has supported the Western European countries by the so-called Marshall Plan aimed at helping Europe to recover after the devastation of World War II, to improve European industry and to strengthen its economies. The Soviet alternative to the Marshal Plan, the "Molotov Plan" later known as COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Development) was aimed at rebuilding the countries in the Easter bloc. However, the real goal of COMECON was to prevent Soviet satellite states from looking for help or moving towards the Western Europe. Stalin was "*anxious to keep other powers out of neighboring buffer states rather than to integrate them into a new mammoth economy*" (Wallace and Clark, 1986).

Post-Cold War Period (1989-2001)

The Soviet Union had dissolved in 1991 and soon afterwards NATO lost its main conventional enemy and strategic opponent. Therefore, NATO aimed its activities at cooperation with the former Soviet Union satellite states and their integration into the organization as well as into other international organizations, such as the European Union, as well as to widening the zone of security and stability in Europe. The main change in this period was the shift from the strictly defined territorial defence to the defence of the security interests of the Alliance. As US Senator Lugar stated in 1993, NATO has to "go out of area or out of business" (Good, 2012).

Without the main military and political opponent NATO was able to redefine the notion of security, by shifting its focus to new threats in international security, such as terrorism, the proliferation weapons of mass destruction, failed and rogue states. This meant that NATO was prepared, besides the territorial defence of its member states, to engage in crisis management operations outside its own borders to prevent rising threats to the Alliance. In this period NATO engaged in missions outside its borders – for example

through the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995, Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996, followed by air campaign in Kosovo and Serbia (1999), followed still by KFOR and many other missions.

Post-9/11 Period (2001-2014)

After the 9/11, the threat of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue states and failed states became the top discussed issues in the majority of states and international organizations of the trans-Atlantic space. 9/11 attacks gave the impulse for the next round of post-Cold-War transformation of NATO.

The main transformation in this period was that NATO has re-focused its attention to "*active engagement in operations out of area of the Alliance (outside the European territory). Majority of NATO member states adapted their capabilities for the crisis management operations* (Korba and Majer, n.d.).

Furthermore, NATO shifted its efforts from the relative short air operations to the long-term ground offensives far away from its territory. The relative secure environment in Europe allowed these strategic changes, because NATO states had lost a big military opponent in their neighbourhood, although the main threat to the Alliance at that time came from Afghanistan and the broader Middle East. To be successful in foreign operations NATO "*needed to reform itself.*" The Alliance needed to "*strengthen its operation capabilities*" (Bátor, 2013). Foreign operations also contributed to better interoperability between member states, who have sought more effective cooperation.

The best example of NATO long-term operation out of Europe was the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan launched on the basis of Resolution 1386 of the United Nations Security Council in December 2001 (United Nations Security Council, 2001). Initially, the ISAF mission was to punish Al-Qaeda for the 9/11 attacks and to defeat the Taliban

regime in Afghanistan. Later, the mission changed to securing Kabul and its surroundings from Al-Qaeda and Taliban. In 2003, "*NATO took over the operation from the UN (upon the request of the government of Afghanistan)*" and the ISAF mission had expanded through all the territory of Afghanistan (Majer, 2013). The main goal of the ISAF mission was to train and develop the Afghan National Security Forces to be able to provide security across the territory of Afghanistan, "*to ensure that Afghanistan can never again become a haven for terrorists*" (Bátor, 2013). In Afghanistan the allied forces were also involved in the counterinsurgency missions which called on NATO to develop the capabilities to be able to project force and equipment to the state far away from Alliance territory. According to NATO sources (2014), 48 nations had contributed to the ISAF mission with 34, 512 troops in 2014, but more than 100 thousand at its peak, just a few years before. Among top contributors were the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Georgia, Jordan, Turkey and Australia.

Post-Ukrainian Crisis/Russian-Ukrainian War Period (2014-ongoing)

The current crisis in the Eastern Europe (2014-ongoing) can be characterized as the fourth and the most recent period of NATO's development. According to Ondrejcsák (2014) there are three main changes in this period from the previous one. First, the Russian aggression against the Ukrainian territory and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula showed that Russia is still a security threat for Europe and for the Alliance. Second, NATO member states were unable to effectively react to this situation, and there was not set, so-called, effective "red line" at the first phase of the Russian invasion. Third, most of the NATO member states lacked sufficient military capabilities to defend their own territories, and Central Europe was missing strategic infrastructure. The perception of relative security in Europe and absence of strong military opponent near the borders of the Alliance affected the military spending of most NATO member states. According to SIPRI (2013), in majority of states the defence budgets were decreasing. In fact, the Alliance was unprepared for the aggression from the Russian side. In 2010 at the Lisbon Summit, the

new Strategic Concept (Swami, 2010) was approved, where it was literally stated that "*conventional military attack against NATO territory is low.*" This has proven as false and Alliance had to take measures to reverse this negative trend and to strengthen its own security.

First − majority of the member countries promised to increase defense spending.. Many NATO members announced, even before the NATO Summit, that they will spend more on defence to secure the territory of Alliance against Russia. According to Croft (2014), "*Poland aims to increase the defence spending to the 2% by the year 2016. Latvia and Lithuania have pledged to reach the 2 percent target by the year 2020. Romania has promised to increase its defence spending gradually until 2016. Czech government has said it aims to reverse the trend of declining defence spending.*"

Second− building of the new strategic military infrastructure in Central Europe and Baltic states (military and logistical bases, joint military exercises). The joint military exercises should, according to Ondrejcsák and Rhodes (2014), strengthen the interoperability of the armed forces of the NATO member states, which will be a crucial challenge for members after the end of the current ISAF mission in Afghanistan, which improved the Allies' armed forces ability to act and fight together significantly to unprecedented level. As an example of the joint military exercise, we can mention the international exercise Ground Pepper, which took place in the training area of the military base Lešť in Slovakia. The aim of this exercise was to "*strengthen the interoperability of the armies, which is one of the most important goals for the Alliance after the Wales Summit*" (Maxim, 2014).

Third – strengthening of the military presence of the Alliance forces on the territory of its eastern members. The Wales Summit Declaration (2014) stated that the measures to strengthen the security of the Alliance will include the "*continuous air, land, and maritime presence and meaningful military activity in the eastern part of the Alliance, both on a rotational basis. They will provide*

the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are flexible and scalable in response to the evolving security situation." Some of these measures were already taken, for example, the "*deployment in March and April of an additional six F-15 fighter jets to the Baltic Air Policing mission; deployment in March of an aviation detachment of 12 F-16s and 300 personnel to Lask Air Base in Poland; deployment of 175 marines to Romania to supplement the Black Sea rotational force, [...], and deployment of 150 paratroopers each to Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia*" (Belkin, 2014).

Fourth – the creation of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force where NATO member states commit to enhance the NATO Response Forces "*by developing force packages that are able to move rapidly and respond to potential challenges and threats.*" The Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) "*will be able to deploy within a few days to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO's periphery*" (Wales Summit Declaration 2014). It is part of the new Readiness Action Plan, which is aimed at strengthening the collective defence of its states.

Fifth – the need for the stronger partnership with states outside of the Alliance. According to Ondrejcsák (2014), NATO "*should strengthen the existing partnerships, start to develop the new ones from Moldavia to Central Asia and to re-launch the enlargement process.*"

Wales Summit (2014) also noted that NATO's doors will stay open "*to all European democracies, which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership…*"NATO member countries also have endorsed the package for Georgia that includes "*defence capability building, training, exercises, strengthened liaison, and enhanced interoperability opportunities.*"

NEW SECURITY THREATS FOR THE ALLIANCE

Alongside the security threats such as – terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber defence and energy security is NATO facing the security threat right in its neighbourhood in Ukraine. The Russian "*invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula changed not only the previous political realities of Eastern Europe, but also the strategic balance that had been there since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union*" (Ondrejcsák, 2014). Ondrejcsák further argues that there are three main areas that Russian invasion to Ukraine has changed: "*the territorial integrity of Ukraine that is considered crucial for the strategic independence of Central Europe; the Russian armed forces will approach Central Europe, mainly due to future Russian air bases in the Crimea; and that the war is no longer "taboo" for Russian foreign policy in enforcing its the power interests in Europe.*" Andrzej Karkoszka, former Deputy Minister of National Defence in Poland, said in his speech at the international conference NATO 2020: Alliance Renewed (2014) that *"Russia is using Russian minorities as tools of influence. We are seeing very visible military build-up in Russia, which is trying to reinstate itself as a superpower."*

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
NATO 2012 Chicago Summit emphasized that "*proliferation threatens our shared vision of creating conditions necessary for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).*" The main tools used by NATO to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, but NATO uses also all conventional measures to prevent the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, such as The Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre; Combined Joint CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) Defence Task Force; Joint Centre of Excellence on CBRN Defence; standardization, training, research and development of the necessary capabilities; or the improvement of civil preparedness. However,

NATO contribution is strengthened by the cooperation with other states or international organizations. "*NATO is committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency, and keeps armaments at the lowest possible level*" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2014).

Cyber defence

Cyber attacks are the new phenomena in security. The 2014 Wales Summit incorporated cyber attacks to the Article 5 of Washington Treaty, but every cyber attack on the NATO member state will be considered individually. Cyber attacks have a potential to pose threats at strategic level and seriously affect both civilian and military infrastructure. Wales Summit established cyber security as "*a part of the Alliance's core task of collective defence.*" NATO has an ambition to develop the capabilities to build effective defence against cyber attacks and to share these capabilities with other NATO member states. In addition, the Alliance has developed NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), which "*protects NATO's own networks by providing centralised and round-the-clock cyber defence support to the various NATO sites. This capability is expected to evolve on a continual basis, to maintain pace with the rapidly changing threat and technology environment*" (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2014).

Energy security

Energy security was introduced to NATO's agenda at the Riga Summit in 2006, recognized as a key element of Alliance's security. "*[T]he disruption of the flow of vital resources could affect Alliance security interests*" (NATO Multimedia Library, n.d.). There were 5 key areas identified, where NATO can provide added value – information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical infrastructure. In addition, NATO commits itself in Strategic Concept 2010 to "*develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners,*

and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning." Energy security can be interpreted in two ways. First, it is the energy security of each member state of the Alliance. And second, it is the energy security of the forces on the battlefield, where they need enough energy to secure their basic needs for successful combat operations (Bátor, 2013).

NATO ENLARGEMENT AND PARTNERSHIP POLICY

Currently, we can define several categories of NATO partnership policies. The first category represents relations with states with NATO membership aspirations (Georgia, for example). To second category encompasses relations with European states without NATO membership aspirations (Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland), while the third category represents NATO global partnerships, which can be sub-divided into individual partnerships with important international actors like Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan and relations with the states within the NATO institutional framework (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Mediterranean Dialogue and Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council).

Partnership for Peace Programme

Despite some of its shortfalls and limited flexibility to adapt to the current situation, The Partnership for Peace programme is still the most important institutional cooperation framework for the Alliance. The role of PfP was also enhanced at the recent Wales Summit: *"Partnership for Peace and Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council are, and will continue to be, a part of our vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace"* (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014, par. 82). In general, one can describe PfP as tool of practical and pragmatic cooperation between NATO and partner states. The PfP allows participating country to choose own priorities of cooperation with NATO (Partnership for Peace Programme, 2014). The programme was launched in 1994.

NATO's PfP programme is closely connected with the Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council. There are two approaches for states' participation in the programme. Participation in the PfP programme could be understood as a pre-accession phase for countries with NATO membership aspiration. In its other role, PfP programme would "serve" as a communication tool for countries like Austria, Finland, Switzerland and Sweden, which wish to intensify relations with NATO, but without current aspirations for membership. However, they do not want to stay on the side lines of the current development and cooperation and see NATO as a means to strengthen their international position and security.

NATO Accession Conditions

According to the Article 51 of the UN Charter *"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations"* (UN Charter, 1945), every state has a right to ensure own security by individual or collective measures. The idea of NATO collective defence is based on this precondition. The Enlargement represents a crucial tool how to spread the area of security and predictability. The question who can be or who cannot be NATO member is defined in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty: "*The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty*" (Washington Treaty, 1949). Thus, the Washington Treaty set up geographical limitations to future members of NATO.

However, there are also other conditions for states aspiring for NATO membership. Democratic principles are crucial for NATO members as well as for future NATO members. As it is stated in the Preamble of the Washington Treaty: "*they are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law"* (Washington Treaty, 1949). Those principles are

also repeated in the "Study on Enlargement," which was published in 1995. This document highlighted democratic political system, market economy, fair minority rights, commitment to peaceful resolution of conflicts as basic preconditions for future members (NATO Enlargement, 2014). Nevertheless, the democratic conditions for NATO membership were not always upheld. In 1949, Salazar s Portugal became a founding member of NATO. The democratic regime of Greece was changed when Greece was a full NATO member and was governed by the military junta at the same time[5] (Barett, 2014). However, we have to understand these exceptions in the context of the Cold War. The democratic principles became a crucial precondition for NATO membership after the Cold War and the level of democratic standards played a crucial role in the inviting of new members to the NATO in 1997. Although Slovakia was originally considered as a "first-line" candidate together with Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, was excluded from the first round of membership because of the lack of domestic democratic standards during the Mečiar government.

First Round of Enlargement

During the Madrid Summit in 1997, NATO launched the first round of enlargement after the Cold War. At that time, the North Atlantic Council invited only three countries: Poland, Czech Republic and Poland, which formally joined NATO in 1999.

Second Round of Enlargement

At the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO invited to the Alliance Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Romania and Slovenia, which became Alliance members in 2004.

Third round of Enlargement

 At the Bucharest Summit, NATO continued in inviting the new members from South-East Europe, which was a signal of the significantly improved

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[5] The Greek military junta was in charge from 1967 to 1975

stability in this region. In 2008, the Alliance invited Albania and Croatia and Macedonia. However, Macedonian accession to NATO was unilaterally blocked by Greece, because of the dispute over the country's constitutional name of Macedonia/FYROM.

Practical process of NATO accession starts with the official political declaration of an aspiring county. Later, the Alliance may set up special partnership framework to facilitate relations with the aspiring candidate. The second step in the process could be the invitation to join the Membership Action Plan (hereafter MAP). *"The MAP is a set of criteria that the country needs to fulfil to show its progress in the military reform process, but also in the general democratic and political development process*" (Cameron, 2008). However, MAP does not guarantee future membership of the participant country in NATO. On the other hand, an invitation to the MAP symbolized strong political message toward candidate country (McNamara, 2008). MAP was launched in 1999 and took into account experiences from the candidate process of newly joined countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (Membership Action Plan, 2014). In its practical dimension, the Membership Action Plan consists of 4 branches: (1) Annual National Plan (ANP), which covers political and economic issues, defence/military issues, resource issues, security issues and legal issues (see below); (2) feedback mechanism, which means Partner Progress Assessment; (3) preparation of domestic institutions for security assistance and (4) establishment of agreed targets (Simon, 2000).

Political and economic issues

Each candidate country has to take responsibility for obligations and commitments which arise from the Washington Treaty. As we noted above, Preamble of the Washington Treaty points out the democratic nature of NATO; MAP´s "political and economic issues" transform those values as a precondition for future membership.[6] From our point of view, the most

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[6] „*Future members must conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty such as democracy, individual liberty and other relevant provisions set out in its Preamble*"(Manifesto of North Atlantic Council, 1999).

important provision of MAP´s political and economic issues relates to territorial and ethnic disputes: *"Aspirants would also be expected to settle ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes including irredentist claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles and to pursue good neighbourly relations"* (Manifesto of North Atlantic Council, 1999). Moreover, states aspiring to NATO membership have to establish appropriate civil control of their armed forces.

Defence and military issues

Defence and military issues are related to the commitment of each member country to contribute to collective defence and to improve own defence capabilities. The nature of this commitment arises from Article III of the Washington Treaty, when each member state is responsible for own defence individually and then collectively.

Resource issues

The main focus of resource issues is on the obligation of each state to allocate sufficient financial resources to the defence budget. Even though the issue of defence spending is the question of the day, we have to note that NATO has no mechanism to push member states to spend more on defence. Customarily, member countries should allocate 2 % of their GDP to the defence spending, which was also mentioned in several communiqués from ministerial meetings or summits. At the recent Wales Summit, NATO countries reaffirmed their commitment to halt the decline in defence expenditures, to increase defence budget as GDP grows, and to move defence expenditures to the 2% of own GDP in order meet NATO Capability Targets (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014).

Security and legal issues

Security and legal issues focus on the capacity of a candidate state to protect intelligence information, which is shared between NATO member states. Legal issues address the capability of a candidate state to cope with the NATO legal

framework. After the accession to NATO, new member country is obliged to adopt NATO acquis, which consists of several international treaties as well as technical arrangements; for instance the Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the status of their forces (London SOFA) (London, 19th June 1951), the Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters set up pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty (Paris Protocol) (Paris, 28th August 1952), the Agreement on the Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, National Representatives and International Staff (Ottawa Agreement) (Ottawa, 20th September 1951), the Agreement on the status of

Missions and Representatives of third States to the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (Brussels Agreement) (Brussels, 14th September 1994). At the time of this writing, there are 4 states with NATO membership aspirations, but only two of them were invited to the Membership Action Plan.

POTENTIAL MEMBER STATES

Montenegro

Montenegro joined the Partnership for Peace in 2006, shortly after the declaration of independence from Serbia. In 2009, NATO invited Montenegro to join the Membership Action Plan. At the Chicago Summit, the Allied Head of States announced that NATO is committed to maintaining stability of the strategically important Balkan region (Chicago Summit Declaration, 2012) which —together with supportive political signals — created a "strategic momentum" for Montenegro to be a partner country with most serious chances to become a NATO member. The Montenegrin government fulfilled almost every requirement with certain reserves (Šolaja, 2013).[7] One of the key challenges for the Montenegrin leadership is the public support for membership, which is a sine qua non for any serious aspiration to join the Alliance. According to public surveys of the Centre for Democracy and

[7] There are problems with reform of intelligence services and Security Sector Reform (Šolaja, 2013)

Human Rights (CEDEM) 44.5% of Montenegrin citizens are against the country's membership (Policy Association for an Open Society, 2014). [8]

Macedonia/Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

Macedonia joined the Membership Action plan in 1999 (NATO-FYROM relations, 2014). Formally, the country fulfils all criteria for entering NATO, but the Macedonian government has to settle the dispute regarding the constitutional name with Greece (NATO- FYROM relations, 2014). The Greeks point out that this dispute is not about the "name," but about the territorial integrity of the Hellenic Republic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hellenic Republic, 2014). At the Bucharest Summit in 2008, Greece had blocked Macedonia's NATO membership.

Georgia

NATO-Georgia relations have officially commenced in 1994, when Georgia jointed the Partnership for Peace programme. Since that time, the relations have progressively intensified *"Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is one of the top foreign and security policy priorities of Georgia"* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 2014). Moreover, the political declarations are followed by very high public support for NATO membership. According to the opinion polls by National Democratic Institute Public more than 72% of the public supports Georgian government´s goal to join NATO (NDI, 2014).[9] Political will and public support are clear evidence of Georgian intention to become a full-fledged NATO member. These important aspects are also followed by practical steps in favour of NATO accession. One of the clearest commitments is the country's participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, where Georgia represented the biggest non-NATO contributor of troops (together with Australia) to the ISAF mission. On May 2014, more than 1570 Georgian soldiers were deployed, mainly to the Helmand province operating with US contingent (Rubin, 2013).

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[8] The public opinion survey was conducted in September 2014.
[9] Public Survey was conducted in August 2014.

The political watershed for Georgian membership aspirations was the Bucharest Summit in 2008. *"NATO welcomes Ukraine's and Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO"* (Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008, par. 23). However, the Bucharest Summit Declaration did not set up any clear date or roadmap to the membership (Bucharest Summit Declaration, 2008). The Membership Action Plan was not granted to Georgia (and Ukraine) due to French and German positions (Enlarger, 2008). Those countries stressed that Georgia and Ukraine were not prepared enough at that time (Enlarger & Lee Myers, 2008), but we cannot exclude the so-called Russian-factor in considerations of key European NATO-members.

As a reaction to the Russian invasion to Northern regions of Georgia in August 2008, the Alliance established NATO-Georgia Commission as a forum for deeper consultations (Bátor, 2013). Despite strong political message which the Membership Action Plan for Georgia would bring, there are some opinions that Georgia technically did not need the MAP. "*What Georgia needs, more than any membership plan, is actual membership in the alliance, buttressed by bilateral security guarantees provided by the United States*" (Joseph and Tsereteli, 2014). What's more, Edward Joseph pointed out that the interoperability of Georgian troops and the level of political reforms reach the point, where is no need to do mid step through Membership Action Plan (Joseph and Tsereteli, 2014). There are also other factors in favour of future Georgian membership in NATO. First one, there is a strong commitment of the United States towards Georgian NATO´s perspective; Second, Georgia is crucial in terms of the geopolitics of the entire South Caucasus; and last, but not least, as we noted above, there is a strong Georgian political commitment and public support for integration and Euro-Atlantic orientation (Ondrejcsák, 2012). However, despite the above- mentioned facts in favour of Georgian membership, the Wales Summit Declaration only repeated commitment to future Georgian membership without any exact date. *"At the 2008 Bucharest Summit we agreed that Georgia will became a member of NATO and we*

reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions" (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014).

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The aspiration of Bosnia and Herzegovina to NATO membership should be understood in the broader perspective of the Western Balkan stabilization. The candidate status to NATO (and to the European Union) advances the requested reforms, which could potentially stabilize the domestic political situation. The internal constellation of Bosnia Herzegovina makes the reform effort harder and only external motivation (integration to the Euro-Atlantic structures) can effectively overcome the domestic political deadlock. In general, the integration of all Western Balkan countries is considered as a last step to enduring stability in this region. NATO formally invited Bosnia and Herzegovina to join the MAP but, the first Annual National Programme under the MAP will be accepted only if B&H authorities will resolve the issue with immovable defence property.

NATO GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS

NATO has developed complex systems of relations with key international players, mainly with international organizations and states outside Europe. However, partnership building is a complex and never-ending process. Partnership policy serves as a tool to reach NATO´s strategic objectives, with the stated objectives as follows: "*Enhance Euro-Atlantic and international security peace and stability; promote regional security; facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest; prepare eligible nations for NATO membership; Promote democratic values and reforms; enhance support for NATO-led operations and missions*" (Marônková 2012: 145). Beside the Partnership for Peace programme, there are three multilateral cooperation frameworks - The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, which create the institutional framework for discussions between NATO and partners.

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

EAPC is the successor of North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which had transformed itself to the new form in 1997. Currently, EAPC encompasses 50 countries around the world.[10] EAPC has served as a forum for dialogue and consultations among all the involved states. Technically, EAPC has set up a two year action plan focusing on pre-agreed political and security related topics (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 2006). EAPC is one of the crucial tools, which represents NATO's global role in international affairs.

The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)

Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in 1994 as a consultation forum, which now includes countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, namely Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. As in the previous case, MD has two dimensions of cooperation: one of these is political dialogue, which represents regular meetings between representative of NATO and participating states. Practical cooperation includes transfer of know- how through educational programmes. Participating countries can also join common military exercises in the Mediterranean area.

The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)

ICI represents NATO's needs to bilaterally enhance relations with the Gulf countries, as this region has the strategic importance and is still considered a place of future tensions. The ICI was created to strengthen the confidence among partners on the North-South Axis (Borgomano-Loup, 2005). At the time of this writing there are four cooperating countries (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates) and two countries, Saudi Arabia and Oman, are considering their deeper involvement. The relevance of this initiative was demonstrated during the Libyan crisis when Qatar and United Arab Emirates had actively participated in the Unified Protector operation with own Air Forces. Qatar deployed six Mirage 2000 fighters plus two C-17 Globemaster transport aircrafts. The United Arab Emirates contributed with six F-16

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[10] Including 28 NATO member states

aircrafts. Both states used mainly Greek base of Souda on Crete for launching missions (Gertler, 2011). The involvement of the Arab countries in combat mission against Libya increased the legitimacy of the whole mission and thus the operation Unified Protector got broader geographical and geopolitical dimension and could not be understood as a purely NATO operation.

Global Partners

Relations of NATO with countries like Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan have several strategic dimensions. The first dimension could be the participation of those countries in NATO-led missions. The second dimension encompasses common commitment to democratic principles, i.e. the same value system that ensures a greater likelihood for common positions in the event of an international crisis. Those countries and NATO member countries do not share only common democratic principles but also specific threats like international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Australia

As the former Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen declared in 2012 *"Australia and NATO share the same commitment to freedom, democracy and human rights"* (Rasmussen, 2012). Australia contributed to the NATO-led mission ISAF for more than decade (Marônková, n. d.). In addition to that, Australia-NATO partnership has institutional framework based on the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, which was signed on February, 2014. This document sets up main areas of cooperation like enhancing interoperability, combating maritime piracy, exchange of cyber issues, addressing global threats and others (Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, 2013) Beside this, Australia has been developing close relations with individual NATO members *"In addition to the close partner relations with NATO countries of Britain, the United States and Canada, Australia has developed remarkably close ties with France – particularly French forces based in New Caledonia. Similarly, with Portugal*

having close and strong ties with East Timor Australia has had cause to work closely alongside Portuguese forces as well" (Blaxland, 2014).

New Zealand

Relations between New Zealand and NATO are of similar nature as relations with Australia. New Zealand signed its own Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme with NATO in 2012. The main aim of this accord is strengthening interoperability in the NATO-led operations, promoting security in the Euro-Atlantic and Asia- Pacific relations and promoting democratic values (Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme, 2012).

South Korea and Japan

Relations between NATO and South Korea and Japan have the shared objective of addressing global security challenges. Beside this, South Korea and Japan are also contributing with financial and development aid to the NATO- led operations. For instance, Japan is one of the biggest financial aid contributors to Afghanistan (Poole, 2011).

CONCLUSION

Current engagement of NATO in the international crisis management operations demonstrated the Alliance s important role in addressing the global security challenges. NATO and its members were involved in the Alliance's mission in Afghanistan since 2001 which came to an end in 2014, in the KFOR mission in Kosovo. In addition The Alliance has staged two maritime missions in the Mediterranean Sea (Active Endeavour) and spearheaded the antipiracy mission Ocean Shield in the Gulf of Aden. What's more, the crisis in Eastern Europe underlined NATO's principal role − the collective defence of NATO member countries. However, the Eastern Europe crisis does not mean that previous threats have disappeared. NATO is still facing threats such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD or rogue states. This situation would lead to double-hatted role for the organization. On the one hand, NATO will

put emphasis on its principal role as a guarantor of territorial integrity of its own members; on the other it has to face other unconventional threats outside of the European and North Atlantic territory. For instance, NATO has to extend the provisions of Article V to unconventional threats, such as cyber attacks or attacks of non-state actors. In addition, NATO has to maintain the "Open Door Policy" for the states with membership aspirations to continue the enlargement policy. These commitments help the organization to continue to be a reliable partner for other states and international actors.

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SECURITY STRATEGIES AND STRATEGIC DOCUMENTS OF KEY GLOBAL ACTORS (THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, RUSSIA)

Robert Ondrejcsák - Lucia Husenicová - Barbora Padrtová

The main ambition of this chapter is to present and analyze the most important strategic documents of the most decisive state actors on a global scale. The United States, China and Russia were chosen as countries to analyze, given their global ambitions, global or multi-regional vision about their status and mission, as well as significant political, economic and military potential. On the other hand it is clear that the position of the United States is unique, which puts it in a category all its own (also to an extent the dedicated US documents counts on this fact), and China and Russia can be considered as regional players with simultaneous presence in several strategic regions (South Caucasus, Central Asia, South-East Asia and Asia-Pacific). The regional specifics of the South Caucasus were also kept in mind while defining the most important players, a region where these three actors are carrying out the most significant political, economic and military influence and presence.

Each chapter presents an overall framework about security strategies and strategic documents of a particular country, with a n aim to give an answer to what kind of documents they have, what is their hierarchy, and, if necessary, to draw up the historical framework. Then we analyze the most recent military/ defense document, with particular focus on the ideological background, self-definition (global or regional power, status quo power or „challenger", etc.). In addition, special attention was paid to analyzing the security and strategic interests and tools for their realization, the actors' main allies and potential adversaries or strategic competitors. We also looked at the regional specifics, the use of armed forces (circumstances, visions), as well as specific topics (for example nuclear forces).

THE UNITED STATES

In the American strategic discourse there are two major defense and military related documents issued on a regular basis, with rare exemptions, in four-year-cycles. First, at the strategic level, there is the National Security Strategy, signed by the President. It could be considered as a "Grand Strategy," which defines the strategic direction and framework for foreign and security policy of the United States. Second, at the level of applied policies, for Department of Defense and Armed Forces, there is the Quadrennial Defense Review, signed by Secretary of Defense. On ad-hoc basis , other security and/or defense related documents are also issued, such as the Defense Strategic Guidance from 2012 being perhaps the most prominent recent example.

The National Security Strategy 2002 and the "Bush Doctrine"

In analyzing the most relevant National Security Strategies, it is necessary to start with the NSS 2002 issued by the administration of President George W. Bush. The Strategy represented a watershed moment in post-Cold-War American strategic thinking and set-up a basic framework of American security policy for the Bush era (as a cornerstone of the "Bush-doctrine") with significant influence for years to come. Its relevance is supported by its continued influence on the current strategic realities in key regions, including the broader Middle East. However, President G. Bush has also issued an additional National Security Strategy in 2006, s document that de facto confirmed the basic principles of the NSS 2002, with certain modifications, including stronger emphasis on democratization and transition, as well as multilateral approach, without changing the basic paradigm defined four years ago. The National Security Strategy from 2002 was based on recommendations of leading neoconservative experts, published as a Defense Planning Guidance, under the leadership of Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense, in 1992. The above-mentioned document and the key principles it contained thus created the framework of the NSS 2002, making it its ideological and strategic predecessor and source.

The cornerstones of the 2002 Strategy are the self-identification of the United States, its vision for the Word and a strong will to exercise that vision at a global scale. The USA was identified as a power which "possesses unprecedented−and unequaled−strength and influence in the world" (NSS, 2002, p. 1), a global power with second to none capabilities and influence. The documents define undoubtedly the country's ambition to be a global "normative power," and a champion defending certain universal standards: "the United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere" (NSS, 2002, p. 3). The Strategy creates direct linkage between the security of the United States and its allies and the global transformation and transition of authoritarian regimes and so-called "rogue states." From that point of view the basic strategic objective of the United States is to create "safer word" by transition of certain regimes, which has become known as a doctrine of "regime change." Those principles were already defined during President Bush´s speech at West Point in June 1, 2002 when he described the basic goals of American strategy and policies as follows:

- To defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants

- To preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers (a strictly realistic approach that puts emphasis on great power relations – a note by the author)

- To extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent" (White House 2002).

The "Grand Strategy" of the Bush administration was de facto a combination of the "USA as a status quo power" globally and the "USA as a transitional power" regionally, with focus on the broader Middle East. Globally, the most important strategic goal of the USA was to preserve its position as a sole superpower and to prevent emergence of competing regional power able to potentially threaten or challenge American primacy. Regionally, in the Middle East, the USA was engaged in a broad transition endeavor which challenged

both the domestic status quo of particular countries, as well as the regional balance of power. The latter was also supported by large-scale and long-term military engagement in Iraq, 2003, as the most notable example).

The most important tools were defined in the Strategy were regime-change, pre-emptive strikes and active counter-proliferation measures. What's more NSS 2002 declares that in post-Cold-War security environment the traditional concepts of deterrence don't apply, especially in case of rogue states and terrorist groups, which the USA cannot deter by traditional means. It generated a need for a new approach. If the risk from inaction is greater than from action, the USA will act pre-emptively (NSS, 2002, p. 15): "we cannot let our enemies strike first." Those actions could – in necessary cases – include unilateral military actions, if other solutions will be ineffective or impossible: "While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country" (NSS, 2002, p. 6).

The National Security Strategy 2010 and the "Obama Doctrine"

One of the crucial strategic objectives of the NSS 2010 is "to be different" from security strategies adopted by Bush governments because the "change" itself was considered a "game changer." "It is a rather dramatic departure from the previous national security strategy," said about the document Susan E. Rice, former US ambassador to the United Nations, one of the key national security personalities of the Obama-team (The New York Times 2010).

It was in accordance with the ambition of the newly elected US President Barack Obama to change the perception of the United States by setting himself and his administration apart from the previous one. It means that the Obama team's emphasis on "change" and alternative foreign policy was driven not only by identity and philosophy and traditions of the Democratic Party, but

also by cold strategic calculations. The general decline of America's prestige and appeal in the word during the Bush era had serious consequences and impact on America's soft-power. In order to re-establish this power in all its complexity, Obama appears to have concluded that the U.S. must first renew its focus on soft-power (Ondrejcsák 2012). This is why "change" carries a strategic importance (though Obama mainly uses it to denote a break with the "past"). For President Obama and his team, change is strategy because of its potential to improve American foreign policy potential in a positive way (Ondrejcsák 2012). As stated in Cairo in 2009, the "9/11 trauma led us to act contrary to our traditions and our ideals, we are taking concrete actions to change the course. I have unequivocally prohibited the use of torture … and I have ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay to be closed by early next year" (Obama 2009), which – by the way – was not fulfilled so far. On the other hand one has to note that this strategy showed very serious limits and limited successes in several regions, including the Middle East or Eastern Europe, especially in dealing with Russia.

The second guiding principle of the National Security Strategy 2010 is based on Jeffersonian tradition of American foreign policy based on "building strong America at home" (Mead 2002): "Our strategy starts by recognizing that our strength and influence abroad begins with the steps we take at home. We must grow our economy and reduce our deficit" (NSS, 2010). "Our national security begins at home... we must renew the foundation of America's strength" (NSS, 2010, p. 9). However, it does not mean that the USA under the Obama administration has moved towards strictly defined isolationistic positions. As Barack Obama presented (before his first election) in Foreign Policy article (July/August 2007) "Renewing American Leadership," the security and wealth of Americans are strongly connected with security and wealth of people living beyond the borders of the United States of America (Obama 2007). By emphasizing the legacy of F.D. Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy, Obama described his basic foreign and security policy philosophy in a classic Wilsonian way. The balance between "rebuilding America at

home" and connecting American security to security and well-being of the
rest of the World was present during President Obama´s policies during both
of his terms in office, which sometimes created tensions between goals and
the applied tools.

One of the key elements of the Obama doctrine is the perception of the use
of American military force. While during the Bush administrations the armed
forces were engaged in overall "transformational agenda" of the United
States, especially in the broader Middle East, Obama set serious limits in that
regard. In contrast to emphasizing "transformation by force" by the previous
administration, the Obama administration espoused an extremely reluctant
approach towards engaging American military forces abroad. As the National
Security Strategy 2010 declares "We will draw on diplomacy, development,
and international norms and institutions to help resolve disagreements, prevent
conflict, and maintain peace, mitigating where possible the need for the use of
force. … While the use of force is sometimes necessary, we will exhaust other
options before war whenever we can, and carefully weigh the costs and risks
of action against the costs and risks of inaction. When force is necessary, we
will continue to do so in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our
legitimacy, and we will seek broad international support, working with such
institutions as NATO and the U.N. Security Council" (NSS 2010, p. 22). The
very strong emphasis on international legitimacy and support in combination
with inherited reluctance to use of force created a situation where the United
States was not engaged militarily even if it lead to diplomatic reversals and
resentment of its regional allies (Syria 2012-2013) or where the USA were
asked by allies ("leading from behind" approach applied in Libya in 2011)
(NATO 2011).

The Obama administration also significantly changed how the United States
addresses the challenge/threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The Bush governments were focusing on active (even military) engagement
in order to counter nuclear proliferation, especially in case of so-called "rogue

states" and to reduce the imminent or potential threats to the US and allied security. The Obama administration defined more ambitious (and perhaps unrealistic) goals: to create a Word free from nuclear weapons (Obama 2009). That ambition was confirmed by the National Security Strategy 2010. One of the key strategic endeavors of the USA will be to "pursue the Goal of a World Without Nuclear Weapons" (NSS 2010, p. 23). As a decisive tools how to reach that long-term goal the global international treaties (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) and bilateral arms reduction treaties (START with Russia) were presented. However, serious criticism over this initiative ensued, especially from the realist point of view. Moreover, the current developments in relations with Russia, after the occupation of Crimea and Russian military engagement in Ukraine, made achieving of that goal even more complicated.

Defense Strategic Guidance from 2010 and the US "rebalancing" towards Asia

 Even though the 2010 Defense Strategic Guidance is relatively lower in the hierarchy of strategic documents, especially in comparison with the "Grand Strategy", or the National Security Strategy; in this very specific case its importance is immense because of the historic context. It is widely perceived as a central document of so-called "pivot" or "rebalancing" towards Asia-Pacific. However, the documents themselves do not mark the beginning of turning of the US attention towards Asia-Pacific, the most important driving forces and reason of this change started to emerge at least 2-3 decades ago (Ondrejcsák 2012). The Obama administration´s steps toward the Pacific and East Asia are to a large extent based on changes initiated or realized by previous administrations, particularly that of G.W. Bush (especially the shift of deployment of armed forces to the Asia-Pacific theatre launched by former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld). From that point of view Obama´s "Pacific shift" is a combination of both continuity and new elements based on long-term historical/strategic trends. Thus, on the whole, there is more evolution than revolution (Ondrejcsák 2012).

The basic strategic calculus behind the "rebalancing" is declared in the Defense Strategic Guidance: "U.S. economic and security interests are inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia, creating a mix of evolving challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, while the U.S. military will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region" (Priorities 2012, pp.2). Former US Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta confirmed this during his speech at Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore (June 2012) where he clarified the goals and objectives as of January 2012: "We have made choices and we have set priorities (in era of financial austerity and declining defense budget –author's note), and we have rightly chosen to make this region a priority" (Panetta 2012). It means that while almost in every region of the World the USA military presence will be reduced, the Asian-Pacific theatre will be one of the very rare examples where the US military presence will be strengthened.

The central part of that development is how the United States as the normative status quo power will handle the rise of potential challenger, China. The Defense Strategy 2012 declares: "Over the long term, China's emergence as a regional power will have the potential to affect the U.S. economy and our security in a variety of ways" (Priorities 2012, pp. 2). The US long-term approach was declared clearly, while China is not mentioned per se, nobody is questioning who is the subject of the strategic calculations when it is declared that "The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure that we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations and with international law… Working closely with our network of allies and partners, we will continue to promote a rules-based international order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism, and constructive defense cooperation" (Priorities 2012, pp. 2). Moreover, the aim to "project power despite anti-access/area denial challenges" is among the primary missions of US forces, as outlined in the Strategy (Priorities 2012, pp. 4). On the

other hand, similar declarations, mainly with focus on Chinese anti-access capabilities and securing American freedom of action were treated several times in previous administrations' documents, including Obama´s including the Quadrennial Defense Reviews.

CHINA

The People's Republic of China is undoubtedly becoming an important player in international relations. The unprecedented economic growth China has experienced since the economic opening in 1978 led to the increased presence and importance of the country for regional and global development. Naturally, growing China is seen with suspicions from the existing powers, it is perceived as an important partner and a possible threat at the same time, especially by the United States. Understanding of Chinese intentions and perceptions of reality of international relations and its own position is therefore crucial.

Concerning the Chinese security strategy, there are two main sources analysts are using in order to understand and predict moves of the rising power. First of all there are the official documents published bi-annually since the mid-1990s currently available from the website of the Ministry of National Defence. Second source are analyses on Chinese history, strategic culture and traditions which aim to better understand the rationale behind contemporary foreign and security policy.

As for the latter, Chinese security strategy is often explained as a combination of Confucian tradition, which goes over two thousand years back, with the experiences China has from the century of humiliation that has ended in 1949 and the following purely pragmatic approach of the Maoist era. Based on these principles Andrew Scobell describes what he calls the *Cult of Defence* that dominates Chinese strategic culture. The *Cult* consists of the Confucian tradition based on harmony and Sun Tzu's concept of wining war without

force, and the perception and interpretation of all wars China has ever fought as purely defensive in their nature (Scobell, 2002).

The first source, the so-called White Papers on National Security, are published bi-annually since 1998. In general all the documents have had comparable structure addressing the security environment in general, possible threats to China on national, regional and global level, state of development of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and its modernization and military expenditures. In this regard, the eight document stands out. It was published in April 2013 and is considered as a strategy of 2012. It differs in several ways. First of all, the title is *The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces* while the previous ones were only dubbed the white paper. Secondly it is much briefer when analysing the overall security environment as any of the previous documents. It lacks the above-mentioned distinction of three levels of security and threat. Most of the text is dedicated to rather detailed description of PLA activities in different areas, in different parts of the world not only in China. Thirdly, for the first time the document does not touch on the issue of the military expenditures at all.

The whole document focuses on the role of the People's Liberation Army, People's Armed Police Forces and militia in China. What is important, the acronym PLA is used for the following forces: PLA Army, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force and PLA Second Artillery Forces. From among these, the Second Artillery is a unit of strategic deterrence composed of nuclear and missile forces with the aim to prevent a nuclear attack on China, and conduct conventional precision strike when necessary. This unit, along with the others is undergoing a modernization and "informatization." Based on the latest document, the PLA consists of approximately 1.5 million troops. The number of troops is not disclosed in the case of the Second Artillery. As for the Police Forces, they conduct activities common for any police force in any other state in peacetime and are expected to participate in defence operations assisting PLA in wartime. The Militia are taking part in the modernization campaigns

and support different defensive operations as well as "emergency and rescue and disaster relief operations" (The Diversified Employment… 2013).

Role of armed forces

Article I of the latest document defines the key areas of army's activities:

1. To safeguard national sovereignty, territorial integrity and further peaceful development of the country
2. To prepare to win local wars under the conditions of informatization
3. Provide comprehensive security – ability of the armed forces to adapt to new security threats, their active participation in preserving internal security and social stability as well as taking part in disaster relief operations
4. To deepen cooperation on the international level through conducting of international exercises and workshops as well as participating in different missions

Based on the document, the role of the armed forces is divided into three sections. The defence of national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity, which is sub-divided further into safeguarding borders and coastlines, which is ascribed to the PLA Army and Navy; the protection of air space, which is defined as the responsibility of the PLA Air Force. At the same time all forces are required to maintain combat readiness at different levels. They conduct drills and exercised on a regular basis. One chapter in the document is devoted to the role of the armed forces, the PLA and Police Forces in the support of national economic and social development. They take part in the realization of plans of economic development, mainly on the provincial level, as well as provide sources, personnel, equipment and technology for different projects in infrastructure, environmental protection, rural development and other areas. In addition, they participate in disaster relief missions for which they have their own specific regulations adopted in 2005. Basically, they have a role as active participants in any crisis China can face from natural

disasters to epidemics. The other area of their activity is maintenance of social stability, through anti-terrorist activities. They also provide security at a range of events even on the international scale that are taking place in China. What is specifically stressed in the document is the role of armed forces in safeguarding the maritime rights and interests of PRC where the Navy supports the "maritime law enforcement, fisheries, and gas and oil exploitation" (The Diversified Employment... 2013).

A special section of the document covers activities of the armed forces and their participation in different UN missions, as well as a range of drills and exercises in the region.

Strategy of "active defence"

Regarding the military strategy of the PLA, the concept of the "active defence" introduced by Mao Zedong is still considered as the most important for the strategy. Although the explanation of the meaning of the concept differs, in general we can understand it as China's preparedness to counter-attack and if necessary, for the purpose of defence, to conduct a pre-emptive action.

Chinese self-perception

In the documents and speeches delivered by the country's political representatives China is very careful in presenting itself as a growing power, whether it's in the military or traditional realist sense. However the latest document contains a statement of Chinese awareness of its position in the world. China presents itself as a country with dramatic growth in its national strength and improvement of life of its citizens. China also admits the increasing influence the country has in the international area but at the same time it acknowledges the security threats it still faces.

In most of the documents China calls for peaceful development in international relations on global as well as regional level. The main argument is that in order to secure further national development China needs and seeks peaceful

relations with its neighbours as well as other countries. As it is aware of the impact of the economic interdependence and its own dependence on foreign investors and markets, China regularly stresses its peaceful intentions and peaceful traditions of its foreign policy.

Regardless of the content of the documents published, China has adopted more assertive foreign policy, especially concerning her interests in South China Sea and the West China Sea. Even if it was not clearly and straightforwardly stated, China has started to behave as a regional power, with regional interests, which it is ready to protect if necessary.

National Interests and Security Threats
Based on every accessible White Paper, China defines its security and national interests based on the analysis of security environment on three levels – national, regional and global. As for the first level, the main aim of China and its armed forces is to safeguard its unity, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. These are threatened by three risks – terrorism, separatism and extremism. In this regard when we look at the last three official documents, the one from 2008 clearly states that Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang are territories that pose a threat to above-mentioned aim. The 2010 document omits Tibet from the list, while the 2012 document even leaves out Xinjiang. Paradoxically, the security situation in China has worsened in connection with the situation in the most remote Western province with all recent attacks on Central authorities identified as terrorist attacks conducted by Uighur separatists.

At the same time natural disasters, security accidents and public health are stated as affecting social harmony in the country.

The situation on the regional level is in general evaluated positively. China emphasizes the economic importance of the region and development in inter-regional relations in recent years. The 2010 document mentions the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, ASEAN, ARF and ASEAN+ formats

as contributing to a significant institutionalization of relations. At the same time China is assessing possible threats to the overall security environment. The 2010 document mentions the situation on the Korean peninsula as well as the US military alliances as rather disruptive factors. The last document pays more attention to the troubled situation brought about by the demands of Japan concerning Diaoyu islands[11] and also touches upon the strengthening of military presence of "some power," not addressing the US openly.

On the global level, China is aware of the situation caused by the economic crisis, the omnipresent "power competition, signs of hegemony, and interventionism." What is quite striking when we look at the latest document is that the analysis of the security environment on all three levels is shorter and briefer, especially in comparison to the previous documents. The document mentions only selected issues as mentioned-above, even though it is highly unlikely that the threats mentioned in the previous documents have been suppressed or have disappeared. It seems that Chinese authorities have opted for stating only several of the problems; however the process of this selection seems somewhat uneven, especially given that the most imminent threat at the national level represented by Xinjiang is completely omitted, while the Taiwan and cross-strait relations are addressed regardless of the positive development in mutual relations in the last couple of years.

With regards to possible allies and partners, China does not state any specific entity that would be in any way close to it or that would share interests with it. From its presentation since the mid1950s, China tries to project its image of a responsible country, recently as a responsible power that adheres to The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. In its foreign policy endeavours, especially in its relations with Africa, China stresses the importance of non-interference in the political situation in any country. This seems to be an approach adopted due to historical experience as well as for purely pragmatic reasons of requiring the same approach from others.

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[11] Japan uses the name Senkaku Islands

RUSSIA

Brief historical overview of strategic documents

Russia´s key strategic documents in last decade were adopted during the first year of Vladimir Putin´s Presidency, in 2000. The key drivers of Russian security policy during the era of V. Putin are based on the main characteristics of the strategic documents, i.e. "National Security Concept of the Russian Federation (2000)", "Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2000)" and "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (2000)." In terms of strategic and security culture, these three key documents share a number of features - shift to multilateralism (preference for multilateralism instead of unilateralism, Russia´s desire to create a multipolar world), greater emphasis on internal and external threats to national security and the possibility of using nuclear deterrence, which represent features hinting at a shift toward militarism, but Russia – according to declarations made in the above-mentioned documents – prefers non-military means to resolve political and prevent any military conflict (which is in clear contradiction with concrete Russian steps during 2014 in Ukraine). According to documents' definition, a serious threat to multipolar world is posed by intentions of Western countries, led by the United States, who advocate unilateral policies and try to weaken existing security assurance mechanisms such as the UN and OSCE, which may in turn *"destabilize the international situation and cause international tensions"* (NSS 2000). Besides international terrorism and proliferation of WMD, documents from the beginning of 2000´s indirectly allude to the *conduct of use-of-force operations outside of the zone of application of the Washington Treaty without the sanction of the UN Security Council,* as a threat to national security and furthermore the establishment of military bases and NATO enlargement towards the Russian borders. *Russia retains its negative attitude towards the expansion of NATO* (NSS 2000). Russia preserves the right to *use of nuclear force as an instrument of defence against the military aggression towards Russia and its allies in the situation when all other instruments fail* (NSS 2000). This approach clearly lowers the threshold of using nuclear forces.

Strategic and security culture of the Russian Federation during President V. Putin´s electoral period 2000-2008 was marked by four characteristics - the enforcement of multilateralism, exaggerating threats to national security and emphasizing the possibility of use of nuclear deterrence. A specific element of Russian security culture was the use of "energy weapon" as a political tool, as witnessed in 2008 and 2009, as well as at time of this writing (2014) with relevance to Ukraine.

While during Putin´s era, NATO was considered a threat indirectly, later documents (including the most recent one, the "Military Doctrine 2010"), adopted during his presidential successor, Dmitry Medvedev, are more concrete in naming *enlargement of NATO as a direct "military danger" to Russia´s security* (Doctrine 2010).[12]

During President Medvedev´s era, similarly as during Vladimir Putin´s first two presidential terms, three strategic documents were adopted, namely the "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (2008)," "National Security Strategy of Russian Federation until 2020 (2009)" and "Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2010)" (SCRF 2010).

The *Concept* is to a large extent identical to the previous Concept from 2000 - it declares the ambition of strengthening the Russian role in international relations and sets up a goal to increase the "positive perception" of Russia as a "democratic state with socially oriented market economy and independent foreign policy" (Eichler,2013). The *Concept* again underlines Russia´s disagreement to the unilateral steps, which according to this document, *destabilize international relations and ignore the international law* (Concept 2008). As an example of unilateral steps the *Concept* defines *the missile defence proposed by the United States in Central Europe (Poland and Czech Republic). In addition,* Russia maintains its objection *to NATO enlargements*

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[12] While the Western (European and American) strategic thinking is usually using "challenges" and "threats" the Russian discourse is focusing on „military danger– *voennaja opasnost*" and "military threat – *voennaja ugroza*".

"towards its borders" and especially in regard to Ukraine and Georgia (Concept 2008).

Almost immediately after the end of Russia-Georgian war in August 2008, President Medvedev introduced to the Russian media five principles of Russian foreign and security policy, the so-called "Medvedev doctrine" (BBC 2008). The first point focuses on the acceptance and compliance of international law (which did not apply in case of annexation of Crimea in 2014). The second point highlights the importance of the multipolar world (which, in theory requires at least comparable "poles" which is not the case). According to third point, Russia wants to avoid any military confrontation with other countries and Moscow would like to have good relations with Europe and the US (which, again, did not apply when Moscow launched military operations against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014). This is – from Russian perspective – dependent not only on the behaviour of RF as such, but also on the others' approach towards Russia. Fourth point, RF will be protecting the interests of Russians, living anywhere (Baltic states or Ukraine). This guarantees the doctrinal basis for potential intervention in these countries, if Russia considers it necessary. Fifth point, Moscow has the eminent interest in territories of former Soviet Union and friendly relations with its successor states. The interference of any other state in these regions would be considered as a threat to "privileged interests" of Russian Federation (BBC 2008).

For the overall strategy, two of five points are crucial: preservation of the right to protect ethnic Russians in "near abroad" as well as de facto requiring a "sphere of exclusive influence" in post-Soviet space by trying to minimize strategic presence of other players there. These two factors create tensions not only with countries of post-Soviet-space, but automatically generate tension with European states as well as the United States. First, the ambition to protect ethnic Russians abroad also by military means (as witnessed in Crimea) is in contradiction with principles of international law and the West also refuses the existence of exclusive spheres of influence. Because of that,

it can be considered as one of the key roots of the current conflict among Russia, EU and the United States.

"National Security Strategy of Russian Federation until 2020 (2009)"

A key recent document of Russian security thinking is the "National Security Strategy of Russian Federation until 2020" (hereafter *Strategy*), approved by President Dmitri Medvedev on May 12, 2009. This document replaced the security concept from 1997 (modified in 2000), thus reflecting Russia's evolved security environment. The *Strategy* also influences the preparation and approval of other important documents, such as "Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" and "Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation," thus becoming the overarching strategic document for internal and external security of RF. The *Strategy* depicts a complex picture of Russia's security situation.

In 6 chapters, it describes trends of global security environment and defines Russia's national interests and strategic priorities. *Strategy* defines the *protection of constitutional rights and freedoms of RF citizens, stable socio-economic development, and the protection of the country's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity* as the main strategic national priority for Russia's national security (NSS 2009). *The main components of the provision of national security consist of the maintenance of legal and institutional mechanisms, and likewise of the resources of the state and society* (NSS 2009). The economic security penetrates several parts of the document and its influence on the other security issues is emphasized. However, the National Defence remains very important (if not the most important) issue with emphasis on the strategic deterrence and new face of RF Armed Forces (Nečej 2009).

In comparison with previous documents, much less attention is devoted to hard security threats. The document goes far beyond the classical definition of national security with a predominantly military approach. The *Strategy* identifies threats and challenges within a broadly defined concept of security

(e.g. "Improvement of living standards, "Economic growth", "Research, technologies and education") (Zysk 2009). On one hand, it demonstrates continuity of numerous characteristics of Russian security policy during president Putin's term in office. On the other hand, in some ways it also shows the differences and evolution of security thinking. Compared to previous concepts, *Strategy 2009* is characterized by greater optimism and confidence, as reflected in the absence of ideas about encirclement of RF by other global competitors.

In regard to national interests, *Strategy* identifies as a main priority for national security the *protection of state and its citizens, but also the need to improve the living standards of Russian citizens and increase economic growth*. The social-economic development is just as important as military security. The dependence of the Russian economy on exports of raw materials has been recognized as a threat, together with foreign involvement in the national economy (NSS 2009).

Another priority interest defined in the document is the protection of Russians living in the so-called "near abroad." *Strategy* points at failure of the current global and regional security architecture, as it is disproportionately weighted in favour of NATO from the Russian point of view. *The inadequacy of the current global and regional architecture, oriented (particularly in the Euro-Atlantic region) towards NATO, and likewise the imperfect nature of legal instruments and mechanisms, create an ever-increasing threat to international security* (NSS 2009). Similar to the "Concept 2000," it indicates Russia's long-standing opposition to any *eastward enlargement of the Alliance and plans to move its military infrastructure to Russian borders, as well as attempts of NATO to play a global role in security relations* (NSS 2009).

National defence tasks are described relatively vaguely. The new *Strategy* doesn't go into detail about Russia's nuclear policy, confirming only the need to modernize Armed Forces and nuclear forces (to compensate for its weakness in conventional forces), while reconfirming nuclear parity with the

United States and suggests further discussion on nuclear arms reduction (Zysk 2009). Last, but not least, the *Strategy* underlines the importance of energy security and the importance of natural resources for economic development, considering the use of energy commodities a significant instrument of defence of its sovereignty and strengthening the Russian influence in the world.

Contrary to expectations based on the anti-Western rhetoric frequently used by the Russian leadership, the United States is not mentioned in the document as a security concern. Rather, the *Strategy* refers to attempts of a range of leading states to achieve military supremacy as a threat to state's security (Zysk 2009).

"Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2010)"

Russia's Military Doctrine, the third pillar of the "troika" in the country's security policy hierarchy - after the national security strategy and the foreign policy concept - was published with some delay on 5 February 2010 (de Haas 2010). Shortly after the Georgian war (December 2008), Kremlin announced plans for new military doctrine (Interfax 2008).

"Military Doctrine 2010", which replaced the "Military Doctrine 2000" is very critical of the West, with focus on NATO and the United States. With regard to national security interests, the document points out three aspects: first, there is *an effort to expand the circle of partner states in strengthening international security on the basis of common interests* (Doctrine 2010). The second aspect refers to the "*possibility of use of armed forces outside Russia to protect national interests and Russian citizens* (Doctrine 2010). The third aspect comprises *the creation and training of special units from the Armed Forces and other troops for use in the interests of Russia's economy*." This provision was probably related to protecting energy infrastructure and possibly also with an eye toward securing future resources, such as those in the Arctic region (Doctrine 2010, de Haas 2010).

Contrary to previous Military Doctrine, this document besides the term „military threats" also uses terms like „military danger." While external threats are rather general in nature, these dangers are expressed as very specific and refer to a large extent to the West (especially NATO enlargement and missile defence). „*One of the main external military dangers is the desire to endow the force potential of the NATO with global functions carried out in violation of the norms of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation*" (Doctrine 2010).

Also, while in previous Military Doctrine, Russia reserves the right to use the nuclear force only in case of a nuclear attack, now it emphasizes the *possibility to start a nuclear war not only as retaliation, but also in case of suspicion of a possible attack against Russia* (a form of pre-emptive approach) (Doctrine 2010).

"Military Doctrine 2010" is the latest strategic document adopted by Russia. However, currently (September 2014) the Russian leadership openly declares the change of military doctrine, from Russian point of view, caused by the expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe, problems of missile defence and the crisis situation in neighbouring Ukraine. According to several sources the new document is to be issued by the end of 2014 (RIA Novosti 2014, Telegraph 2014, Newsru 2014).

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CONFLICT ANALYSIS - CASE STUDIES

Tomáš Kučera

Conflict is a commonplace and natural experience of each of us. It stems from the plurality of interests and its consequences are often viewed as benefiting society as a whole. A number of philosophers have thought of conflict as bringing about change and stimulating progress. According to Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535 – c. 475 BC), conflict was the father of all things and Immanuel Kant considered 'unsociable sociability' – the man's natural propensity to conflict – the chief cause of establishing a law-governed organisation of society (Kant, 2006, p. 6). Conflict constitutes the social dynamics in modern societies. Liberal democracy rests on free struggle of political views and interests and the market economy is defined by the competition of economic subjects. Nonetheless, conflict remains a benign and constructive aspect of social relations only as long as it is carried out by peaceful means.

In contrast, this chapter is concerned with analysis of armed conflicts and wars, whose destructive effects on lives and well-being of individual people and entire societies more often than not surpass any potential good that might come from the conflict. Admittedly, also war has sometimes been regarded as a fundamentally positive phenomenon. For instance, Hegel insisted that war helped to uphold the moral health of society: "Just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of prolonged calm, so also corruption in nations would be a product of prolonged, let alone 'perpetual' peace" (Hegel, 1942, p. 210). Such a way of thinking had enjoyed much prominence up until the First World War. Thus Charles de Gaulle could utter shortly before 1914 without controversy that war "develops in the heart of a man much of what is good in it, while peace lets grow there all that is evil" (De Gaulle, 1981, p. 76). The experience of the wars of the last century destroyed these romantic notions of war. The strife to prevent armed conflicts

and solve them when they occur has become a major mission of a number of institutions and organisations in the modern international system.

The aim of finding the causes of war and proposing a solution stood at the beginning of the academic discipline of international relations in the aftermath of the First World War. Among the identified causes has been, for example, man's natural propensity towards war, capitalist economic system, the state, and the anarchic international system (see Waltz, 1959). The range of views on the causes also generated a variety of possible solutions. The man's belligerent nature, for instance, could be tamed through proper education and socialisation; the socialist revolution would put an end to the capitalist imperialism; and the mutual perception of threat (the so-called 'security dilemma') that is perpetuated through the continuous preparation for national defence could be alleviated if all states became liberal democracies (theory of democratic peace) or the international anarchy was replaced with an international government. In this way, war has been dealt with as a general phenomenon whose main features are common to every occurrence.

The starting point of conflict analysis is different. It stems from the assumption that every armed conflict is unique. It goes without saying that there are some similarities and common tendencies between various individual conflicts and the theory of conflict analysis draws on these commonalities. Nonetheless, the ultimate purpose of conflict analysis is to gain understanding of a specific conflict. What is more, a thorough insight is necessary for any effective engagement in the conflict, regardless of whether in the role of a mediator, intervener, or as a party to it.

One of the oldest and most insightful conceptual frameworks for conflict analysis was sketched by Carl von Clausewitz in his *On War*. Clausewitz describes war as a 'chameleon' that adapts its features to a given context. Each war contains three tendencies related to three entities ('a paradoxical trinity') – first, the passions of hatred and enmity that must be inherent in the people;

second, the play of chance and probability that is the main concern of the army; and, third, subordination of war, as an instrument, to a government's policy. Although these aspects are present in all wars, the relationship between them is unique to each actual occurrence of war (Clausewitz, 1989, bk. I, ch.1/28).

The basic idea of Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity is echoed also in modern attempts to grasp the nature of armed conflicts. The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) understands political conflict as

... positional difference between at least two assertive and directly involved actors regarding values relevant to a society (the conflict items) which is carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions, the international order, or hold the prospect of doing so ("HIIK," 2014).

Peter Wallensteen defines conflict as "a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources" (Wallensteen, 2002, p. 16). These definitions, like various others, are built upon three essential components of conflict: actors, actions, and issues of incompatibility/political objectives. The armed conflict thus requires at least two hostile groups of people, a violent behaviour between the armed bodies of these groups, and political goals/causes which can be achieved only at the expense of the adversarial group. Yet, these three components – actors, action, and issue of incompatibility – may vary considerably from case to case. It is, therefore, the understanding of these components and their roles in a conflict that constitutes the core of conflict analysis and also of this chapter.

The following sections deal with the individual components in isolation from each other. The first section is concerned with incompatibility of political issues and objectives, the aspect which provides political substance to armed conflict. The intricacies of this aspect will be described in the case of Colombian civil war. Conflict actors will be analysed in the following

section. The plurality of actor types in an armed conflict will be demonstrated in the case of Mali. The final section focuses on the dynamic character of armed conflicts. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine will help here to understand conflict development before it breaks out and the armed conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia will show the importance of the capacity for armed action in conflict escalation.

ISSUES OF INCOMPATIBILITY

The term 'incompatibility' refers to a "severe disagreement between at least two sides, where their demands cannot be met by the same resources at the same time" (Wallensteen, 2002, p. 15). Along with the actors, incompatibility is the very foundation of conflict. Incompatibility of interests and issues may emerge in the relationship of well-established actors; nevertheless, it is not rare, either, that actors, in terms of organised groups, become created as a consequence of an incompatible issue having been realised. This latter situation is rather commonplace in intra-state conflicts. Some sort of incompatibility, however, always precedes conflict actions. In fact, a conflict, in its latent form, can be identified even without having been manifested through conflict behaviour.

It is possible to analytically distinguish two types of issues whose incompatibility provides a conflict with a political substance: root causes and specific political objectives. As for the former, conflicts usually have their 'root causes' in long-standing grievances and/or deprivation of individual and collective basic needs. Basic needs may be regarded as universal to all human beings. In this sense, the denial of *identity*, *security*, and *recognition* may be considered a fundamental issue in most armed conflicts (Jeong, 2008, p. 28). Regarding interstate conflicts, the realist tradition in the study of international relations views the strife for security and recognition in the anarchical international system as the basic cause of war. Intra-state conflicts may stem from relative deprivation, social inequality and an inability to

communicate the grievances through normal political channels (see Østby, 2008; Wallensteen, 2002, pp. 39–43).

The root causes create suitable conditions for a conflict to grow. However, a conflict becomes visible when organised actors articulate specific political objectives that they intend to pursue. These political objectives may reflect the actor's view of how the original grievances should be remedied. But new goals may also emerge in the course of the conflict as a response to the other party's behaviour. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) makes distinction between two basic types of political objective/incompatibility: over government and over territory ("UCDP," 2014; Wallensteen, 2002). The HIIK identifies nine different 'conflict items': 1) system/ideology, 2) national power, 3) autonomy, 4) secession, 5) decolonisation, 6) subnational predominance, 7) resources, 8) territory, 9) international power (Hachemer, 2014, p. 8). Thus in interstate conflicts the actors may aspire for a change of the ideological, religious, or socio-economic orientation of the opponent's political system or be concerned with a change of international borders, especially if this includes possession of natural resources. In addition, characteristic for the international conflicts is the struggle for international power. Intra-state conflicts over government can be based on the intention of a non-state actor to change the political system or ideology of a state or merely to take over the government. In intra-state conflicts over territory actors may strive for a political autonomy within a state, secession from a state with the aim to establish a new state or merge with another one, or to end a colonial rule. An aspect additional to these conflict issues is the desire to control natural resources. Economic literature on civil wars even suggests that greed, or attempt to use the conditions provided by an armed conflict for exploitation of natural resources, is a stronger factor than grievance in intra-state conflicts (Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2004). The conflict item of subnational predominance, which means the de-facto control over a territory or a population, can be regarded as a provisional objective in the course of a conflict.

COLOMBIA

The element of incompatibility in conflict will now be examined in the case of the civil war in Colombia. The civil war between Colombian central government and Marxist guerrilla groups, most notably the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), is classified by the HIIK as a conflict over system/ideology, subnational predominance and resources (Hachemer, 2014, p. 79). The Colombian civil war is thus one of the conflicts driven by both greed and grievance.

The root causes of the conflict between Colombian government and the Marxist guerrillas lie in gross social inequality (the highest in Latin America) and, specifically, the pauperisation of peasant farmers and agrarian workers. The integration of Colombian agricultural production into international markets accompanied with an absence of adequate agricultural reforms created conditions in which traditional landowning elite gained the power to enlarge their estates at the expense of peasants. In this process the use of violence was not uncommon and, in particular, during *La Violencia*, the 1948-1958 civil war between the Conservatives and Liberals, the level of violence in the countryside escalated. Many peasants were forced to seek protection in armed resistance communities. In 1964/66 FARC was established on the foundations of these communities (Thomson, 2011). However, while the purpose of the original communities was merely self-defence, FARC articulated the objective of socialist revolution as the only remedy to the situation of peasants in Colombia. Thus the incompatibility over ideology and political system between FARC and the ELN, on the one side, and the Colombian government, on the other, was the consequence of the severe deprivation in the Colombian countryside.

However, the cultivation of coca leaf has brought a new aspect into the civil war. In the 1970s, the guerrilla groups realised the potential of the coca production and engaged in close collaboration with drug mafias. Their cooperation was

facilitated by their common interest in securing the coca production and preventing the government from exercising its authority in the rural area. This alliance, however, soon broke up and the mafia raised its own paramilitary forces to fight the guerrillas ("UCDP," 2014, sec. Colombia). Since the 1970s the dynamics of the conflict became driven by the struggle over the control of the area for coca cultivation at least as much as by the ideological aims. The conflict was no longer based merely on the opposition between the Marxist guerrillas and the government. Also the paramilitary forces organised by the drug mafias and large landowners became involved and hostile actions were reported between individual guerrilla groups, such as FARC and the ELN, too. It is estimated that in recent years FARC has made around 500 million USD from the illicit trade per year and its total income was equivalent to 2 percent of Colombia's GDP (Ugarriza & Craig, 2013, p. 452; "Five facts," 2012). This puts into question whether FARC means the effort to attain subnational predominance and economic resources merely as a means in their ideological struggle. It may seem that the guerrillas' commitment to their ideological objectives has been pushed aside by the economic objectives.

ACTORS

A great variety of actors may become a party in an armed conflict. The main contenders are organised groups that are "engaged in adversarial activities and have a main stake in a conflict outcome" (Jeong, 2008, p. 23). The basic typology of actors distinguishes the state from non-state actors (see Wallensteen, 2002, pp. 61–75). The state is the most important type of actor participating in the vast majority of armed conflicts. Interstate wars, as the name indicates, are waged by states on both sides of the conflict. But also in intra-state armed conflicts is the state very rarely absent. The state is supposed to be the sole legitimate authority within its territory, and maintaining this authority is not only its right but also functional necessity. An absence of the state as an actor in an armed conflict is hence conceivable only if this conflict

takes place in a failed state. Nonetheless, even then the conflict parties tend to claim the state authority or aspire to seize or create it.

The state is particularly powerful actor in armed conflicts – and a valuable asset for anyone pursuing particular political goals (see the section on incompatibility) – due to its monopoly on the legitimate use of force and the right to levy taxes (Wallensteen, 2002, pp. 63–64). This is not to say that other actors do not use force or gain financial and other resources through levies. However, only the state is generally recognised as a legitimate holder of these rights within its territory and any attempt to disrupt these state monopolies is regarded as a serious challenge to the state authority.

Besides the state, there are also non-state actors in many armed conflicts. Yet, it is important to make a distinction, in theory at least, between non-state actors of an armed conflict and organised criminal groups. Both may exercise armed violence without the state's authorisation, but whereas the organised criminal group would use violence only for its enrichment and would not attempt intentionally to contest the legitimacy of the state, the non-state actor of an armed conflict, by definition, strives to justify its use of force by a political objective. It may claim to act/fight on behalf of a wider group of people (a community defined by ethnicity, religion, or social class) and/or out of loyalty to ideological or religious principles. Even in the latter case, nonetheless, the violent activities of the non-state actor remain to be associated to a wider community which is intended to be ruled by the ideological or religious principles.

Apart from the state/non-state dichotomy, the actors of armed conflict may also be examined, as indicated above, along the categories of political representation and membership/association. A presence on both sides of the violent clashes of an organisation that claims some sort of political representation may distinguish armed conflicts from spontaneous protests and riots. Without an organisation it would not be possible to articulate political

objectives of the armed struggle (see incompatibility) and systematically pursue these objectives (see action). However, it is by no means uncommon that an organisation emerges out of spontaneous protests. For example, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) was created at the end of July 2011 with the aim to protect and support the ongoing popular protests against Assad's regime ("UCDP," 2014, sec. Syria). The FSA thus may characterise a representative/ reactionary organisation, this means an organisation that may convincingly claim that it reacts on some wrongs committed and represents the will and interests of a community of people. The state is normally regarded a representative and reactionary actor, although in specific cases, as shows the Syrian war, the extent and legitimacy of its representation may vary. The opposite of the representative/reactionary organisation is the vanguard. Vanguard organisations, typically ideological or religious militant group, e.g. the Islamic State (in Iraq and Syria) (ISIS/IS), attempt not only to enforce their principles of faith against the armed opponents but, simultaneously, also promote them, often violently, in their reference community.

The category of membership/association is related to the character of the reference community and is, therefore, closely connected with the previous concept. The effective engagement in armed conflicts requires support from a wider community of people. The reference community is often the primary source of manpower and material supplies for the armed organisation and, if guerrilla tactic is applied, the organisation has to rely on collaboration of the local population. Cohesiveness of the community and its support for the political cause pursued by the armed organisation is therefore of particular importance. Yet, we may distinguish two different types of membership – exclusive and inclusive – which may necessitate different strategies for building up and maintaining support.

In interstate conflicts the actor with exclusive membership is typically the state, as the membership is defined by citizenship. In intra-state conflicts, however, thus defined membership is often rather illusive. For example, in the

War in Syria the Assad regime does claim its representation over all citizens of Syria, but, de facto, it primarily protects the interests of the Alawite minority. Ethnic communities, since they are defined by inherited features, such as race, religion, language and historical experience, are another example of a group with exclusive membership (see e.g. Harff & Gurr, 2003). The basic strategy to raise support of the community is through the process of polarisation, which increases internal cohesion within the community and insulates and emotionally distances it from other ethnic groups (Wallensteen, 2002, p. 34; Reynal-Querol & Montalvo, 2007; Esteban & Schneider, 2008).

It is often the vanguard organisations that define their reference community rather inclusively, for example through social class or religion. Their pool of potential sympathisers is hence much wider. On the other hand, their reference community is rather illusive and lacks cohesiveness. To develop a basic sense of commonality, for example class consciousness, is therefore one of the primary strategic tasks of the vanguard groups.

MALI

The analytical categories of the representative/vanguard organisation and exclusive/inclusive membership will now be applied in the case of Mali. The armed conflicts in northern Mali consist of an intra-state conflict over the control of northern regions of Mali, so called Azawad, between the government of Mali and the Tuareg militants and an intra-state conflict over the character of government between the government of Mali and several Islamist groups. The conflict became manifested through widespread armed violence in three phases: first in the early 1990s, then between 2007 and 2009 and the current conflict broke out in 2012 (see "UCDP," 2014, sec. Mali). This case study thus presents multiple types of actors. Moreover, it shows that it is a rather rare occurrence that an actor fits straight into the analytical categories.

One party to these armed conflicts was the government of Mali. During the 1970s and 1980s the country was under the authoritarian rule of Moussa Traoré. However, simultaneously with the first episode of the armed conflict with Tuareg separatists in the early 1990s, Troaré's regime had to face strong protests by a democratic opposition which culminated in a military coup in March 1991. During the first phase of the conflict (1990-1991) any government's claims of it being the legitimate representative of the entire population of Mali rang hollow. Nonetheless, after the overthrow of Troaré's rule Mali set out on a democratisation process and became one of the most stable democracies in Africa ("UCDP," 2014, sec. Mali).

Despite the democratic character of the government of Mali, from the perspective of the Tuareg minority, which constitutes less than 10% of the population of Mali, the government failed to represent and protect its interests. The Tuaregs have been politically and economically neglected by the central government and, furthermore, during the early 1990s the Malian army tried to fight the Tuareg militants by unleashing a campaign of violence against the civilian population. This, in turn, further antagonised the Tuaregs against the central government ("UCDP," 2014, sec. Mali).

Admittedly, the armed groups engaged in the fight on behalf of the Tuareg's self-determination could only welcome government's heavy-handed treatment of the civilian population. Although their reference community has been defined very specifically on the basis of ethnicity, their representation of the community will is not unquestionable. The first phase of the conflict was initiated in June 1990 by Tuareg militants who had been expelled from Algeria and Libya. Their organisation, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MPLA), was established in the 1980s in Libya under the support of the Libyan government. The last recurrence of the conflict from 2012 onwards has similar origins. After the fall of Gaddafi's regime in 2011, a number of Tuaregs who had served in the Libyan armed forces returned to Mali and together with other groups created the National Movement for

the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The new round of fighting in which the MNLA forced the Malian forces to retreat from the northern regions was a result of the influx of experienced fighters and armament from Libya. The Tuareg rebel groups thus may be qualified as actors who fight on behalf of a definite, exclusive community of Malian Tuaregs and their resort to force was to a significant extent based on deep rooted grievances of the community against the government of Mali. However, the fact that the armed conflicts were not triggered by any developments related to the Tuareg minority within Mali but, rather, by events in neighbouring Libya demonstrates that the representative character of these groups was not overwhelming.

The success of the Tuareg separatists in 2012 owes a great deal also to their alliance with Islamist militants, such as the Tuareg islamist group Ansar Dine and originally Algerian group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Among the objectives of the Islamist groups were to impose Sharia law and spread jihad across the entire Islamic Maghreb. The attempts to pursue these aims soon clashed also with the objectives of MNLA and these former allies turned into enemies. After all, the character of the Islamist groups differed significantly from the Tuareg separatists (Cyrill, 2013). Although Ansar Dine, AQIM and other Islamist groups could draw on some local support and some of their objectives were set in the local context, their reference community was rather illusive, defined in very inclusive terms as the entire Islamic Maghreb. Moreover, their primary political aims of enforcing Sharia and spreading Jihad qualify them quite clearly as a vanguard organisation.

The summary of the analysis of actors of the armed conflict in northern Mali is shown in the following chart.

	Exclusive		Inclusive/illusive	
Representative/ Reactionary		Gov. of Mali		
	MPLA, MNLA			
Vanguard			Anzar Dine	AQIM

Table 1 Armed conflict in northern Mali: analysis of actors

ACTIONS

War or armed conflict is merely one category of the phenomenon of political conflict. What distinguishes armed conflict from other forms of political conflict is the use of violent means. War and armed conflict normally develop out of a non-armed political conflict when one of the parties resorts to violence in order to achieve its goals. It is important to realise that every armed conflict went first through a non-violent development. Tracing the development of a conflict is one of the basic conflict analysis methods.

To monitor the development of political conflicts around the world is the aim of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK). The HIIK distinguishes five levels of intensity of a political conflict according to the conflict measures/actions applied by the actors: 1) dispute, 2) non-violent crises, 3) violent crises, 4) limited war, and 5) war. In the former two levels violence is not applied. A dispute is a political conflict carried out completely without resorting to violence. In a non-violent crisis, however, at least one of the actors would threaten its opponent with the use of physical violence. The latter three levels of conflict are distinguished by the intensity of physical violence exercised in the course of the conflict (Hachemer, 2014, p. 8; "HIIK," 2014).

The possible longevity of conflict development can be demonstrated in the case of the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine. The events in Ukraine this year (2014) caught almost everybody by surprise. Following the ousting of president Yanukovych by the pro-Western opposition, Russia annexed Crimea and started a proxy war in eastern Ukraine. However, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has a longer pedigree (see the table below). The conflict was first reported by the HIIK as a non-violent crisis in 2003. In September of that year Russia began to build a dam linking the Russian mainland with the island of Tuzla, which Ukraine regards as a part of its territory. Ukraine, in response, declared a state of alert and deployed its border guards to the strait. The relationship between Ukraine and Russia became tense again during the pro-Western governments of president Yushchenko. The conflict was manifested in periodic gas crises, disputes over the Russian naval base in Sevastopol and Russian threats that Ukraine's aspirations to join NATO may have 'serious consequences' ("HIIK," 2014).

Table 2: The development of the Ukraine-Russian conflict. (Source of data: "HIIK," 2014)

Conflict escalation does not always stem from intentions and plans of individual actors. Conflict development also becomes susceptible to the

retaliatory logic of competitive interactions. "Each party tries to outdo the other's behaviour in a vicious circle of hostile action and negative reaction (Jeong, 2008, p. 37)." This applies particularly to the stages in which conflict becomes violent and destructive. In one view, the increase of polarisation and emotional antagonism produced by the hostile actions may overcome the cost-benefit calculations about the utility of conflict's continuation (see Mitchell, 1981, p. 52). The same effect can also be explained from the rationalistic perspective, the lives and resources already sacrificed compel the actor to continue, otherwise the investment would be lost (see Zartman, 1995, p. 33). The conflict thus may take on a life of its own, independent of original intentions and strategies, forcing the actors to escalate the intensity of conflict actions (Wallensteen, 2002, p. 34).

Whereas the conflict development after violence has been applied may take a course rather independent of original political strategies, it continues to be strongly affected by material factors that enable the exercise of armed violence. Without military viability no armed conflict can last long (Collier et al., 2004). Military operations require financial and material resources, which a non-state actor can obtain, for example, through donations from diasporas, sympathisers or a foreign government and through exploiting the local resources. Of great importance is here the geographical position of the non-state actor, as the ability to move across state borders significantly facilitates the access to external resources. A considerable support to armed activities may also become available due to an armed conflict that has occurred previously in the region. Such a conflict brings into the region large amounts of available weapons and directly or indirectly provides experience with military operations.

KOSOVO AND MACEDONIA

The significance of available resources in the process of conflict escalation can be demonstrated in the cases of widespread armed violence in Albania

in 1997, Kosovo in 1998-99, and Macedonia in 2001. The outbreak of the Kosovo War in 1998 was considerably facilitated by events in Albania one year ago and, in a similar vein, the Macedonia crisis might have not escalated if it was not for the conflict resources generated during the Kosovo War (for illustration see the table below).

Table 3: Successive escalation of armed conflicts in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia. (Source of data: "HIIK," 2014)

After a failure of a pyramid investment scheme in 1997 Albania was struck by a large-scale civil disorder and violence during which about 700,000 weapons and a huge amount of ammunition were looted from army and police armouries. Until the 'Albanian Unrest' of 1997 the shortage of armament presented a significant obstacle to the activities of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). The armament of the Territorial Defence had been removed from Kosovo after riots in 1981 and supplies were limited. This situation changed when over 25,000 assault rifles, anti-tank weapons, mortars and also anti-aircraft guns from Albania got in the hands of Kosovo-Albanian fighters ("Kosovo," 2008).

The activities of the UCK in Kosovo were enabled also by financial resources coming from organised crime and donations from Albanian communities in Western Europe and the United States. It is estimated that the Albanian diaspora presented the UCK with 163 million USD and 250 million USD came from the Albanian heroin mafia (Hislope, 2001, p. 29). These resources ― and more importantly after the end of Kosovo War in 1999 the infrastructure for their generation ― became readily available to the Albanian insurgents in Macedonia, who adopted the same brand 'UCK'. According to the Small Arms Survey, the Albanian community in Western Europe and the USA provided the Macedonian UCK from May to October 2001 with no less than 60 million USD (Grillot, Paes, Risser, & Stoneman, 2004, p. 21). Last but not least, the Kosovo War supplied the Macedonian UCK with experience, know-how and 'human capital.' According to some estimates, the Kosovo Albanians constituted about 20 percent of all combatants in the ranks of the Macedonian UCK and, furthermore, a significant number of local combatants had fought in Kosovo before (Daftary, 2001, p. 293; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006, p. 346).

This case study thus shows that the successive escalation of armed violence in the Albanian communities in Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia is not a mere coincidence or a result of a grand design. Rather, it demonstrates the importance of available material and human resources for the ability of conflict parties to engage in armed actions.

CONCLUSION

Clausewitz in his *On War* puts forth that the best way to win a war is by attacking the enemy's "centre of gravity." To identify the centre of gravity requires understanding of adversary's dominant characteristics:

Out of these characteristics a certain centre of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against

which all our energies should be directed. Small things always depend on great ones, unimportant on important, accidentals on essentials. This must guide our approach (Clausewitz, 1989, bk. VIII, ch.4).

The aim of conflict analysis is analogous to the identification of the centre of gravity. Any attempt to solve a conflict has to focus on the conflicting political issues relevant for it. It is also imperative for the conflict resolution effort to understand the character of the actors engaged in the conflict. Particularly in civil wars and insurgencies, it is of great importance to know in what way an organisation active in the armed conflict is related to the population, or one of its segments. Last but not least, to get the right picture of a conflict we need to realise the nature of its dynamics. It might be possible to prevent a conflict from escalation with relatively little effort, if it comes at the right time. In contrast, when a conflict turns violent, not only does it become the cause of human tragedy and material destruction, but the conflict also becomes more complex and confusing. The use of armed violence is likely to lead to a significant transformation of actors and conflict issues.

The question of how to engage in conflict resolution remains beyond the remit of this chapter. Yet, as indicated above, conflict resolution is quite intimately related to conflict analysis. Any effort to manage or solve an armed conflict would come in vain if it was not based upon a thorough analysis.

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SECURITY SECTOR REFORM-THEORETICAL ASPECTS

Beata Górka - Winter

DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS

The complexity and multidimensionality of security sector reform (SSR) results in lack of a working, uniform, universal definition of this process in the literature (Hendrickson, 1999; Hendrickson, Karkoszka, 2002; Edmunds, 2002; Chanaa, 2002; Born, Caparini, Fluri, 2002; Beyden, Fluri, 2003; Brzoska, 2003; Ball, Fayemi, Olonisakin, Williams, 2003; Germann, Edmunds, 2003; Karkoszka, 2003). In the most general terms, the SSR is defined as "a process of creating modern, efficient, professional security structures, subject to democratic control"; or "transforming the security system, which consists of all the institutions contributing to the proper functioning of the security environment in the country". These institutions should be managed in a way that takes into account the democratic standards and the principles of so-called *good governance*[13]. In turn, the Report of the United Nations Secretary General defines the security sector reform as "a process of evaluation, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation carried out by the government, which aims to create an efficient and predictable security environment for the functioning of the state and all its citizens, with respect for human rights and the rule of law"[14]. Sean McFate from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) describes the SSR in a similar way: "SSR is the complex task of transforming the institutions and organizations that deal directly with security threats to the state and its citizens. (…) The objective of SSR is to institutionalize a professional security sector that is effective,

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[13] See, Security *Sector Reform and Governance: Policy and Good Practice,* DAC Reference Document, OECD, Paris 2004, p. 16.

[14] See, „Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform, Report of the Secretary-General", A/62/659–S/2008/39, 23 January 2008, p. 6.

legitimate, apolitical, and accountable to the citizens it is sworn to protect." (McFate, 2009).

Irrespective of the differences between the definitions quoted above, all seem to have two elements in common: first, they relate to institutions, which are called jointly referred to as the state's security sector, and second, they signal a need for their reform in line with a certain pattern emphasizing the need for changes to the concept of functioning of these institutions in a way that ensures their efficiency and the ability to respond to the security needs of the, as well as the observance of certain principles, key among them—democratic standards. As clear as these assumptions may appear, they—and the very definition of the SSR—have become a topic of a heated debate. This debate is an off-shoot of a more general discussion about the dynamic changes that have taken place in the international security environment, and in the way it has been perceived during the past two decades. The centerpiece of this shift has to do with a move away from defining security in a narrow, political-military manner, and recognizing that the security of an individual, along with the right to live in a state which observes democratic standards and adheres to the principles of good governance, should be the reference points for policy formulation (the so-called *human security* paradigm[15]). Perhaps crucially, the very notion of security has been recast. Whereas the Cold War rivalry called for and prioritized the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation-states, the last decade of the 20th century saw a rapid rise in the importance of new concepts, such as energy security[16], economic security,

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[15] One of the broadest presentations of the „human security" concept contains the UN Commission on Human Security report, developed under presidency of Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, the Commission was created in result of the UN Millennium Summit reflections. Its full version, called „Human Security Now", Commission on Human Security, New York 2003, is here: http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/English/FinalReport.pdf

[16] It is impossible to quote all elaborations bringing up the questions of the so called securitization of consecutive social life areas in a very rich literature of the subject. Their broadest representation is to be found among others in: B. Buzan, O. Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security. A New Framework for Analysis*, Lynne Riener Publishers, United Kingdom and United States, 1998. See also R. Zięba, Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego: Koncepcje-Struktury-Funkcjonowanie [Institutionalization of European security: concepts-structures-functioning], Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2004.

ecological security, cyber security, and others.[17] In addition, state institutions and the international community as a whole — Western democracies in particular—found themselves in the need to counter the development of new threats, e.g. international terrorism (including cyber-terrorism), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental disasters, energy extortion, and organized crime.

However, by far the most important driver behind the emergence, development and ultimate conceptualization of the SSR was the shift in the subjective approach to the notion of security. Mass violations of human rights were commonplace during conflicts in the Balkans, Africa or in the former Soviet Union, thus changing the perspective on key players (actors) in security policy: away from the state and its institutions, the ruling elites (particularly in the context of the protection against threats from the outside), and towards social groups (ethnic, religious) or the individual. The paradigm of *human security* has become critical, underscoring the need to ensure the protection of the individual from any (and therefore not only from military) threats to its existence. It is often noted that these hazards can be generated by a state whose institutions have no second thoughts about resorting to violence against those who contest the political or economic order, or by actors such as criminal groups or private militias, operating largely outside of state control. Thus, as dictated by the human security paradigm, the state institutions are obligated to create conditions in which an individual can be "free from fear" and "free from deprivation" (Paris, 2001; Buzan, 2007). The security sector reform is therefore placed in a completely new context. The SSR concept naturally expands the group of institutions (state and non-state actors), which affect—either positively or negatively - the security environment within a state, and therefore require attention. These institutions include the armed forces, the police, border guard, intelligence services, private militias, drug cartels, and the like (Hendrickson, Karkoszka, 2002). In extreme cases, e.g.

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[17] See ex. M. Madej, M. Terlikowski (edit.), *Bezpieczeństwo teleinformatyczne państwa*, [National teleinformatic security], Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych*, Warszawa, 2009.

in the event of state failure or prolonged inability of state institutions to perform their basic functions, the SSR would broaden this group even further, recognizing that once a state cannot ensure its own security and the security of its populace, the international community has a duty to step in, resorting to institutions with a global (the United Nations) or regional reach (NATO, the African Union).

The *governance* theory is another important contributing factor to the definition of the security sector reform (Hänggi, 2005: 5-9). The theory is based on an assumption that globalization is bringing about a far-reaching fragmentation and deregulation of international politics. Formal and informal interactions between a plethora of non-state actors—individuals, families or clans, religious groups, corporations, NGOs, the media, to name just the most obvious ones—are of key importance for the dynamics of international politics. What follows is the need to analyze the actual influence that these actors—and not just state-controlled institutions—exert on just about every area of social life. Of course, this principle applies to the security sector as well, since it too is affected by fragmentation and deregulation. Today, much of the tasks once performed exclusively by the states, e.g. providing security in a particular area, training security forces, gathering intelligence—are part of portfolios of non-state actors, private military corporations in particular (Chesterman, Ch. Lehnardt, 2007). The role of the civil society, the media, the academia, the think-tank community in formulating or otherwise influencing the content—goals, directions—of official policies, security policy included, is on the rise. Nowhere is this trend more profound than in Western-style democracies. There is an increasing role, especially in highly developed western democracies of the civil society, media, research institutes, think-tanks in formulating objectives and directions for security policies of states. As already mentioned, in extreme cases - public sector institutions (army, police) do not exist, or exist in a reduced form, not covering large areas of a state's territory, referred to in the literature as *failed states* (Rotberg, 2002; Fukuyama, 2004; Newman, 2009: 421-443), and the most important context

there is made of informal structures, remaining beyond the influence of the government.

It needs to be stressed that even though the SSR concept attaches great importance and recognizes the impact that non-state actors have upon the dynamics of the security environment is concerned, it remains state-centric. Indeed, the SSR, at least in the initial period, is aimed at strengthening state institutions, which is a direct consequence of acknowledging that the greatest responsibility for the adequate functioning of the security sector (still) rests with the state.

ACTORS OF THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

The side effect of elevating the importance of institutions other than the state-controlled ones, as dictated by the paradigms of "human security" and "governance", has been an inflation of sorts with respect to the actors (agents) that need to be taken into account in the context of the security sector reform. When faced with traditional threats, military institutions—or, more broadly speaking, institutions authorized to resort to force—had been the natural reference point for analysis. With the broadening of the catalogue of threats, it became necessary to adopt a more holistic approach, and to ensure adaptation of all institutions affecting the national security milieu, both directly and indirectly. Malcolm Chalmers believes that "security sector are all of these institutions, which have a mandate to use force, order the use of force or threat to use force in order to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those institutions of a civilian nature, which are responsible for their management and control" (Chalmers, 2000: 6). The by far most comprehensive classification was compiled by D. Hendrickson and A. Karkoszka. They singled out - four types of actors who comprise the security sector of any state. Of note is that only the first three types are state-controlled (Hendrickson, Karkoszka, 2002: 179).

1) *Forces authorized to use force* (also called "basic" or core security actors) - armed forces, police, military police, paramilitary forces, intelligence services (military and civilian) and other services operating in conditions of secrecy, the border guard, coast guard, institutions responsible for customs supervision, reserve forces, as well as local security forces, including civil defense, fire protection, national guard, secret service, civil militias;

2) *Security management and oversight bodies*: the office of the president and the prime minister, the parliament and its committees (defense, foreign affairs), the ministry of defense, the ministry of the interior, the ministry of foreign affairs, various advisory bodies in area of national security, institutions endowed with public confidence, financial institutions (the ministry of finance, auditing authorities), as well as civil society organizations;

3) *Justice and law enforcement institutions:* the courts, the ministry of justice, prosecutor's office, the prison service, criminal investigation services, human rights commissions, the ombudsman, correction services, as well as local community institutions, whose authority stems from tradition - councils of elders, tribal council, and the like (Chuter, 2006: 14);

4) *Non-statutory security forces*, divided into two subcategories: those acting outside legal boundaries, such as breakaway armies and militias, guerilla group, or militias associated with political parties, and those whose activity is sanctioned by the law, most notably private security companies and private military companies, authorized to use force in a limited number of cases.

It is worth noting that the "Human Development Report 2002" published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) identifies an additional fifth category--the public opinion--comprising professionals dealing with security

problems, media, research institutes, lobby groups, religious organizations, or groupings of local communities focused on a specific security problem.[18]

The directory of institutions whose activities either affect or are believed to be affecting the dynamics of the state's security landscape is quite large, in both vertical and horizontal dimension (Law, 2004: 31-37)[19]. However, the roles assigned to particular actors are very diverse. Although none of the above mentioned institutions ought to be omitted when analyzing the security sector, it should be obvious that depending on context, (traditional location of an organization/group in one specific country, political system, etc.), their importance in solving a particular security problem will vary.

It is also worth noting that the malfunctioning of one or several institutions could spark a process leading to the demise of other actors or even of an entire subsystem in which they are positioned. And so a faulty judicial system can negatively affect the activities of the police and the prison institutions. Indeed, problems affecting one actor tend to spill over onto other actors. Therefore many authors tend to believe that security sector reform is best understood as a systemic phenomenon, encompassing a wide range of functionally related actors.

Marina Caparini underlines the relevance of a robust, mature civil society—comprising NGOs, social movements, mass-media—for the ultimate viability and success of the security sector reform. The civil society plays an important oversight and control role during the formulation and execution of national security policy, providing independent, alternative ideas and recommendations, thus increasing the likelihood that the security sector will operate properly. Key here is the actual independence of civil society

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[18] See *Human Development Report 2002, Deepening democracy in a fragmented world*, UNDP, Oxford University Press, New York 2002, p. 87.

[19] However, as D. Law notes, most elaborations on the institutional dimension of the SSR ignore the influence, especially in concepts, that is currently imposed on creation of the security environment by international structures – alliances which bind any given country or international organizations, which in certain countries play a huge role in shaping and functioning of the security sector.

institutions. Marina Caparini warns that ignoring the civil society during a reform of the police force, which by definition is expected to closely interact with the citizenry, could negatively affect the very efficiency of this endeavor (Caparini, 2004: 4-7).

GOOD GOVERNANCE" AND THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

In so far as identifying actors who populate the state's security sector in the country is the necessary first step in initiating its reform, the next one rests on an assumption that an institution (or institutions) has encountered a problem and is malfunctioning. The centerpiece of any SSR is to ensure that the security sector is managed properly, i.e. that it does not pose a threat to the society which it has been designed to protect. While it would be difficult to list all irregularities which could plague the security sector, the most common include an illegitimate use of force against political opponents or for financial gain, hindering the economic development of the state by excessive defense spending, especially in lack of existential threats to national security, favoritism towards a particular ethnic group or political institution during staffing of the security sector, corruption, clientelism, lack of professionalism, involvement of the armed forces, the police, or intelligence services in criminal activities, and the like.

The prevalent view holds that eliminating these dysfunctions is possible through adherence to the principles of good governance (Hänggi, 2003: 3-22). Rooting them in the institutional culture is considered to be a guarantee for the proper functioning of the security sector (Schnabel, 2009: 4-7). These principles include:

- **transparency**, manifesting itself in two dimensions: first, the right of the general public to access information about the premises, objectives, directions and outcomes of security policy, as well as about the funding allocated for these purposes, unless disclosure of information could compromise national security; second, the right

of civil authorities (the president's office, the relevant ministries and parliamentary committees) to gather information about the activities of the institutions of the security sector, especially the core security actors (Ball, Bouta, Goor van de, 2003: 35-36);

- **accountability**, meaning that institutions belonging to the security sector, in particular those with the most far-reaching decision-making prerogatives (the cabinet and government administration, the parliament) ought to be accountable to stakeholders who can be affected, either directly or indirectly, by their decisions. Military institutions will be primarily answerable to civilian authorities with a democratic mandate. The accountability principle emphasizes the role of civil society (NGOs, the media, research institutes) and its role in monitoring security policy, challenging (or promoting) decisions and steps taken by the authorities, and animating the public debate on issues which could be of interest for the general public;

- **participation**, defined as the ability of all social groups, both formal and informal, regardless of ethnicity, gender, political affiliation, or religion of their members, to participate and exert influence, both directly and through representatives upon the activities of the institutions of the security sector; however, participation is predicated on unhindered access to information, as well as freedom of association and expression. This principle is particularly important when a society is multi-ethnic, or otherwise polarized, in which case the foreclosure of a particular group may put its security interests at a significant risk;

- **the rule of law**, which is equivalent with a requirement that all security sector institutions act in obedience with all applicable laws; this includes international human rights standards (in particular the obligations concerning the rights of minorities); the proper functioning of the security sector is dependent on the existence of an independent judiciary as well as a professional, non-corrupt law enforcement system;

- **responsiveness**, or the ability of institutions directly responsible for ensuring national security to respond to an emerging (or existing) threat in an adequate, prompt and professional manner, as well as the ability to respond to the social needs with respect to security;

- **effectiveness and efficiency**, closely associated, which places an obligation on the institutions of the security sector to carry out the tasks assigned to them and to deliver results, acting within the financial and material constraints. Aside from professionalism, effectiveness and efficiency requires proper management of these institutions, as well as cooperation and coordination between various actors—internally and internationally (Ball, Bouta, Goor van de, 2003: 61-67). Thus it is necessary to factor in a broad context (regional, supra-regional, global) in which they operate. Last but not least, effectiveness and efficiency should also be characteristic of the civilian oversight over armed forces, intelligence services, and other core actors;

- **consensus orientation**, referring to the requirement of taking into account the needs and views of all social groups, or ensuring their participation in designing security policy; a consensus-oriented approach to good governance would therefore take into account a broad cultural, social, historical context, or anything even remotely referred to as tradition. From the standpoint of the security sector, this implies a need to follow a course of action agreed upon during wide-ranging public consultations, in adherence to the consensus rule (Ball, Bouta, Goor van de, 2003: 63).

Proper functioning of the security sector requires that all of these principles be implemented simultaneously. Of course, while individual principles can be implemented in isolation, i.e. irrespective of each other, it would be insufficient to guarantee proper management of the security sector. For example, securing wide participation of social groups is no guarantee of efficiency of its institutions. Similarly, institutions of the security sector may

be professional and effective, but need not necessarily act in accordance with applicable law (Luckham, 2002: 8).[20]

Implementing all of the above-mentioned principles is meant to ensure that security sector institutions will be able to carry out their tasks (ability to respond), while at the same time preventing from becoming an instrument for strengthening the position of one political party, a national group or a clan. The purpose of transparency, consensus orientation, or ensuring the greatest possible participation of all interested social groups in the formulation of security policies (both in its internal and external dimension) is to prevent fraud, manipulation, corruption, or unfair lobbying practices.

Of course, implementation of these principles is not problem-free. Agreeing upon assessment (measurement) criteria is perhaps the most pressing challenge.[21] For example, what level of transparency with respect to the activities of the security sector, especially the intelligence services, can be deemed as satisfactory or sufficient? Which decisions should be subject of public consultation? Regardless of the case at hand, answers to these questions will always be subjective, depending on the institutional culture prevalent in the security sector of a given country. In fact, there is no single, uniform set up of the security sector even in the group of Western democracies. Although they routinely engage in fairly comprehensive consultation processes when

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[20] E.g. R. Luckham quotes in this context the examples of military coups in numerous Latin American countries in 1960's and 1970's.

[21] However, such criteria have been adopted in the North Atlantic Alliance for candidate countries. In a document published in Sept. 1995 „The Study on NATO enlargement", among the conditions necessary to fulfill in the effort for NATO-membership, the following were quoted inter alia: establishing a civil control over the armed forces and transparency of defense planning policy and defense budget planning. It was emphasized that the armed forces of a candidate-country should be able to fulfill tasks. In the area of collective defense and participation in the new missions of the Alliance. See NATO, The NATO Handbook; The 1995 Study on NATO's Enlargement, 1995, on: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24733.htm.

conceptualizing their national security policies, for example when drafting so called white papers on defense, the differences in perception of the actual role that the civil society ought to play in these consultations may be enormous. Indeed, in case of Anglo-Saxon states, the decisions about participation of the armed forces in overseas operations are, as dictated by binding law, the exclusive prerogative of the executive branch (the president, the prime minister), with a limited oversight role for the legislative, in continental Europe--Germany and Spain are indicative of this—the role of parliaments is essential.[22] Difficulties in implementing the participation principle or that of consensus orientation also stem from the fact that security policy decisions are traditionally the domain of the elites, and the security sector is no exception in this context. Although Western-style democracies are more likely to share information about directions, methods and objectives of their security and defense policies the public opinion at large is not sufficiently knowledgeable in this field, displays little or no interest in it, and therefore is reluctant to participate in the decision-making process, no matter what role is effectively assigned to it.[23]

Another important dilemma results from the possibility to undermine the effectiveness of security sector institutions (the responsiveness principle) because of extremely strict adherence to the principles of transparency, participation and consensus orientation. In another words, putting too much emphasis on one principle over the others. As R. Luckham points out, democratization tends to raise, rather than reduce the political tensions

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[22] More on the role of parliaments in the decision-making process related to participation of the armed forces in international operations see the report: *Parliamentary Oversight of Civilian and Military ESDP Missions: the European and National Levels*, prepared by DCAF for the Subcommittee on Security and Defense of the European Parliament in Oct. 2007 on: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/pe348610_/ PE348610_en.pdf. See also B. Wojna, *Udział sił zbrojnych w misjach poza granicami państwa - nowe ustawodawstwo Hiszpanii [Participation of the armed forces in overseas operations--new legislation in Spain]*, „Biuletyn PISM [The PISM Bulletin]" iss. 86 (331) of Nov.30th 2005.
[23] For an extended analysis on the issue, see the special edition of „Contemporary Security Policy", Vol. 26, Issue 3, 2005, devoted to description of mechanisms of decision making processes of different European countries about the anti-missile defense program.

within a state, thus jeopardizing the ultimate goal of providing security to its citizens (Luckham, 2002: 6-10). Such a scenario is more likely to occur in a post-conflict state, where emphasis should be put on strengthening the effectiveness of the reconstructed, legitimate security institutions, rather than on the democratization process, which by its very nature implies heightened competition. Of course, this does not mean that it should be omitted altogether. Indeed, Luckham pointed out that "democracy has become the only acceptable form of government in the international environment". Similarly, N. Ball argues that democratization ("good governance" versus "democratic governance") is a necessary precondition for an effective security sector reform, that security sector institutions, the army and the police in particular, must be accountable both to state authorities and the civil society, and that they act in accordance with the democratic rules and standards, as well as all applicable legislation (Ball, 2004: 2).

As should be apparent from the examples highlighted here, implementation of "good governance" rules will not be challenging in war-torn countries, or countries which have embarked upon political transformation. The emergence of new threats requires the states with a long-standing tradition of compliance with democratic standards to constantly review the rules which govern their respective security sectors and to seek compromise, which, on one hand, enables these institutions to operate in an efficient manner, and, on the other hand, does not inhibit democratic standards.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM--GOALS AND DIRECTIONS

In the most general terms, the goal of a security sector reform is to ensure that security sector institutions operate in an efficient manner and can carry out the tasks assigned to them, key among them being the protection of the people from violence inflicted by different actors (state and non-state; internal and external). Obviously, depending on the situation of any given state, this goal can be achieved at quite different levels. While the objective

of security sector reform is by and large universal, it will nonetheless focus of completely different issues depending on different states (or groups of states). Security deficits can result from vastly different phenomena, thus the SSR will necessarily have to begin with the elimination of the pathologies that pose the greatest threat to the physical survival of citizens (Law, 2004: 26).[24]

According to the prevalent view one of the most important factors when considering goals and directions of a security sector reform is the context in which it will be carried out (Bryden, Hänggi, 2005: 24-26). The activities which jointly constitute the SSR, the number and types of actors subject to it, objectives of the SSR and methods for achieving them, the types of instruments to be used, the sequence of actions and benchmarks for measuring their success (effectiveness) all depend on unique conditions in which the state finds itself. The principal criteria used for determining the context for implementing the SSR concern the type of the political system (democracy, autocracy, a system in transition to democracy), the level of economic and socio-economic development and the security situation in the country concerned (this criterion is particularly important to isolate the group of countries in a post-conflict situation). They allow for singling out of four groups of countries in which the security sector reform will take certain, specific forms. These are as follow:

(1) developing countries, characterized by low level of economic development, where securing stable conditions for economic development is of primary importance;

(2) countries undergoing transition toward a democratic political system and market economy;

(3) countries undergoing reconstruction following an armed conflict (domestic

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[24] The most important of them, such as e.g.: under investment (or in contrast – earmarking too much funding for functioning of security sector institutions), lack of control over security sector institutions (army, police intelligence services) lists D. Law in the article *Security Sector Reform in the Euro-Atlantic Region...*, op.cit. p. 26.

or international); fragile security situation means that priority is given to ensuring the physical security of the people;

(4) developed countries, or so-called Western democracies, with a stable internal security situation

This classification, although simplified,[25] points to great diversity of conditions for security sector reform (Ball, 2002). Whereas in case of developed countries initiating an SSR will serve the purpose of improving the functionality of security institutions in face of new threats, an SSR in a post-conflict state will most probably be driven by serious internal instability and dysfunction of security sector institutions. In sum, the goals of an SSR can be quite diverse, ranging from creation of conditions for economic development, prevention of resurgence of an armed conflict, to the safeguarding the security of the people (Edmunds, 2002).[26]

1. SSR GOALS IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

As already indicated, the term "security sector reform" emerged from the discourse on development policy (Brzoska, 2003: 3-22). The reform, and in particular its economic dimension, was seen as an important instrument for poverty eradication through the allocation of funds in the state budget in a way which would reduce defense expenditures and allow for increasing investment in other sectors (Brzoska, 2003: 5). In the 1990s the leading donors of aid for developing countries drawn attention to the fact that part of the funds channeled to these countries may be used, contrary to the intention of donating countries, to fund military institutions, greatly expanded during the Cold War, or otherwise contribute to defense spending (Bailes, 2008;

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[25] This division was put in question by Nicole Ball, who indicated it is too simplistic. Acc. to Ball the security sector characteristics In many countries does not allow for categorizing them to any of the proposed groups. Instead, the Author outlined seven criteria, based on which a country context should be characterized, in which the SSR is conducted. These criteria are: political, psycho-social, normative, economical, institutional, social and geopolitical. See N. Ball, „Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP", October 9, 2002: www.undp.org/bcpr/ruleoflaw/index.htm.

[26] T. Edmunds writes e.g. about consecutive generations of SSR.

Wulf, 2011). The recipient countries were expected to reduce their defense expenditures (especially if at the same time they competed for low-interest loans), and dedicate extra assets to boost development.[27] A 1984 report by the Independent Commission on International Development, under patronage of former German Chancellor Willy Brandt, echoed these recommendations.[28] In addition, global financial institutions--the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank--pressed for reduction in military spending and tied the amount of development aid to the level of these reductions. In addition, the end of the Cold War lowered the (perceived) risk of an outbreak of an armed conflict, raised hopes for a so-called peace dividend, and created an impulse to reallocate financial assets from military to civilian purposes. The main point of reference for security sector reform in this particular context was the state institutions seemed like natural starting points for the incoming SSR, but the donors turned out to be reluctant about working directly with the institutions of the military sector. This conditionality was often applied in Latin American and African countries, where military regimes seized power following coups, and were therefore seen as lacking democratic legitimacy (Brzoska, 2003: 3; Wulf, 2011: 3-4).

Thus while development policy was—in line with its basic function—aimed at poverty eradication, the SSR was seen as an auxiliary tool for achieving it. However, these initial assumptions had to be modified in result of several important observations. Most importantly, it proved very difficult to come up with an objective criterion both for rating expenditures from state budget as "sufficient", and for finding the most favorable ratio between civilian and

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[27] The idea, in which legitimacy of reducing the military spending is underlined in order to increase the development resources has emerged already in the 50's, when the UN General Assembly adopted a relevant resolution on the issue (724A). In 1973 the General Assembly for the first time gathered on a special session on disarmament and development (Special General Assembly on Disarmament and Development). See: M. Brzoska, *Development Donors…,*op.cit. p. 5-6.

[28] More on the work of the Commission, see http://www.brandt21forum.info/About_BrandtCommission.htm

military expenditures (Hendrickson, Ball, 2002).[29] Many countries questioned the real intentions of the donors and conditionality of the assistance provided (in particular, as M. Brzoska indicates, there were cases in which some countries requested that the development aid be limited, while at the same time agreeing upon major arms sales with the same partner). Some feared that an SSR would serve as a pretext to hand sensitive security data over to external actors, thus adversely affecting national security.

An assumption that a simple reduction of security-related expenditure would lead to eradication of poverty and an increase in economic development turned out to be false in a number of cases (Williams, 2002; Chuter, 2006:14). A drop in defense expenditures didn't always coincide with (or at least bring about) an increase in a state's economic development. In countries where the security sector (armed forces, but also other formations) was one of the major employers, rapid demobilization which was not accompanied with provision of alternative sources of income can lead to wide-spread impoverishment, cause massive protests and facilitate recruitment criminal groups.[30] This in turn would have an immediate negative effect on internal stability, could discourage potential investors and thus hamper economic development. In addition, the security sector institutions, army in particular, were often the only public institutions able to effectively enforce public order, reverse separatist trends, or mitigate religious radicalism. As a result, reducing the expenditure for their upkeep could act counter to the actual survival of the state in a desired political or territorial shape. Last but not least, it was often noted that the size of the army or the police should at all times be correlated with the kind of threats that needed to be countered.

All this led to questions about the legitimacy of the SSR as an instrument for reducing poverty, and more--as an instrument of development policy

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[29] Especially that security sector activity can also be funded by extra-budgetary income (e.g. generated by defense industry companies, partially or fully nationalized).
[30] On these reservations, see e.g. the report „Supporting Security" published by the British Department for International Development at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/supportingsecurity.pdf, p. 13.

(Williams, 2002). The need for a multi-dimensional approach to SSR in this group of countries is therefore underlined quite often, along with the need to go beyond a (simple) decrease in defense spending. Instead, it is important to strike the right balance between "down-sizing and right-sizing" of the budget, i.e. to ensure proper and effective management of the budget.[31]

2. SSR GOALS IN COUNTRIES UNDERGOING TRANSITION

With the breakup of the Soviet Union and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, countries of Central and Eastern Europe (as Poland, Ukraine, Georgia) regained the ability to freely formulate their national security policies, and this change included embarking upon SSR. In case of states in transition, SSR needs to take into account the broad context of transformation toward a democratic social and political system and market economy. With the exception of few Western Balkans countries, which got entangled in a crippling armed conflict, transition was peaceful, and people (civilians) were able to stay out of harm's way most of the time.

In this context the core challenge for the SSR was a reconstruction of the security sector institutions in a way that would help eliminate the negative phenomena inherited from the previous era. They involved a revamping multi-thousand armed forces, designed for a full-scale war (and in consequence reduction of overgrown procurement programs), and the accompanying large-scale military bureaucracy, disbanding of internal security services, designed to protect the political system, and implementation of democracy and "good governance" principles in order to eliminate pervasive corruption, lack of professionalism, and wasteful spending (Trapans, 2002; Górka-Winter, 2002: 17-51).[32] The SSR was principally aimed at state institutions, even though

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[31] See "Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency" published by the International Monetary Fund in March 2001, revised in 2007. The document is available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/051507c.pdf

[32] Countries like Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia found themselves in a peculiar situation. In contrast to other Eastern-Bloc countries, following the USSR's withdrawal from their territories, they were forced to create most of their security sector institutions from the start.

civil society institutions (NGOs, the media, think-tanks) were beginning to gain prominence during security-related debates. In fact, it was in no small part because of the involvement of the civil society that Central and East European states began to consider membership in the North Atlantic Alliance as one of the most important goals of their security policies (Hendrickson, Karkoszka, 2002: 192; Ball, 2004).[33] This, in turn, became the key driver behind SSR in these countries.[34] Indeed, in September 1995 NATO set out the main membership criteria, listing among them "satisfactory progress" with regard to SSR, and deciding that they be measured annually based on fulfillment of individual country plans.

Although the likelihood for success of the security sector reform in countries in transition is evaluated by specialists in the field as high and in case of Central and East European states the prospect of NATO membership provided additional motivation (Hendrickson, Karkoszka, 2006: 20), many of them also draw attention to factors which reduce the positive effects of reforms. Resistance to changes among members of the politico-military establishment, seeing the reforms as a threat to their interests and thus wary or of losing their privileged position or earned before the democratic transformation, was perhaps the most acute of them (Nathan, 2004: 4-5).[35] To make things worse, countries in transition had to struggle with the disastrous effects of decades-long, ineffective economic policies, finding it difficult to fund security-related reforms. Political instability (frequent change of government) resulted in lack of consistency in implementation of reforms and absence of consensus concerning their scope and pace (Donnely, 2004: 45-65; Trapans, 2002:13).

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[33] As D. Hendrickson and A. Karkoszka are stressing, completely different are the SSR perspectives in Eastern Europe countries. Also on the issue N. Ball, who points to a very slim potential of the post-soviet Central Asian countries for the SSR success.

[34] To a lesser extent the driving force for this transformation, in respect to security issues, were other organizations, such as: Council of Europe, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

[35] E.g. L. Nathan indicates, that a huge problem for the elites stemming from conventional armed forces was to notice the new kind of security threats.

3. SSR GOALS IN THE POST-CONFLICT STATES

Security sector reform in which have recently emerged from armed conflicts (especially internal ones) is regarded to be one of the most promising tools for transition of these states towards lasting stability. Security sector reform is launched primarily to ensure physical security of the civilian population (and therefore there is a strong focus on strengthening or creating national security forces which would be able to promptly ensure protection of the most vulnerable groups[36]). In contrast to the circumstances for development and transformation discussed above in case of post-conflict states the SSR must also target non-statutory entities, in particular those acting outside the legal regime (banned tribal militias, groups around local military commanders, guerilla groups), given that their activities may put reform efforts at the greatest risk. Many of them have drawn tangible benefits from conflict situation (control of raw materials revenue, smuggling, illicit arms and trafficking). Thus their motivation to play by new rules is sometimes minimal.

The most demanding goal of the SSR in this particular case is the durable stability of the countries in question. The idea behind implementing "good governance", e.g. the participation principle, or making sure that all ethnic and religious groups will have a say in shaping relevant state institutions, is that this would lead to giving up of violence and encourage participation in the political life. Ensuring adequate level of professionalism and efficiency of security sector institutions is another problem. Entanglement in and armed conflict drains its economic, demographic and social potential. Devastated infrastructure, coupled with limited earning opportunities in sectors other than military, exacerbated by high death toll, and accompanied with rising illiteracy, physical and mental exhaustion, and brain-drain.

Prospects for a successful SSR in a post-conflict state are least promising. SSR goals can be met only if the reform agenda is part of a post-conflict peace-

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[36] Usually this obligation is taken over by international coalition forces under the UN command, especially in initial phase, which later begin training of the local security forces.

building process which covers dimensions beyond security - economic, social, political (Wulf, 2011: 6-7). A successful SSR depends on active participation of external actors (states, international organizations and donors, such as the United Nations and regional security organizations, international financial institutions) and their willingness to take responsibility for a difficult and complex process, whose positive effects are not usually felt in a short term.

4. SSR GOALS IN A DEVELOPED WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

Over the past two decades the goals and directions security sector reform were influenced by two major trends: the break-up of the bipolar system, which necessitated an overhaul of security sector institutions, and the emergence of new threats, e.g. international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, and organized crime. In particular, 9/11, as well as terrorist strikes in London and Madrid, have shown that even countries boasting a fairly high ability to ensure their security should modify their institutions and strategies or introduce appropriate remedial measures. As summed up by M. Caparini, despite changes for the better, security has proved to be "a constant concern" for these countries (Caparini, 2004: 3).

Therefore SSRs in democratic countries have two main goals. First, it is necessary to establish institutions (or transform the existing ones), which will be capable to respond to current threats in the optimal way and to significantly reduce the exposure to new, negative phenomena in this area. Security strategies of Western-style democracies (mainly members of the European Union and NATO) show that they consider terrorism, proliferation of ballistic missiles, a WMD-strike (executed by state or non-state actors), and instability generated by failed states as principal threats to their security. Such threat perception makes it a necessity to strengthen the border guard, the intelligence services and immigration services, and to enhance critical infrastructure protection (transport network, energy-related installations, such as pipelines, power plants, electrical grid). Another task has to do with introducing new,

more strict procedures governing the activities of these services, especially to strengthen oversight over the movement of people, enhance data exchange and coordination, and to provide technical support (Stevenson, 2003: 25 and others). In the external dimension, it became necessary to boost expeditionary capabilities of the armed forces and make them more interoperable with the armed forces of other countries for purposes of joint peacekeeping and stabilization operations (Isturiz, 2006: 74).

Second, the SSR is to ensure that security actors will follow the principles of "good governance". Even though established democracies can boast fairly stable security institutions, recent years have obscured enormous deficits in this area. While institutional reforms were rationally justified by the authorities, they still raised doubts and attracted public criticism. Greatly expanded prerogatives of internal security services, application of highly controversial interrogation techniques such as waterboarding, or detention of individuals suspected of terrorism in so-called black sites run by U.S. intelligence services, have all rekindled the discussion about the necessary and acceptable balance between efficiency of security-related activities and the rule of law. An important example of viability of this debate is also the problem of U.S. policy on the issue of missile defense and institutions (in this case the Missile Defense Agency), which in result of priority given to these issues by the G. W. Bush administration, gained extraordinary powers in the sphere of military acquisition (such as moving away from the "fly before you buy" rule, classifying results of interceptor missile tests)[37] .

In addition, the actual direction of the SSR will deliver clues as to which external actors—international financial organizations, military alliances, either standing or formed ad hoc—will be involved in the reform process, and to what extent. External actors will play a central role in initiating and implementing the SSR in the case of post-conflict states, where weakness

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[37] See *Limiting Missile Defenses,* Nuclear Weapons & Global Security, August 28, 2008, at: http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/solutions/limiting-missile-defenses.html .

and dysfunction of state institutions usually makes them passive on-lookers, rather than active animators of reform By contrast, democratic states are usually capable to implement an SSR without significant external assistance.

Of course, an SSR need not be recognized as desirable by the political elites and decision-makers in any given circumstances. As already mentioned, especially in the group of developing countries, the necessity for SSR, particularly in the promoted fiscal dimension, did not satisfy the political elites. Also, some post-communist countries, though being generally in favor of reform, expressed concerns about its far-reaching consequences (e.g. in social dimension).

MEASURING THE EFFICIENCY OF SSR

Given multiple contexts and diversity of accents and directions that an SSR can take, a cohesive record of factors to determine the ultimate outcome of reforms is difficult to come by. Thus practical examples of SSR-related activities—both successes and failures—is where the search usually begins.

Arguably the most important factor used to determine whether an SSR has succeeded is the so-called local ownership rule. Many pundits underline fact that SSR is only seemingly of technical nature (McFate, 2009; Nathan, 2007: 13). Implementation of "good governance" is in fact a highly political process. Without the awareness of the country's power elites (including the opposition) that they are in fact its co-owners of the process, it will be neither fast nor permanent (Donais, 2008). L. Nathan argues that the "reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors" (Nathan, 2007: 9). It is all the more important given that in most cases external interference has an impact on state's sovereignty, although to a varying degree. Thus the process should be as transparent and inclusive as

possible from the very outset, and open to all stakeholders, both vertically and horizontally ("national ownership" versus "governmental ownership").

When underscoring the importance of social legitimacy in implementing SSR, many authors point to its fragility, even when initially the local elites have endorsed the reforms. This is often the case with post-conflict states, and when involving the main culprits behind past instability (person/group accused of genocide, human rights violations) in SSR-related activities. Similarly, excluding important, influential political, ethnic or religious groups from having a say in formulating and implementing the SSR can delay, obstruct or otherwise undermine the reforms. The situation becomes even more precarious when an important political player can count on the support of the army or other armed groups.

A major problem in securing a social mandate for intended shape of reforms may also come from the fact that concrete proposals do not match the cultural context in which they are to be implemented or run counter to traditions, religious views or world outlooks prevailing in the country. L. Nathan reminds of officers corps in South Africa, who first served in apartheid conditions, and later were required to pursue a policy completely different from that with which they were familiar, e.g. establishment of free trade unions in the army, adopting a defensive military doctrine, or introducing transparency of defense policy planning process. In Muslim countries such resistance may be provoked by attempts to admit women to military/police service; in caste societies, a similar pattern could occur with respect to the possibility of promoting people stemming from a lower caste. In light of all of the above factors many authors stress the need to accept local conditions, i.e. taking into account the cultural context of reforms and refraining from pressing for forcing solutions for which a state may not yet be ready in civilizational dimension. At the same time, hardly anyone seems to question the need for good governance and democratization (Williams, 2006: 45-73).

By the same token, both in theory and in practice, most experts agree that the SSR needs to be set in a wider context of social transformation, and follow a so-called holistic approach. A military sector reform undertaken in most countries undergoing a political transition is a case in point. Pressure to reduce the size of the army, although justified by the pursuit of a "peace dividend" and sensible from the economic point of view, had an adverse impact on the employment level and budgetary balance (severance payments, compensations, retirement benefits to persons who have been released from service). The German example is telling in this context, where downsizing and professionalization of the army depleted the human resources in health service facilities, which generally relied on conscripts performing so-called surrogate military service.

Therefore H. Wulf and A. Ebo argue that the success of the SSR process depends on embedding it in the wider context of the transformation agenda, in which security is only one, albeit critical, of the elements. In a post-conflict context a sudden demobilization (both in the ranks of the forces, as well as among informal groups such as tribal militia, private warlord armies etc.) may result in an influx of workforce to the labor market. If they fail to find alternative sources of income, they might rejoin the guerilla groups or organized crime.[38] The SSR needs to be closely correlated with socio-economic reforms on the ground.

Continuity of reforms is another factor determining the efficiency of reforms. Irrespective of context, SSR is always complex and multidimensional, and therefore, by definition, time- and cost-consuming process. This is of particular importance in case of post-conflict countries, who are almost entirely dependent on financial assistance provided by external donors disinclined to pursue "quick-impact" projects. Taxpayers are reluctant to

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[38] The problem is especially acute in case of so called child-soldiers, whose return to the labor market without a relevant educational program is very difficult in the peace time. For more detailed information about this, see official website of Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers - http://www.child-soldiers.org/home. Also see the report „Child Soldiers Global Report 2008" at http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/

succumb to expenditures related to SSR, especially if its effects are only felt in longer term.

Finally, as Wulf indicated, in case of certain countries, the security sector reform will not be at all possible to succeed. He indicates first of all, a group of countries, where an armed conflict was in fact not terminated or where significant problems of permanent lack of security exist (Wulf, 2011: 6).

SUMMARY

It is beyond the scope of this study to summarize all SSR-relevant issues. What is unquestionable is that it ought to be analyzed on a context much broader than security policy of a state. Brzoska and Wulf argue that an SSR ought to be analyzed on political, economic, social and institutional levels (Brzoska, 2003: 5). This first one concerns broadly understood civilian control of security sector institutions. The economic dimension emphasizes proper (efficient) allocation of funds within the sector. Underinvestment and overinvestment are seen as equally undesirable. Social dimension encompasses, the need to secure physical and material safety of citizens, whatever the source of threat. Finally, in its institutional dimension, the SSR equals transformation of the security sector in a way that guarantees professionalism and proper allocation of responsibilities and tasks between security actors. Last but not least, relationship between security actors need to be calibrated in a way which will promote, and not hinder, the attainment of the ultimate goal, i.e. the security of the state and the people.

As Alyson Bailes points out, despite relatively rich literature on the subject, ample practical experience gathered on the ground and ideas developed by various international organizations (the OECD, the European Union, NATO), the SSR is still subject of many debates (Bailes, 2008: XIV). Multiple contexts and challenges that a reform is likely to face make it difficult to define all activities that an "ideal" SSR should encompass. In addition, it is still subject

to controversy who is ultimately to decide on the shape of introduced reforms. Even by applying in good faith the local ownership rule, in particular in case of post-conflict countries, the main costs of reforms will be eventually born by external donors, who reserve the right to shape or modify the SSR concept in line with their own vision. Unfortunately, the external actors have a fairly poor orientation in the local conditions for SSR, and are pushing for solutions suitable for Western democracies, but often useless in local circumstances.

Analysis of SSR would not be complete without taking into account the impact on its individual elements exerted by actors most closely involved in practical implementation of the reforms. Key among them are international organizations (OECD, NATO, the European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank) and individual donor-states, usually highly developed Western democracies (in particular the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Japan). In recent years, in particular due to involvement in military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, United States became another country to actively promote SSR. Contrary to theoretical concepts, which focus primarily on management aspect of security sector institutions, the external actors tend to formulate SSR programs according to mandate entrusted to them, and in line with their own philosophy of solving the problem, leaving aside the scientific approach. In addition, different organizations apply different terminology set. For example, the UNDP refers to "security and justice sector reform" to emphasize the role of justice as equivalent, and not subordinate, to security. The OECD refers to "security system reform"[39] to emphasize the non-military nature of the process. A Chuter adds that defining SSR is not free from political influence. Some institutions may want to influence the process and hence lobby in favor of recognizing them as vital SSR actors (Chuter, 2006: 8).

Andrzej Karkoszka summarizes this discussion by arguing that "the security sector reform can be seen as a new, all-purpose formula for defining a

[39] See, *The OECD/DAC's Handbook on Security System Reform, Supporting Security and Justice,* 2007 Edition, available at http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf/38406485.pdf .

comprehensive process of changes in mutual relations between specialized state and social institutions in all aspects related to individual, social and national security". The main objective of these changes is "a more democratic system of governance, better management of funds earmarked for maintaining and strengthening of security, enhancement of human rights protection and individual freedoms both in the institutions responsible for safety themselves, as well as in executing their tasks, and finally a greater internal and external stabilization of the country." (Karkoszka, 2003: 292-294).

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SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY AND THE PUBLIC – LESSONS LEARNED FROM SLOVAKIA

Oľga Gyárfášová

INTRODUCTION

We were finalizing this study in crucial times for global security: with Russian intervention in Eastern Ukraine as the Ukrainian crisis newly escalated and held all the signs of the biggest threat to global security since the cold war; furthermore, civil wars are devastating Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan; moreover - NATO is holding a momentous summit in Wales sending an important signal of its relevance to the world. All in all, the general feeling is that we are at the verge of new security world order and the security is becoming more and more a precious commodity.

Naturally, everybody wants to live in a secure country, in a stable world. However, we take security for granted if there are no threats on the horizon. Once there is a threat, everything else becomes much less relevant. The feeling of security is essential, it is so-called survival value. But how security is viewed by the general public? What is seen as a threat and how are the national security and broader foreign policy issues perceived not by politicians or military representatives but by ordinary people? What are the arguments in favor or against collective defence, namely NATO? Are there any differences in how European Union and NATO are perceived? What does the 'mental map' of geopolitics look like? The following study addresses these and similar questions. It focuses on Slovakia´s experience of the last two decades. At first glance Georgia (or more general - three South Caucasian countries) and Slovakia do not have anything in common and we are very much aware of our differences. On the other hand, we see also some commonalities – post-communist legacy, constructing new statehood, transition and democratization processes, and integration efforts, and last but

not least, ethnic heterogeneity and fragmented political culture. The case of Slovakia might be a good example of how the Central European countries tackled the difficulties they faced in transition and the lessons learnt for those who decide to go down a similar road.

In addition to the analytical literature, the chapter utilizes empirical data from many representative surveys (like Transatlantic Trends project by the German Marshall Fund of the U.S., the EU-wide Eurobarometer series, but also local projects, many of them conducted in 2000-2002 for the communication campaign prior to Slovakia´s NATO accession).

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES – HISTORICAL LEGACIES

It is commonly accepted that in the field of foreign policy, the key decision-makers include political actors, institutions, and the political elite. For many years the diplomatic world was acting behind the closed door and the decisions made in closed circles, remote from public eyes or ears. Furthermore, the public was not interested in such remote issues like foreign and security policy. Accordingly, the common wisdom when running a political campaign in Slovakia was that foreign policy issues do not decide the elections, so they were marginalized in favor of economic and social issues – those of higher salience for the voters. This was the "world of yesterday." It has changed dramatically over the last decades. In foreign and security policies of today, an increasingly important role is played by the citizens, public opinion constituted by ordinary people, civil society associations and the like. Today, important internal resources of a country's foreign and security policy include cultural and value-based background of the public, with the societal and cultural context playing a more relevant role than at any time before.

In this respect, the newly-established country like Slovakia had to catch up and bridge the deficits stemming from the lack of experience in the decision-

making and information, as well as the inadequate contextual perception of international affairs (Lukáč, 2000: 6). Moreover, the political, and consequently also the public debate, on international issues was pretty underdeveloped. These deficits became visible quickly after the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989, and were still present – and even more so – three years later in 1993, when Slovakia became an independent country. Overall, the new elites lacked the historical experience and know-how necessary for running an independent state with its own foreign policy goals and clearly articulated national interests. The process of establishing state institutions, a diplomatic apparatus, and foreign policy institutes began only after 1993. It was also around this time that various periodicals and forums began to spring up, contributing to the necessary environment for a nationwide discussion on the country's international course, geopolitical position, and future challenges.

There was also another deep cultural legacy having an impact on foreign and security policy perceptions – it was rooted in the society's historical memory that strategic questions about its fate and future were decided elsewhere, outside its borders - be it in Vienna, Budapest, Prague or Moscow. Such historical legacy also resulted in a weaker interest in events beyond one's "own backyard."

Let's mention other important factors which were in background of foreign policy attitudes in Slovakia, but also more generally – in the post-communist countries. Social costs of economic transformation (objective deterioration of living standards and sensitive subjective perception of social problems) increased the populations' sensitivity towards the social problems even more. The hierarchy of urgent problems was long dominated by unemployment, standard of living, health care system etc. Due to transformation difficulties these societies were extremely inward-looking, consumed completely by their own problems.

This is closely related to the general openness, interest in foreign policy and also contact with other cultures. In this respect, Slovak society has opened up very slowly. According to opinion polls, the share of those who do not speak any foreign language decreased from 76% in 1992 to 70% in 1997, similar to the proportion of those who did not visit any foreign country beyond the "socialist bloc" from 77% to 68% (Cf. Bútorová - Bútora, 1998: 175). Widespread lack of interest in foreign affairs reinforces the particularly vague and fuzzy attitudes towards the Euro-Atlantic integration of Slovakia.

Closed mentality and lower awareness of international issues could be also later on illustrated by the findings of the Transatlantic Trends surveys. In the post-communist countries included in the survey (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), there is a much larger portion of respondents who never talk about the foreign politics. The weaker interest in international affairs becomes evident in higher proportion of ambiguous or "do not know" responses regarding the international and security issues. This may say something about the heritage of isolation behind the iron curtain (Gyárfášová, 2007).

On the other hand we have seen the change and as Ivan Krastev correctly and timely noted that while during the Cold War, foreign policy and security issues were excluded from the domain of electoral politics due to the nature of the security threat, later on these issues are at the center of electoral politics, and NATO could become the victim of a populist backlash (Krastev, 2006).

HOW IS SECURITY PERCEIVED?

When we ask the basic sociological survey question: "What are the most urgent problems in your country?" people usually say it is unemployment, standard of living, health care system or economy. These are usually the most wide-spread citizens´ concerns; these are the priorities of everyday in times of peace and security. Once there is a threat, the hierarchy of priorities changes

completely. There is a popular saying in Slovakia – the situation is serious when you have just one problem.

In principle we could distinguish internal and external security, although the line between them is fading. Several surveys in Slovakia have shown that the Slovak public is more concerned about internal rather than external sources of danger. This is due to increased sensitivity to social problems and fears for personal safety that arose during the period of post-communist transition. Social dissatisfaction and frustration reached such levels that over half of the population thought that life was better for people like them before 1989. The situation improved in early and mid- decade of the millennium but deteriorated again due to the economic crises in 2008-2012: not less than 85% of the Slovak population stated that their financial situation has been negatively effected by economic crises (Transatlantic Trends 2012-13).

External threats or dangers coming from "behind the borders" are viewed as less worrying. Most people found security against the external sources of danger an unlikely scenario and perceive their country as safe. External security refers above all to conventional threats, for instance a military intervention. Such favorable environment leads to the fact that many Slovaks negated the need for defence and joining organizations of collective security. Other non-conventional security risks such as terrorism, excessive dependence on unstable energy sources etc. did not rank high on the list of potential sources of instability either. A lot has changed after 9/11. People have grown more sensitive to international terrorism. As Transatlantic Trends 2004 identified, it was the most sensitively perceived global security threat on both sides of the Atlantic. However, the Europeans and Americans have different opinions on how to combat it. According to the more general political culture - military actions have been considered more effective by Americans than Europeans (including Slovaks).[40] On the other hand, "soft means" such as providing

40 There is one substantive difference between American and European understanding of using force in specific circumstances: where most Americans tend to agree with the statement "Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice," the Europeans do not (Transatlantic Trends, survey data).

economic assistance to improve living conditions in countries that are the principal breeding grounds for terrorists were endorsed equally by Europeans and Americans.

In public perception the link between external and internal threats almost does not exist. It is due to lower contextualizing of the problems. A certain exception from this pattern of identifying possible threats is the Slovaks' perception of the inflow of immigrants. Here, their level of sensitivity is comparable to other European nations, which may suggest that this international problem has become reflected in people's perception of it as a possible internal security problem.

Threat perceptions have both a rational and irrational basis and are predominantly shaped by memories of periods in the country´s recent past. The era prior to 1989 is often remembered as the safest period for individuals and country alike, defined by higher degree of personal safety as well as relatively high national safety. The years after 1989 brought, above all the decline in terms of personal safety. In addition the gap between perception of personal safety and nation's security has widened since 1989 – people are worried about their individual well-being while threats to the country are receding in comparison.

DEVELOPMENT OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Slovakia is a small Central European country, which has in its modern history experienced a number of regimes, state formations and a plenty of historical discontinuity. Slovak historian Ľubomír Lipták called Slovakia's 20th century "changes of changes" (Lipták, 2002). Together with the feelings of smallness and unimportance, this historical heritage is at the root of people's generally weaker interest in world developments and foreign policy whose understanding requires a certain level of awareness and experience.

Shortly after the establishment of independent Slovakia, a relatively widespread view was that Slovakia must rely just on its own efforts and not to enter into any pacts and alliances. In March 1993, one third of the population took the view that Slovakia cannot trust anyone and must rely primarily on itself. The option to take its own path was preferred by a third of citizens, while taking the Western vector and to associate with the countries of the European Community and NATO at that time was supported only by a quarter of the adult population (Aktuálne, 1993: 71).

The first year of Slovakia's independence was marked by intense crystallization of the foreign policy orientation. Besides the proclaimed majority interest in the continuation of Slovak foreign policy along the lines of Czechoslovakia, at times it appeared that the possibility of neutrality was considered, and even a „turn to the East was possible if Slovakia did not succeed in the West." Nevertheless, gradually, all parliamentary political parties and the majority of other political actors agreed not only on the need for integration into the European Union and the usefulness of the regional Visegrad cooperation, but also supported Slovakia's entry into NATO. This was followed by the public opinion and gradually reflected in the attitudes of the public. While the first months of 1993 were marked by ambivalent attitudes and low trust in international institutions, in October 1993 there was a significant increase in trust. The year 1993 can therefore be described as a period of accelerated learning process of the Slovak public in terms of understanding the international context and foreign policy.

There are definitely several factors which were in the background of this process. In particular, the public realized that Slovakia now has responsibility for its foreign policy, there is no room for excuses in the face of real foreign policy accountability, and after the political elite also the public began to understand that the Western vector is a more attractive alternative for the country than a doubtful vision of „third way" or even adherence to Russia. On the other hand, despite the growing acceptance of pro-integration political

line, in the minds of some people the heritage of autarchy and isolationism prevailed.

„This finding may not surprise us: a decade of political and economic isolation contributed to the reproduction of the closed mentality of the country's provincialism. If the Czechs were sometimes overly preoccupied with Europeanism, if T.G. Masaryk convinced that „the Czech question is the world´s question" - then Slovak leaders operated usually in a smaller space. Home horizons used to be limited to the immediate neighbors: Slovaks are often compared to or mainly coped with the Hungarians and Czechs, often in a defensive manner" (Bútora – Bútorová, 1994: 60).

In the next period a significant polarization in the foreign policy attitudes took place.

Foreign policy orientations have become an integral part of the population's value profile, the dividing line appeared between pro-integration, open-minded, liberal democratic positions on one side and closed, anti-Western ones on the other. This cleavage was identical with the deep cultural value divide with pro-reform, pro-democratic people on the one hand and people who were close to authoritarian attitudes on the other.

Between 1994-1998 Slovakia deviated from the Central European path of democratization and integration. Nevertheless, important decisions were made during these years - the invitation of three former members of the Warsaw Pact into NATO and the opening of accession talks with the first group of candidates for EU membership. Initially Slovakia had all the prerequisites to be „in" however the politics of Mečiar's government disqualified the country from both integration processes. At the level of public confidence towards the EU and NATO support for Slovakia's entry increased, culminating in a time of obstructed referendum on direct election of the president and Slovakia's accession to NATO that took place in May 1997.

After the 1998 general election when Mečiar´s party lost and a broad pro-integration coalition came into office, Slovakia began the journey from international isolation and began to catch up with its Visegrad neighbors - Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Since autumn 1999, it began to show a positive trend – trust in the EU and NATO, as well as willingness to approximate Slovakia to these groupings – increased gradually. It was important particularly in relation to NATO, where the support was about 50%. Integration efforts were successfully completed in 2000, when Slovakia was approved as a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and especially in spring of 2004 when the Slovak Republic became a full-fledged member state of the European Union and NATO.

In joining the EU and NATO, Slovakia has successfully completed an important stage in its modern history. This step, of course, did not mean "the end of history;" quite the contrary, the following years have shown to be equally important but much more complex and demanding with the extent to depth of internal resources of the country's foreign policy. The variety of goals, issues, questions and challenges was likely to increase and not decline. Such a hypothesis can be supported by at least two facts: first, Slovakia became part of a larger entity, its active player, partner and opponent; secondly it joined at a time of very dynamic international situation whose most typical features include emergence of new threats and continuing search for a new world order.

SLOVAK PUBLIC AND EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION

European Union

Public support for EU membership was high and very stable long before accession but also relatively shallow and impersonal. The share of opponents was negligible. This public perception was partly influenced by high consensus of political elites as well as by the fact that public debate on country's

European future has been quite lackluster compared to other candidate countries. The "debate without conflicts" also influenced the referendum on country's accession to the EU held in May 2003. In a referendum on Slovakia's accession to the EU over 90 per cent of voters said "yes," but almost half of the eligible voters did not show up, the turnout was just slightly over the required quorum (52%). Nevertheless, the membership was highly welcomed by the public - in late 2004, the fact that 79 per cent expressed positive attitudes clearly showed that post-accession Slovak society did not feel disappointed or frustrated as was the case in Austria or Sweden. On the contrary – satisfaction and optimism prevailed (Bútorová et al., 2005). This was particularly due to the fact that pre-accession expectations were characterized by "cautious optimism:" people expected benefits for the country as a whole rather than for themselves personally (the focus was more "socio-tropic" than "egocentric"), and not immediately but in the more distant future. The combined high support and cautious expectation created a favorable starting position for post-accession adaptation. Positive attitudes to EU membership were relatively evenly distributed across Slovakia's regions, notwithstanding Slovakia's deep regional and rural–urban disparities.

Expected gains and losses

EU accession represented a step into an unknown territory. For Slovakia this was even more the case since the debate on the "pros" and "cons" of being part of the European Union was extremely undeveloped and unstructured. A consequence of the broad pre-accession consensus was that Slovakia's membership was viewed only instrumentally. This is very much true not only for the political elites but also for the broader public, which to a certain extent reflects the position of the elite. By far the most commonly acknowledged benefit of Slovakia's EU membership was the opportunity to work abroad; this view increases as more EU member states open up their labor markets to Slovaks, who are keen to take up the opportunity. All in all, we see that the expectations have been triumphed by the post-accession reality.

On the other hand, there were fears of potential drawbacks. Again, the reality of membership looks better than was expected before the accession. The widespread fears that emerged before Slovakia's entry turned out to be largely unfounded. Still, Slovaks are most concerned about the use of cheap labor in Slovakia, the brain drain and the drop in living standards. However, these criticisms either hold steady or are slightly declining. Over the past 18 months, fears of increased bureaucracy and legislative harmonization have declined. On the other hand, anxieties about brain drain have increased, reflecting the actual outflow of labor from Slovakia and the absence of a noticeable inflow.

Public opinion and the EU membership ten years after
A decade of membership has undoubtedly strengthened the identification of Slovakia's population with the European Union, despite the fact that these bonds had to go through the hard-hitting test of economic and debt crisis. This can be illustrated by the following figures: on the one hand, trust in the EU decreased to 47 per cent (it used to be up to 70 per cent), on the other hand, in relation to the future of the EU, the Slovak public remains largely optimistic (57 per cent whereas the average for the EU28 is lower – 51 per cent).

A lot of changes influenced by the economic crisis have also shifted the image of the EU in public opinion − for the majority of Slovaks the EU is represented above all by the common currency, the Euro (53 per cent) and the freedom to travel, study and work anywhere in the EU (53 per cent), while the attribute of economic prosperity has dramatically weakened − it has been attributed to the EU only by 7 per cent of respondents, whereas in 2004 it was 52 per cent. It is clear that EU membership is no longer perceived as an automatic ticket to economic paradise, but more as an opportunity which has to be actively exploited. A significant increase in European self-confidence can be demonstrated by the fact that while in autumn 2004 only 37 per cent of people thought that Slovakia's voice counts in the EU, in the autumn of 2013 that view was shared by 56 per cent of the respondents, which can be considered a positive trend. And last but not least – in spite of the crises, the

majority of citizens of the Slovak Republic sees the future of the country in the European Union. The statement "Slovakia would be able to face the future better outside the EU" was rejected by majority of public (56 per cent) (Standard Eurobarometer data). It thus appears that growing together with the EU takes time, but it has been certainly progressing during the past decade.

Summing up, we can state that ten years after this historical milestone, people's enthusiasm has partly faded away but the main commitment remains. Looking at public opinions in 2014 we see that in spite of the decline in trust in the EU and support for membership, Slovakia is still one of the most EU-phile countries. However, the positive attitudes are coupled with wide-spread indifference when it comes to participation – especially with regards to the European Parliament (EP) elections, where Slovakia has the lowest turnout of all the member states. This means that the country presents two different faces: on the one hand there is satisfaction with EU membership, on the other, there is little interest in European issues and a critically low turnout in European elections. Record-high abstention was recorded for the third time in May 2014, so we can say it is not an outlier phenomenon, but a deeper cultural and behavioral pattern. The unusual combination of above average positive sentiment towards EU membership and passive indifference to the elections is now being called the "Slovak paradox."

NATO – SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

To gain public support for NATO accession has been much bigger challenge than for the EU. Public support for EU membership was high and very stable long before accession. While the factors influencing the public's support for EU accession were prevailingly socio-economic in nature, the benefits of joining NATO remained unclear for a sizable portion of the population. The most widely proclaimed benefit of membership was increased security. Other (indirect) benefits included a positive effect on direct foreign investments and

on the economy, and strengthening of democracy, although these impacts were only seen as marginal.

The lower level of support for NATO membership compared to EU membership was due partly to the fact that the public was not as convinced of its benefits. Moreover, there was general apprehension regarding the possible negative repercussions of membership, such as that Slovakia would pulled into armed conflicts or would be forced to increase military spending, and even that the country might lose its sovereignty. These differences in the public perception of membership in the European Union and NATO remain unchanged even years after the country's accession to both organizations.

Slovakia went through the integration processes for the EU and NATO simultaneously, and joined both organizations in the same year. As for the Euro-Atlantic integration there were different patterns among the accession countries. Whereas in Slovakia the support for EU was much higher than for NATO, it was the other way around in the Baltic countries where the security factor vis-á-vis Russian Federation had its weight in people's minds.

In Slovakia, the weaker support for joining NATO was associated not only with the perceived weak reasons for entry, but also worries about the consequences it would bring. The spontaneous responses most frequently cited included fears over Slovakia being dragged into armed conflicts, the increase in military spending, as well as the loss of sovereignty.

In addition there were still many myths persisting in people's mind from the time of Cold War – above all the image of NATO as an aggressive military bloc or that entering NATO would destroy good trade relations with Russia. Many in Slovakia still held the idea that neutrality is in Slovakia's best national interest and the country is independently capable of guaranteeing its security.

In 2000-2002, the Slovak government has implemented a comprehensive communication campaign to inform the public about the Alliance. The

activities largely involved non-governmental organizations. Thanks to awareness-raising campaign, the support for the Alliance has reached the majority of population. At the time of joining NATO, the public support, although majority, was not dominant. This corresponded with the fact that the expectations were also strongly balanced by the risk factors (e.g. as an ally Slovakia could become the target of terrorist attacks), as well as the requirement of increased spending on the military.

The Transatlantic Trends 2004 survey (conducted only a few months after the accession) confirmed relatively weak identification of the public with obligations stemming from their country's NATO membership. According to this survey, only about half of the respondents agreed with the military involvement in defending Slovakia's ally. In the early years, a large portion of the population did not view the country's NATO membership as an obligation and a responsibility. In other words, the Article 5 of the NATO treaty, so-called Musketeers´ principle, which says that an attack on one NATO member is an attack on all, was not fully internalized in public perception.

The ambiguity of the early years of membership has been reflected also in Transatlantic Trend surveys. Based on the findings from 2004-2006, GMF analyst Ronald Asmus distinguishes two categories of post-communist countries: 1) those whose publics are willing to support an activist foreign policy, are pro-US and largely pro-European, and whose leaders want to punch above their weight (Poland, Romania), and 2) countries whose publics and elite are more inward looking, minimalist and non-activist (Slovakia, Bulgaria).[41] Moving Slovakia out of this category was not possible without a strong commitment toward transatlantic cooperation, and its active promotion, by political leaders and other public actors.

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[41] Presentation of TT 07 by Ronald Asmus in Warsaw, September 26, 2007. Later on, a third group – not in the TT findings – was identified: countries whose political leaderships are activist, but where the public can still go either way (the Czech Republic and the Baltic countries).

Few years later the Transatlantic Trends survey indicated that the Atlanticism of Slovaks is on the rise. In 2010 the comparison of data on Slovakia with previous surveys has revealed a considerable shift of the public opinion towards pro-transatlantic views and identification with NATO. Since 2004 when Slovakia became a full-fledged member of NATO and the European Union, the perception of these two memberships among the population has been rather dissimilar. Whereas the image of the EU has been always very positive, the image of the Alliance was more controversial and the reasons for Slovakia's membership in the latter one were less obvious to the average citizen. This ambiguity was documented in all TT surveys since 2004 by indicators like the essentiality of NATO for country's security or the commitment to NATO's role and tasks. Relatively shallow transatlantic identity of the Slovak public was indirectly reflected also in the low numbers of respondents approving with the US foreign policies or convinced about the desirability of US leadership in world affairs. On one hand, the attitudes of Slovaks contrasted with those of Poles or Romanians; on the other hand they were similar to those of Bulgarians. In 2010, however, the survey has caught us by a positive surprise: as many as 64% of Slovaks gave an affirmative response to the statement "NATO is essential for the security of our country." It is not only 5 % points above the EU11 average, but also – even more importantly – 12 % points more than in 2009. Higher figures among the eleven EU member countries are only in the Netherlands, Great Britain, Portugal, and Romania – the countries, which have traditionally belonged to the more pro-Atlantic part of Europe.[42]

How did this shift happen? Why is the 2010 public opinion in Slovakia so different from 2004, when the country presented itself in the survey as an "outlier" with an "insular mentality"? Supposedly, this progress can be attributed to the synergic impact of several factors. The first of them is the time factor: with six years since Slovakia's admission to NATO; the population has got used to the membership and perceives the decision about the strategic

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[42] Transatlantic Trends survey in 2010.

geopolitical adherence of Slovakia as a *fait accompli*. In other words, former concepts of Slovakia's neutrality and the fantasies about Slovakia's role of a bridge between the East and the West, which found support in a part of the political community and general public in the mid 1990s, are now out of date. Secondly, during those six years, Slovakia has been acting as a responsible member of the Alliance. The participation of our soldiers in the missions has filled many citizens with the feelings of pride and identification. Thirdly, in the recent years, Slovakia's military engagement has not been challenged by any of the relevant political parties. After 2007, also the anti-American rhetoric has grown weaker; earlier it had been used by the political opponents of Mikuláš Dzurinda as a political weapon against his allegedly too servile pro-American politics. That is also the reason why the attitudes towards NATO have improved among the supporters of Robert Fico and the three coalition parties – Smer-SD, SNS, and ĽS-HZDS. None of these parties used the anti-Atlantic or anti-American card before the 2009 presidential elections and the 2010 parliamentary elections. Fourthly, the "Atlanticization" of the Slovak public has been enhanced also by a greater media visibility of the Slovak security community and its participation in international transatlantic network. The NATO summit in Bratislava in October 2009 was one of those important opportunities when the general public could realize the transatlantic dimension of their country's politics and identity.

MENTAL GEOPOLITICAL MAP

As we indicated earlier the geopolitical perception by the public is a complex multifactor phenomenon with roots in the cultural and historical context. We could have a closer look via two different perspectives: views on the transatlantic cooperation and the perception of other countries and nations.
In their views of the transatlantic cooperation, Slovaks seem to fit into the general European pattern. Most of them believe that the United States and the European Union share enough values to be able to co-operate in solving

international problems. However, when confronted with an "either–or" choice, i.e. when asked "in terms of Slovakia's vital interests, which are more important: EU or United States?" – an overwhelming majority of Slovaks chose the European Union. Like other Europeans, the Slovaks also believe that the EU should become more independent from the United States in security and diplomatic issues and does not very much favor US leadership in international affairs.

It must be noted, however, that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had never in their recent histories faced the choice between Western Europe and the United States, as it was the case with some events and decisions (namely, but not limited to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003). For most states of the region, the classic dilemma that has pervaded the discourse in their modern history had been one of belonging to the West or the East. The only exception that essentially suspended this discourse - was the period of the Cold War, when great power rivalry foreclosed all alternatives for these countries that have found themselves caught on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. The East came to be associated with the imperialistic Russia, but also with Panslavism, Soviet domination, totalitarian regime, and for many - even military occupation. The West, on the other hand, was synonymous with democracy and prosperity. What is more, the West represented the "idea of Europe" but reached even further than that – it stood for a cultural space that stretched across the Atlantic.

In this respect, the views of the Slovak public seem close to those of the established member states. They also point to differences within the group of new accession states with Poland, in particular, standing apart from the rest. The real picture in Slovakia is even more nuanced: the public's vision of security, it turns out, owes more to the tradition of the neutral states than to that of the emerging European strategic culture with its emphasis on activist – if non-coercive foreign policy.

Let's illustrate this on the data from 2004. GMF experts (Asmus et. al., 2004) ranked various European countries according to two criteria: their commitment to the Atlantic mode of security ("Atlanticists" vs. "Independents"), and their willingness to use military force. Combining these two dimensions the authors of the study divided EU member states into four basic models: Europe à la Blair (relying on alliance with the U.S. and on military power), Europe à la Schröder (allied with the U.S. but emphasizing civilian or soft power), Europe à la Chirac (independent from the U.S. and capable to act militarily, and Europe à la Switzerland (independent and using civilian or soft power alone in foreign policy). In case of Slovakia, the public's views place the country in the fourth model, arguably even less for use of force than the (tenuous) European consensus. Needless to say, this only serves to further accentuate the distance from U.S. foreign and defence policy at the level of general public. At the same time, however, the Transatlantic Trends survey shows that Slovakia – as well as Portugal or Italy – remains deeply polarized country, with a minority firmly and passionately committed to the U.S.-European bond. It is this school of thought that allows the governments to credibly pursue a policy of closeness with Washington, despite a skeptical majority.

It is generally known about the Slovaks that they feel less distant towards Russia than other new democracies – especially those in the post-Soviet space + Poland. This pattern can be partially illustrated on a sample of just four countries.[43] The fact that new democracies do not represent a single opinion pattern can be amply illustrated by their attitudes towards Russia. According to the Transatlantic Trends, Slovaks, Bulgarians and Romanians do express weaker concerns about developments in Russia - only about a third of the citizens in these three countries are concerned about the weakening of democracy in Russia. By contrast, the concerns of Polish public are far above the EU average. For instance, 74% of Poles are concerned about Russia's behavior to its neighbors, compared with only 29% of Bulgarians and 35%

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[43] Transatlantic Trends survey in 2007.

of Slovaks! In spite of historical experience, part of the so-called former Soviet bloc does not perceive Russia as a potential threat. Contrary to Poland, where historical experience with the expansionism of its Eastern neighbors goes back to the pre-Soviet era, in other three CEE countries surveyed there prevails certain "geopolitical indifference and unresponsiveness."

In addition to weak public vigilance against the historic, "mother Russia", attitudes of the Slovak (and Bulgarian) publics are marked by tolerance to "Putinism." The roots of such attitudes could be certainly traced also to statements by some politicians. This is very important at the time of this writing when the "interpretation war" of "what's going in Ukraine" is storming in the media.

And finally we could take a closer look at public opinion in the four Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). How do the citizens of V4 countries view their partners and allies beyond the Visegrad? Who are the most and less trusted partners outside the Visegrad group cooperation?[44] Let's take a closer look at each country separately. We have asked about nine concrete nations which included the other 3 Visegrad countries, the strongest and closest European allies (Germans, English, French, Austrians), and the superpowers (Americans a Russians).

There are some common patterns to be observed, however, always with some exceptions. For all Visegrad countries the two most trusted nations are the other (neighboring) Visegrad countries, with the exception of Hungary – the Hungarians have the highest trust in Germans, followed by Austrians. For Slovaks, Czech and Poles it looks like the "Slavic" club enjoys strong ties. There are slight differences in perceptions of the West-European EU partners but not very significant. As it could be expected, the Germans ranked worse in Poland and in the Czech Republic. When looking at the more critical side

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[44] The surveys were conducted on a representative sample of adult population (approximately 1,000 respondents in each country) in the fall 2011. The project was funded by the International Visegrad Fund. For more details see: Gyárfášová 2013.

of the scale, we see that Russians enjoy the lowest trust in the other three Visegrad countries, with the exception of Slovakia, where the worst ranking is given to Americans. Slovaks' comparatively higher affinity towards Russia and higher distrust toward the USA was identified also by other international comparative surveys. The low ranking of Russia in the eyes of Poles, Czech and Hungarians reflects above all the historical experiences with 40 years of Moscow's dictatorship over their national affairs. The lukewarm position of Slovaks towards this legacy has been explained on many occasions; among other factors we can mention the delayed modernization which brought more prosperity mainly in 1960s and 1970s, so the rejection of the former regime was not as pronounced as in the Czech part of the former Czechoslovakia.

The perceptions of other nations reflect not only historical memory and experience but also recent political priorities of the political representations of the countries. Despite the nuances, we can see all four Visegrad countries as firmly embedded within their EU and transatlantic commitments.

CONCLUSION

In a globalized world no country can afford to be an inward-looking island, closed-off just with its own problems. Such circumstances also call for a higher involvement of the public. In Slovakia over the last two decades the issues of the country's role in the European and Transatlantic community, security issues, and its international responsibility have become a focus of debates at various forums. This has to seen as an exceptionally positive shift in political elites' thinking. The salience of such global issues is becoming more and more relevant and there is a greater responsibility on the politicians in sufficiently communicating them to the public. Politicians should not misuse security issues for political points, their actions should not be driven solely by public opinion, and they should take up more responsibility as leaders and be able to explain complex issues. After all, politicians do not only respond to public opinion, but also they are creating it. Causality does not work in one

direction only; it is not a one-way street. More generally, we can also talk about an attitude, which is on one hand built on responsiveness and on the other on responsibility and leadership (Kennedy–La Balme, 2003).

We are standing on the verge of crucial times for security and international relations. Slovakia is finding its own role and mission within the EU, as well as within the transatlantic and increasingly globalized community. In all these processes not only the politicians, diplomats, and experts, but also the public, will play a decisive role.

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ARMED FORCES IN 21ST CENTURY

Pavel Macko

INTRODUCTION

Do the armed forces and hard power represent still relevant instruments of national power and sovereignty in an era of globalization in the 21st Century? If so, what kind of the armed forces do we need? What purpose should they serve and what roles should they play? What are the required capabilities, size, organization, and structure? What will be the security threats and challenges they will have to cope with? These and similar questions are frequently asked by our public as well as political leaders. As the NATO-led international coalition winds down its major operations in Afghanistan and at the same time current global security environment is rapidly changing, the nations and their strategists and military planners are seeking to find the answers to these questions and fuse them into affordable plans of major military transformations. We have witnessed a number of strategic defense reviews conducted and military reforms launched just within the last decade. All of that was accompanied by the worst economic and financial crisis in over seven decades, all under the conditions of serious austerity measures and significant defense budget cuts.

In light of the current dynamic changes in geo-political situation and the fast arising serious security threats such as Ukrainian crisis, consequences of the Arab Spring, unrest in the Middle East, rise of the jihadist movements, extremist and terrorist networks, it is clear that the build-up and potential use of the armed forces is still relevant, and actually the spectrum of their potential use is broadening. Thus, the most important issue is not "if" but "what kind of the armed forces actually do we need for the 21st Century."

Armed forces as one of the main pillars of national power alongside with diplomatic, informational, and economical power will depend on these major factors:

- Nature of conflicts which will determine the required roles and capabilities of the armed forces;
- Dynamically changing security environment, challenges, and threats;
- National level of ambition and its affordability (willingness to pay the cost).

The modern armed forces can be best described by formulating requirements for the following areas, although this list is not complete:

- Purpose and roles;
- Key features and characteristics, equipment and materiel;
- Personnel and leadership, their roles and position within society;
- Doctrine, standards, procedures and training;
- Sound command and control;
- Information and knowledge management, intelligence.

NATURE OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Although some claimed the end of history with the end of the Cold War, just the opposite happened. The World is today much more complex and the security challenges more diversified. We cannot exclude a big war (major combat operations in conventional high-intensity warfare) as strong build-up of military capabilities of some regional powers, further proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as recent armed conflicts such as Russian incursion into Georgia in 2008 or the current crisis in east Ukraine, are reminding us of its relevancy. At the same time completely new security threats and challenges which are arising or the significance of already known asymmetric threats grows in magnitude.

Non-state actors and various terrorist and extremists groups are becoming networked, they leverage modern technologies and World Wide Web, media, and have sophisticated strategic communication capabilities, all in all becoming at least as relevant as traditional states. However, they are even more dangerous due to their loose control, elusive nature, lack of strict roles, non-adherence to basic rules of conflict, and their global reach without recognizing any traditional national borders. At the same time, many states have completely failed in their core tasks and have become a source of overall instability.

The conflicts including the ones between the nations become more complex and less clear. The armed forces are not the only actors and in many cases, although critical for the support of the eventual success, not even a major or decisive player. This would require a more comprehensive approach to use of the armed forces, their lethality combined with more soft capabilities and engagements and all military activities being more interconnected with other governmental sectors as well as able to cooperate with major international players, organizations and institutions such as the UN, EU, regional security organizations, and NGO's. Moreover, the conflicts and warfare go beyond their traditional domains such as land, air, and sea into new ones such as space and cyberspace. These are not any more just marginal areas of clash instead they have become major domain of the future conflicts.

As the former Chief of Staff of the US Army, Gen. Casey stated, we will live in an Era of Persistent Conflict with various intensity, location, and actors: *"...we are facing a future in which several global trends will shape the emerging security environment and exacerbate the ideological struggle we are engaged in. Although such trends pose dilemmas and opportunities, their comprehensive impact will increase security challenges and frame the conflicts ... The combined impact of these trends makes it likely that the next decades will be ones of persistent conflict - protracted confrontation among state, non-state and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use*

violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. In the years ahead, as interests collide across the globe, protracted competition and friction will manifest themselves in many forms. As a result, our commitments in the future will be more frequent and continuous; conflicts will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and will be less susceptible to the traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution"(Casey, 2009).

Among the underlining global trends with most significant impact on the nature of conflicts and security environment we can name the following:

Globalization – it can spread prosperity by accelerating the transfer of trade, technology and ideas, but it can also propagate destabilizing influences. While globalization has brought prosperity to people around the world, its benefits are unequally distributed. The interdependence of the global economy amplifies the local impact of distant crises, as demonstrated by the food, energy and financial disruptions.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - it increases the potential for catastrophic attacks that may be globally destabilizing. Al Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups already seek WMDs and, given the opportunity, will use them against Western interests.

Climate change and natural disasters - they can compound already difficult conditions in developing countries, causing humanitarian crises, driving destabilizing population migrations and raising the potential for epidemic diseases.

Failed and failing states – they lack the capacity or will to maintain territorial control and can provide safe havens for terrorist groups to plan and export operations as well as destabilize whole regions.

Demographic crisis – uncontrolled population growth in the developing world expands markets, but the accompanying "youth bulge" can also increase the

potential for instability and extremism or uncontrolled migration, particularly if not matched with growth of economy and opportunities. Fast urbanization of human population just adds to the problem. On the other hand, in some portions of the developed world, population growth is negative; depopulation undermines established economies and cultures, inviting potentially destabilizing immigration.

Technological advance - inexpensive access to information enables entrepreneurs and innovators to collaborate in developing new technologies and improving existing ones. Yet potential adversaries can exploit these same technologies to export terror around the globe.

Depletion of resources and their uneven distribution - an increased resource demand is a consequence of growing global prosperity and populations. Growing middle classes in developing markets like China, India, and Brazil will exacerbate demands on already scarce resources. These rising demands for energy, water and food may enhance the potential for conflict.

ROLES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODERN ARMED FORCES

The purpose and roles of the modern armed forces will be determined by already mentioned nature of future conflicts and security threats and challenges as well as by future operational environment. Generally, the armed forces will be most likely smaller, however requested to be able to fulfill more complex missions as opposed to the traditional mission of homeland defense. Their size, organization, equipment and training will depend on a national level of ambitions, national Grand Strategy and involvement in international security and more general international arrangements. On the other hand, the armed forces will be constrained by available resources which nations are willing to spend on their security.

Generally we can expect that the modern armed forces will be required to be able to:

- Defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- Assist domestic civilian authorities;
- Contribute to international stability and crisis management;
- Cope with asymmetric and hybrid threats.

Defense of national sovereignty and territorial integrity

Despite the growing complexity of security issues, national security has to be underpinned by a credible lethal combat force, which is able if not to defeat the potential adversary alone, then at least deter aggression by presenting credible defense capability to make cost of a potential aggression very high. The forces have to be ready for regular and irregular warfare they may face.

Assistance to domestic civilian authorities

Although the armed forces are not necessarily the main player for disaster relief or humanitarian assistance, they posses personnel, capabilities, sound planning, as well as   command and control capabilities which can be used by their governments on a short notice in case of need before the other actors are even able to organize themselves or if they lack the needed capacity. Moreover, as the armed forces are under strong and direct "command" of the national authorities and its personnel is constrained by strict military discipline as opposed to primarily civilian rescue and disaster relieve organizations, they may represent the only available initial package for mass scale non-war contingencies. Use of the armed forces for these assistance roles in line with principles of their constitutional civilian control is also the way how to get the citizens their return on investment and link the military with a broad society.

Contribution to international stability and crisis management

In the present day globalized and interconnected world, the armed forces must be ready to contribute on behalf and on request of their nations to conflict

prevention and international crisis management within different frameworks and international organizations such as UN, EU, OSCE, NATO, as well as other security organizations. While for the Cold War era the main strategy was containment, nowadays UN and other main international organizations and major security players such as NATO, EU and USA are focusing on complex engagement strategy, for example translated by NATO into so- called comprehensive approach strategy and vast partnership programs. This kind of armed forces engagements requires additional training and interoperability as well as some expeditionary capabilities.

Ability to cope with asymmetric and hybrid threats

Armed forces will be required to operate alongside civilian authorities and non-military actors, both domestic and international. Dividing lines between civilian and military tasks are becoming less obvious as non-state actors are bringing a new array of security threats. For example Special Forces may well serve as traditional assault and special reconnaissance force, but at the same time provide counter-terrorism capability or serve as security reform and capacity- building agent.

The spectrum of the armed forces capabilities and key features, roles and mission will depend on national ambition and will be different for a global player, mid-size allied state, and non-allied small country. The same is true for the resources dedicated by nations to their defense. It will depend on real security threats, regional dynamics and many other factors. For example countries like Israel and Austria have completely different security requirements and concerns and thus level of defense spending and requirements for their armed forces. In a democratic country the requirements for the armed forces depend on a Grand Strategy, traditions, economic conditions, and acceptance of the populations. These requirements are traditionally formed or described by basic national security documents such as:

- National security strategy;
- National defense strategy;

- Military strategy;

- Long-term plans of the armed forces development;

- Doctrines, policies, standards, and procedures.

Modern armed forces more or less should posses the following characteristics (depending on national ambitions with regards to their scope of engagement):

- Versatility;

- Agility;

- Expeditionary capabilities;

- Lethality;

- Sustainability;

- Interoperability.

Versatility

Versatility is a central organizing principle affecting the quality of the modern armed forces that will enable them to effectively execute operations across the complex spectrum of conflict. We cannot predict in this era of uncertainty all the specific requirements for specific "mission-tailored" forces as they will have to cope with future challenges with what they would have at hand. Versatile forces must possess a balanced mix of multipurpose capabilities and sufficient capacity for execution of various missions ranging from peacetime engagement to major combat in accordance with the established doctrine.

Expeditionary Capabilities

The armed forces might be required to deploy to the site of problems in austere and unfamiliar locations around the world, to sustain operations for extended periods of time, and to engage with the security forces of other nations. To do this, they have to posses some expeditionary capabilities. They should be organized, trained and equipped to operate in austere environments, be comfortable in diverse cultural environments, and able to conduct joint and combined operations. Personnel and leaders should have expeditionary mind-

set including broad cultural component, as they would have to interact with indigenous populations. Soldiers and leaders must feel confident interacting with people of different cultural backgrounds and perspectives.

Agility

Modern armed forces must have the ability to rapidly shift from one task to another; they must be able to quickly adapt and exploit opportunities in complex environments. To do this, it is necessary to have not only agile military units but also agile minds and institutions.

Lethality

Core capability of the armed forces which differentiates them from other institutions is their ability to apply lethal force. This competency requires the capability to outmatch any enemy across the spectrum of conflict while mitigating collateral damage. Conflicts among populations will require the use of proportional lethal force with precision and ability to quickly and accurately identify targets; discriminate between hostile, friendly and neutral actors and apply precise lethal effects on selected targets. Such a precision requires superior intelligence capabilities, precise delivery systems and broad situational awareness.

Sustainability

Armed forces will have to act with what they have at their disposal at the time of crisis. At the same time budget constrains will push them to keep minimum level of war stocks and to outsource some of supporting functions. On the other hand, the anticipated expeditionary use will demand fast deployment of minimal set of forces and supporting structures. However, the success of the armed forces will depend not only on the speed of their deployment, but also on their endurance of operational tempo. Therefore, the modern armed forces must have quickly adaptable and deployable schemes of their support at home and abroad. They must be able to integrate national and global resources to ensure that forces are physically available, properly equipped, at the right

place at the right time, with the right tools to support the combat commanders. In other words, modern military must be both effective and efficient.

Interoperability

If the armed forces should be part of a broader multinational force, be it peace-keeping or war fighting coalition and operate in a complex environment alongside international and local non-military actors, they have to be able to communicate and collaborate with them. It does not mean only the capability to operate on the same radio frequencies and utilize the same caliber ammunition; an interoperable army must be able to build unity of effort with other government agencies, indigenous forces and international partners.

Although the complexity of requirements for the armed forces will be growing, the modern army cannot be built in order to do everything and nations will have to prioritize in accordance with their national ambitions, regional context and ability to finance military in competition with other public services.

ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES, EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL

The organization and equipment of the armed forces are determined by the spectrum of roles and capabilities required by nations. They have to reflect the changing nature of conflict and character of security threats. While nations have to maintain major combat capabilities for the core competency which is deterrence and defense of homeland against military aggression, at the same time they need to keep armed forces technologically advanced and develop or acquire brand new niche capabilities. All capabilities and equipment supporting main features of the modern army are of particular importance.

Organization has to reflect new roles for the military as well as best "business practices" of the civilian corporations. Structures and command and control philosophy of the armed forces has to reflect the dynamic nature

of conflicts, need for speed in the military decision- making process as well as growing complexity of operational environment and military tasks. While relatively small and functionally narrow, military headquarters were needed for traditional high-intensity maneuver warfare and major combat operations, however, contemporary stabilization operations such as the one in Afghanistan, require more robust and complex staffs and broader spectrum of staff expertise as well as field capabilities.

Even relatively small tactical unit such as battalion if employed as a stabilizing force in some Afghan province must be able to control or at least to monitor unprecedented geographical area, conduct wide spectrum of engagements on a sustained basis, understand governance and civilian management principles and procedures in an unfamiliar socio-economic environment, and at the same time maintain the ability to act swiftly to suppress any attempt of combat attacks by insurgents. For that they have to fully understand joint capabilities, request and receive air support and utilize all different kinds of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets and support reaching from tactical to a strategic level. Battalion or brigade commander in addition to his traditional military role of the command and control authority in a strictly organized combat structure all of the sudden becomes advisor to a governor, a diplomat and negotiator, coordinator or facilitator of public governance and services, as well as security and development adviser, legal advisor, trainer of partnering forces and more. Simply put, traditional operational or strategic level responsibilities and missions and even some civilian competencies are now concentrated at this tactical level.

While the leaders and military personnel have to be versatile, the same is valid for the headquarters and overall military structures. They become less rigid and more fluent; any military organization must be ready and adept at permanent change. This has deep impact on all career systems, education, training and institutional support. Mission command is more important than ever, delegation of the authorities and "flattening" of the chain of command will be inevitable.

If the armed forces have to be versatile, they need more diverse and multifunctional equipment in their inventory. Technological advance on one hand provides opportunity to gain the edge over potential adversary; on the other hand it requires permanent modernization and innovation. Even in the case of major combat systems the numbers do not substitute anymore for the quality or combat efficiency of advanced systems. The "entry cost" for effective combat competition or the threshold minimum capabilities to be able to cope with adversary or to join partners is significantly growing with growing speed of technological innovations, automation, introduction of various sensor systems and technology for information sharing. If the armed forces are not able to meet such a threshold, they are not just becoming less combat efficient, something that could be compensated with quantity of outdated systems, but they are becoming irrelevant as they cannot match by any means the level of their adversaries or potential coalition partners. This will put significant pressure on many nations who will have to prioritize and make hard choices. On the other hand it will provide more opportunities for cooperation as they can join initiatives like the NATO's Smart Defense, Pooling and Sharing of the EU or different regional initiatives such as Visegrad Four and others.

Development of military-specific equipment and materiel becomes more problematic and expensive and in many areas the armed forces are not anymore the technological leader as they were in the past. In consequence, they will have to adapt the commercial of-the-shelf equipment and find the best military use for it in order to be able to react to fast changes and proliferation of relatively cheap technology to the different groups of non-state actors.

The military will have to adopt the best practices of their civilian partners in order to stay relevant, efficient and keep growing operational tempo and at the same time keep size and cost of the armed forces lower. Reducing inventories, modular block maintenance schemes, and contracting support in theater of operations are becoming a norm. New principles and tools of

effective sustainment of the force like just-in-time logistics, multinational logistic solutions, modern supply chain management, total asset visibility, synchronization of suppliers and customers, and introduction of something like key performance indicators are just few examples (Accenture, 2009).

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Modern army and its leaders must be able to make informed and sound decisions in a timely manner and have the ability to effectively execute these decisions by the forces on the battlefield, be it the real one or the virtual one such as cyber space. For that reason they must have the command structures (headquarters) and staff, equipment, doctrine, procedures, and supporting information systems allowing for superior command and control (C2) of its operations. In a contemporary conflict, be it traditional or irregular one, the one who has faster and more effective decision-making process reflected in C2 capabilities has a better chance to prevail and eventually win. Mission command is an underlining key principle of the modern command and control.

Effective and efficient decision-making process will require maintaining full situational awareness, understanding of its meaning and assessing contribution of ongoing operations to the overall objectives of a military campaign. In addition, it means adopting the campaign plan and adjusting the conduct of operations by clear and sound decisions and orders to subordinated formations and effective and efficient execution of these decisions and orders by the assigned troops. This system must be supported by the robust information systems and C2 support tools. While intelligence has to provide information on the opposing forces as one of the major components of the situational awareness in the form of a complex common operational picture (COP), the supporting systems such as tracking of positions of own and friendly forces, systems, and platforms (blue force tracker) together with networked command systems allow most efficient employment and control of own capabilities.

C2 support systems will have to provide timely information on enemy, friendly forces, levels of stocks, imagery, as well as platforms for collaborative tools on all levels, from strategic down to the smallest tactical unit. Modern forces must be able to complexly plan mission at the headquarters, use for that purpose all available intelligence from national and coalition sources, and disseminate this plan in automated format to troops and units already en route to a specific mission or engagement area. Upon reception, the units should be able to execute tactical mission planning and war-game the planed battle during the movement, adjust the plan and receive intelligence and other updates to their portion of COP, including motion video from overhead assets deployed already to the area of battle. Once they arrive to the place of battle, interconnected forces can control the conduct of battle; see "behind the corner" and integrate joint fires from various air, land or maritime platforms.

There are dozens of so called functional area systems in support of COP generation, mission planning, intelligence sharing and processing, logistic support, reception, staging and onward movement (RSOM), planning and execution tracking available to the commanders already now. However, the major challenge is how to make all of these tools mutually interoperable, with open architecture allowing further upgrades and integration of the new tools and technology. As achieving unification and commonality of these systems among nations even within NATO is almost impossible (it was possible to some extent in the former Warsaw Pact centrally "commanded" by the USSR), the systems have to be designed in such a way that they allow at least for federalization of various national and service-specific networks and systems. This was exactly the approach adopted by NATO in Afghanistan by creating the so-called Afghan Mission Network, which connected all NATO and ISAF partner forces in one operational network and allowed efficient collaboration of this multinational force. However, it has taken many years to reach this capability and we may not be given so much time in a potential future mission. Therefore NATO wants to utilize all lessons learned and

experience gained to start to create rules and preconditions for any future mission already now through its program called the Future Mission Network.

Acquiring of the command and control capabilities with some basic functionality required by the commanders and staffs is not sufficient. These systems have to fulfill some additional requirements such as:

- Interoperability;
- Robustness and reliability;
- Survivability and resistance to jamming and other electronic warfare actions.

Effective and timely intelligence, ability to share it with or gain it from partners becomes critical for the success of the modern military. Various kinds of specific intelligence such as HUMINT (Human Intelligence), ELINT (Electronic Intelligence), COMINT (Communications Intelligence), SIGINT (Signal Intelligence), IMINT (Imagery Intelligence), OSINT (Open Source Intelligence), MASINT (Measurements and Signature Intelligence), GEOINT (Geospatial Intelligence), TECHINT (Technical Intelligence), and FININT (Financial Intelligence) became regular part of inventory of nations and their armed forces and other national security institutions. They provide huge opportunities in our own hands but at the same time pose a grave threat to own forces if in hands of our adversaries.

Capabilities like small unmanned aerial vehicles loaded with sensors and cameras (UAV) become regular equipment of small units like battalion or even company and small Special Forces teams (Birdsal, 2013). Downlink from strategic satellite assets and satellite communications, ability to integrate to a joint fight at the smallest unit level become core capabilities of these units.

However, possession of all of these systems and tools create another challenge for the military personnel and leaders. While it empowers "strategic lieutenant" or even "strategic corporal" it also brings a risk of turning highest ranking

generals into "tactical generals" as they might have tendency to use available detailed information from a battle field in real time to direct tactical fight over communications means (McCausland, Martin, 2001). Moreover, all of these systems will eventually be only as effective as the military personnel will be able to handle and utilize them.

PERSONNEL AND LEADERSHIP

Despite all technological advance and existence of all various powerful systems and tools, military personnel remains the most valuable "asset" of the modern military. Personnel recruitment, selection, education, training and support, including leadership development must be in the center of focus of the national institutions and senior commanders.

While some western nations like Norway and Denmark keep compulsory military service as the recruitment pool for professional force and an instrument of citizenship- building, most of the modern militaries have opted for all-voluntary forces due to growing demand on professionalism . The revolution in military affairs and growing complexity of military service make it almost impossible to train recruits to a required level in a short period allocated to this end. However, a professional army must pay more attention to education and character building of the professional soldiers and maintaining its links with the society at large. Otherwise the military can easily slip towards an unreliable mercenary force instead of being a nation's patriotic army.

Although the professional force creates an active component of the modern military ready for immediate use, the reserve component and mobilization of reserves is still relevant for its reinforcement, particularly due to a significant pressure on costs associated with national defense. While the active component maintains capabilities of the armed forces, the reserve component can provide a fill in the gap in their capacity for a major contingency.

As professional military service is ultimately profession or job, the armed forces must compete on the market for the high quality "labour force" with other employers and represent a modern employer (Deutsche Welle, 2014). Sufficient attention must be paid to retention systems and social support to the soldiers. If it takes a considerable expense to train a good soldier, we cannot afford to lose him or her prematurely and seek another recruit. New more complex and demanding role of the soldiers requires more comprehensive education and preparation as well as frequent mission-specific preparation. To train a soldier just to master his/her weapon system and basic tactics is not sufficient. It has to be complemented by extra lectures on psychology, social science, culture, history, and requires cultivating special personal traits.

The role of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) is growing significantly. *"He leads our Soldiers into 21st-century battle. He cares for, trains, and directs our soldiers in peace and in war. He is the primary implementer of our new doctrine and concepts. He commands the small units maneuvering our new platforms and engaging the enemy with our new weapons systems. He is the face of the American people as he interacts with indigenous people on counterinsurgency battlefields"* (Proctor, 2009).

The above demands call for development of the leadership skills of the NCOs, which deserves special attention. For example in the Afghan National Army, the NCO Corps becomes the driving force of change and has contributed to higher combat effectiveness of their army despite a traditional leadership paradigm based on seniority and even age. Although the context of threat and its complexity changes, the relationship between the leader and the led soldiers requires education in military art already at this level. Therefore the new leadership development models for the 21st century must recognize the NCO as an agent of change in a transforming force with focus on human-centric nature of conflicts and the armed forces.

Complex security and operational environment of the 21st Century require new leaders and leadership style. These leaders are requested to cope with a set of problems to navigate through religious, tribal, ethnic, social, and political variables. The leaders must have three major attributes:

- Leader in character;
- Leader with presence;
- Leader with intellectual capacity.

DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

Persistent conflict and dynamic security and operational environment changes will pose another challenge for the armed forces. As the doctrine and training must reflect this environment and must prepare forces to operate within it, the armed forces have to become dynamic and flexible as well.

The doctrine and related manuals and procedures will have to follow the speed of the environmental changes as well as their availability and form should match technological development in a civilian domain. For example, the US Army has changed its doctrine a number of times since the end of Cold War. It has transitioned form Air-Land Battle (1982-1993), through the Doctrine in Transition (1993-2001), Full Spectrum Operations doctrine with focus on counterinsurgency and stability operations (2001-2011), to the current Unified Land Operations doctrine.

Unified Land Operations doctrine has its foundation in the key ideas of the Air-Land Battle and full spectrum operational concepts as well as reflects the current changes in security environment. It articulates the importance of mission command and operational art and in the 2011 version of the ADP 3-0 offers two additional ideas which are worthy of introduction. One, lethality, is certainly not a new idea, but its articulation as „the most basic building block for military operations" is. The second, the introduction of combined

arms maneuver and wide area security as the Army's two core competencies, represents an important addition whose utility and meaning require further discussion. "*It is important to note that wide area security and combined arms maneuver do not supplant offense, defense, and stability operations, nor are they intended for use as tactical tasks. Instead, they provide commanders a means to describe the arrangement of tactical actions and/or the application of combat power to achieve a position of advantage over an enemy. The core competencies are applicable in all Army operations, at all echelons*" (Benson, 2012).

Education and training system must produce capable and ready forces led by credible and strong leaders. The force has to be trained for the spectrum of potential mission in an environment close to an operational reality in line with "train as you fight" principle. While education is focusing on knowledge development and formation of capable soldiers and sound leaders which must possess knowledge to cope with the unknown and the unpredictable, training has to prepare the force for the known mission and tasks. The new security environment has changed the demands on the training which must be considered when determining an effective way to educate officers for the future. As the technology deeply penetrated the C2 support systems, their use became part of the core competency of the senior officers and commanders. Therefore their understanding of capabilities and power of these systems is as important as mastering the doctrine, procedures and operational art.

Training remains the essential element that ensures success in battle. However, complexity and methods of training must reflect the changes of operational environment as well as the way military does business. Modern forms of training have to be introduced, new technologies and systems have to be used and trained with not only as a working tool during conduct of operations, but also as the main vehicle for transformation of the training itself. Modern life, virtual, and constructive (LVC) simulation systems, combined with the live field exercises provide unprecedented opportunities for more complex

and realistic training. Distant learning and interactive e-learning are gaining significant momentum as they have the capacity to reach masses at very low cost.

If the armed forces are intended to participate in multinational operations they have to be trained for such operational use. Training can be internationalized and nations can share same training resources and capabilities and eventually interconnect them in order to allow more complex distributed training.

INTEROPERABILITY

Armed forces will be rarely operating in isolation. Even the biggest national players like USA will for one or another reason seek to create coalition of the willing or use its default transatlantic link and NATO support in future conflicts and involvement of the partners around the globe. The same is true for UN-led peace-keeping operation, which are by default international operations. Additionally, comprehensive approach requires not only inter-military interoperability, but much broader interactions starting from de-confliction, through coordination, collaboration to unified international action with non-military actors. This will put extraordinary requirements on technical, doctrinal, and procedural interoperability of the armed forces as well as their ability to co-exist, communicate, and share information with others.

As the NATO today represents a sort of reference point not just for its members but also for many partners, let's discuss interoperability more through the prism of NATO's initiatives in this area. NATO and its partners have experienced their highest ever engagement out of area during the last decade. Operational engagements in Balkans and particularly in Afghanistan have brought NATO and participating partner militaries much closer and they have reached unprecedented level of cooperation and integration on all levels, from strategic down to the smallest tactical unit. It has been a truly

transformational decade for the NATO and its national forces. The Alliance can be seen as more experienced, interoperable and more partnership-oriented than ever before. While the requirements for maintaining Allied capabilities for full spectrum response remain untouched, the nature and complexity of security threats is dynamically changing. The threats are less visible and more networked, which calls for a full set of new capabilities for the Alliance. These were widely addressed in the NATO's new Strategic Concept and commitments from Lisbon and Chicago Summits. Smart Defense Initiative and its complementary Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) represent main avenues of efforts and at the same time ways how to maintain our still relevant present capabilities and acquire new ones how to acquire robust, trained and mission-ready NATO Forces 2020. While Smart Defense is about acquiring and maintaining the needed capabilities, the CFI focuses on making them more interoperable.

As NATO winds down its major operational commitments in ISAF and prepares for a different form of engagement in Afghanistan, it strives to preserve significant momentum in terms of cooperation and interoperability gained internally and with NATO partners. In the absence of possible major operational commitment, an intensified education, training and exercising can be the only practical way for NATO and other militaries to acquire and further bolster the new capabilities allowing it to be more flexible, deployable and adapted to defend its own territory from any threat as well as to cope with the emerging security threats which are more functional in nature than those geographical or purely military ones. This is the reason why NATO introduced CFI in the first place.

In post-ISAF era we cannot expect significant growth of training and overall defense budgets in a foreseeable future. Many nations have no ambition, and even no capabilities, to act unilaterally on a larger scale any more. Thus acting as a part of broader coalition is not an option but a default setup for the future use of the armed forces of many nations. Ability to quickly assemble or

regroup and act effectively together in combined formations in other words interoperability is absolutely paramount. Interoperability can be achieved through standardization of equipment, doctrines, education, and training. From this point of view the major three areas of interoperability are:

- Operational interoperability;
- Doctrinal interoperability;
- Technical interoperability and interconnectivity.

Operational interoperability

Core of the effort and the ultimate objective is to achieve operational interoperability and higher level of readiness through intensified training and exercises. Ability to participate in multinational operations should be an organic part of national training of the forces. Combined joint integrated multilevel exercises including LIVEX (Live Exercises), bringing together the headquarters and forces should represent a regular culminating event for achieving ultimate operational interoperability, which will make sure that "chiefs and Indians" are well trained and coming from the same "tribe."

Mental and doctrinal interoperability

Enhanced education and training should facilitate achieving of "mental and doctrinal interoperability" as a key prerequisite for reaching the operational interoperability. Senior military leaders, officers and all personnel should be trained as "multinational" or "NATO" personnel, in case of NATO forces, ready to "plug in" to coalition effort throughout the whole career development. This will require much closer harmonization and standardization of the national military educational and training systems and programs. National institutions at least of NATO nations will have to educate and train all personnel from the beginning of their professional growth to be able to integrate and act as a part of the international coalition effort and at the same time preserve all aspects of national interests as well as citizenship- and patriotism-building.

Technical interoperability and interconnectivity

Better use of technology as referred in NATO's CFI should aim at achieving technical interoperability and interconnectivity as a key enabler and force multiplier. If NATO Forces 2020 should be born interoperable, their equipment has to fit together and be more interchangeable and cross-supportable, their Command and Control (C4I2S) systems have to talk to each other, and their headquarters should be interconnected. To some extent, the same is true for partner forces willing to take part in NATO-led operations. Technical interoperability is relevant also for training tools and systems. National training support tools, systems and training centers could be more harmonized and more permanently connected together in order to facilitate closer collaboration and more combined and joint integrated training. Militaries should move from isolated stove-piped systems and applications towards more flexible, modular systems and solutions.

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INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPLES OF ENERGY SECURITY

Joshua Posaner

Global energy markets are in transition, and with change comes renewed debate over the security of the supply of natural resources that fuel the world's economies. The uneven distribution of oil and gas reserves and the diverse transit routes through which they are traded form the basis of a global chessboard over which great power politics has often been played out.

Energy security makes and breaks economies. The rapid rise of China is fuelled by energy imports, while Russia helps to maintain its status in the world order (and budget) with resource sales abroad accounting for 68% of total export revenue according to a report by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2014). These factors help to create patterns of dependence and interdependence over increasingly globalised supply chains.

In 2013, China imported a net 6.3 million barrels of oil per day while its gas imports rose by over 32%, cementing its position as a global demand driver for new liquefied natural gas (LNG) export projects being developed in Australia. Meanwhile, global primary energy consumption rose 2.3% last year compared to 1.8% in 2012, with emerging economies accounting for 80% of the increase, according to an annual study by supermajor BP (BP, 2014).

This led the International Energy Agency to report that "the centre of gravity of energy demand is switching decisively to the emerging economies, particularly China, India and the Middle East" (IEA, 2014). In turn, these patterns are creating new arenas for dispute between new economic powerhouses and established economies over climate responsibilities and scarcity of reserves.

But although traditionally energy security covers the trade in hydrocarbons and the often fraught relationship between producers and consumers, contemporary discourse also deals with the struggle to 'keep the lights on' by maintaining and developing power infrastructure in an era where renewables competes against nuclear, coal, gas and oil for a stake in the fuel mix. In Europe today, some countries such as Germany are seeing threats to stable power production emerge not from foreign supply disruption, but rather from heavily subsidised renewables and an uncertain position for traditional fuels like natural gas. This further accentuates the need for balance in the energy sector between different fuels and suppliers.

But it is the securitisation of a primarily non-military issue that is at the core of the study of energy security. As argued by Buzan et al, this politicisation process places energy above the public policy sphere justifying responses "outside the bounds of normal political procedure" (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998: 23). It is this factor which makes the study of energy security such a key topic in today's global system, where the rules of the game are constantly being re-written, and the new lead actors of energy demand are dictating the pace of growth.

Designed as an introduction to the themes and principles of energy security, this chapter will first trace the development of the concept, briefly defining the area, before moving on to discuss historical milestones that have helped shape the understanding of the field in the twenty-first century. Finally, it will focus on the Eurasian gas market as a contemporary study of the securitisation process allowing us to draw implications for the future of gas supply politics in the region.

DEFINITIONS

'Energy security' as a distinct and definable sub-section within the broader security debate reached a century recently with the advent of renewed fears

over gas supply security in Europe, conflict-induced oil production losses in North Africa and the Middle East and omnipresent fears over piracy that dog maritime tanker-based trade in oil products and LNG.

In July 1913, shortly before the outbreak of World War 1, Winston Churchill, at the time First Lord of the Admiralty in the British navy, addressed the House of Commons to announce that the maritime fleet he led would shift from coal to oil in a bid to outpace the rival German force. In doing so he also articulated a tenet of energy security discourse still very much relevant today – the importance of diversification – while also connecting the military security sphere to energy.

"On no one quality, on no one process, on no one country, on no one route, and on no one field must we be dependent. Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone," Churchill said, recognising the new risk that came with switching from locally abundant coal resources to remote sources of oil (Yergin, 1992: 160). Although all agree on diversification as a principle, whether that should come primarily in source, or merely transit route, is an ongoing debate in relation to Europe's reliance on Russian gas today.

More than a century after 1913, with the World War II struggle for the oil fields of the Caucasus; the 1973 oil crisis; the Russia-Ukraine 'gas wars' of 2006 and 2009; and a number of other major market events in between that have helped shape price development and infrastructure investment, behind us, the securitisation of energy supply remains a constant spectre of international relations. Governments count the safe and secure supply of energy resources as a strategic issue vital to continued growth, and in some cases have threatened to exert military force to protect reserves and transit corridors. Pipeline projects such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil link, Nord Stream gas pipeline and its proposed counter-balance Nabucco have become diplomatic fault lines in Eurasia providing for the return to prominence of geopolitical

theorists who see energy infrastructure and reserves as assets which need to be controlled under a balance of power.

But in order to explore energy security as a discourse and the various practical examples of its deployment in foreign affairs, it is first necessary to understand its definition. A number of these exist, with the IEA opting for the succinct and oft-cited description of the "uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price" (IEA, 2011).

Historian and author Daniel Yergin expanded this in a 1988 article to suggest at the strategic role of natural resources to the modern nation state. To him, energy security is an aim that should "assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and objectives" (Yergin, 1988: 111).

This is further developed in a 2007 study by the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre in Japan, which defines energy security as "the ability of an economy to guarantee the availability of energy resource supply in a sustainable and timely manner with the energy price being at a level that will not adversely affect the economic performance of the economy," (APERC, 2007: 6).

This latter definition illustrates the importance of sourcing energy reserves from abroad to fuel a dynamic Japanese economy built on an island nation with few resource endowments of its own. Meanwhile, Yergin's description hints at broader strategic interests, often reflected in US foreign policy pursuits.

In short, where you are in the world dictates how you view energy security and the concept means different things to different people at different times. Here, we concern ourselves with how the energy factor fits into broader international relations and how it affects the interplay between state actors.

As Buzan et al argued, transferring energy to the politicised sphere with the term 'security' suggests that problems can only be resolved in emergency

mode (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998: 24). This places the energy question out of the realms of normal politics and in turn raises questions over whether our understanding of '*energy security*' as an ideal is in itself a good thing, or whether it actually denotes the transferral of a civilian issue that should be confined to public policy to the military arena (Yafimava, 2011: 12). This in turn creates a new kind of vocabulary to describe interstate relations on energy security.

To avoid military endeavours to ensure resources and to secure reliable supply in this securitised arena, state actors undertake 'energy diplomacy' – defined by Goldthau and Witte as "the use of foreign policy to secure access to energy supplies abroad and to promote (mostly bilateral, that is, government to government) cooperation in the energy sector" (Goldthau, Witte, 2010: 28). Likewise, producers may seek to use an 'energy weapon' to enforce foreign policy aims on captive consumers without undertaking military operations, although there is some debate over how successful such actions are in achieving these goals (Stegen 2011: 6505).

These factors then in turn return us to the issue of interdependence between producers and consumers. The trade in energy products is a delicate balance between the strategic value of holding the resource and the need to sustain revenue, or rents, for the sale of the product. Proponents of this thesis argue that Russia may be able to cut off supplies to states dependent on its gas, but the economic sanction of doing this would be heavier in Moscow than the net gain politically. The delay to the incorporation of gas related sanctions in packages accepted by the EU against Russia as of September 2014 can be seen as recognition by the recipient party of the mutual interdependence–annexing the issue of gas supply out of the broader dispute for months despite its relevance as a tool of leverage.

When looking closely at this energy system and the relationship between supplier and consumer, Yafimava suggests that it is helpful to think of

it as a "circuitry of flows" between state and corporate actors engaged in "relationships of interdependence" underpinned by spaces including commercial contracts, bilateral and multilateral agreements, international treaties and political relations (Yafimava, 2011: 32). Energy and cash travel through this 'space of flows' between each actor and disruption to any area underpinning this trade can trip the circuitry, leading to a breakdown in the export/import cycle posing a threat to reliable supply.

Of course, the build-out of this circuitry of supply has a complicated history, shaped by responses to previous disruptions and, in parts of Europe at least, by the Cold War legacy of pipeline infrastructure. This history has helped forge a modern understanding of energy security as having four underlying dimensions depending on context: availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability, with each somehow reflected in the earlier definitions (Kruyt et al, 2009).

In order to explore the relevance of energy security and its associated dimensions in the modern context in Eurasia it is also necessary to discuss the impact of previous energy crises and how those frame the contemporary debate in Europe and the former Soviet space. Risks to energy security come in a diverse set of forms all along the supply chain from political risk factors in producing countries, to technical malfunction in transportation, or poor infrastructural development in the downstream area, or fears over whether available reserves are enough to meet spiralling demand. Fears over 'Peak Oil', natural disasters and human error are also omnipresent worries for energy security watchers.

HISTORY OF RISK

Churchill's decision in 1913 was taken in the knowledge of the potential for conflict and the perils of relying on foreign powers for natural resources. But although the strategic deployment of energy reserves and their use in the

security sector can be traced back to Churchill's speech and World War 1, the entrance of 'energy security' into the mainstream was only crystalised in 1973 with the oil crisis.

Earlier supply cuts to shipments through the Suez Canal in the 1950s had already caused consumers in the West to look to non-Middle Eastern sources but the events of 1973 and early 1974 – most notably the economic impact on the US and Europe – gave cause for wholesale reform to how the world sought and consumed energy resources. It also guaranteed that the safe supply of energy would become an issue which the state itself would have a responsibility to ensure.

The crisis began in earnest during October 1973 with the Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announcing an oil embargo in response to Western support for Israel during the Yom Kippur war. The cut-off increased the global oil price by four times to $12 per barrel by March 1974, caused recession and led to fuel rationing in the US (Yergin, 1992: 597). It gave new political power to producers and also brought the cost of relying on foreign resources home to households throughout Europe and the US. Oil dependence now meant economic vulnerability.

The legacy of 1973 remains today, with the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) shortly after aiming at the "development and implementation of a long-term co-operation programme to reduce dependence on imported oil" (OECD, 1974). From its base in Paris, the IEA works with 29 member countries to maintain a constantly evolving evaluation of threats and rapid responses to potential risks. In addition it provides constant commentary on global trends and production and consumption rates while also acting as a counterweight to the OPEC cartel – which today includes 12 oil producing member states who work to align production quotas and set prices.

The 1973 crisis also led energy companies to seek more remote and harder to develop oil and gas reserves in a bid to ensure demand was satisfied. But despite these efforts, the oil price fluctuated greatly over the following two-decades, reaching $95 per barrel due to the Iran-Iraq war in 1981 before crashing back to $12 in the late 1990s as the Asian financial crisis took hold dampening demand (Smith, 2009: 145). The rise in demand was countered by the realities of international affairs. The boom and bust cycles of oil prices create security concerns in themselves, but the globalised nature of the market and financial tools at hand for arbitrage have helped to buffer losses.

But Europe's lack of immediate major oil supply alternatives in the 1970s saw the development of natural gas – previously mainly an inconvenient by-product of the exploitation of oil reserves - as a substitute fuel. The discovery and exploitation of the largest gas field in the EU at Groningen in the Netherlands from the 1960s onwards, in addition to production in the British and Norwegian sectors of the North Sea, provided some relief to oil import dependence – allowing indigenous production to replace foreign oil in power generation for example.

However, the physical nature of natural gas has encouraged highly localised transmission networks compared to liquid oil which can easily be traded globally by tanker into port terminals. This has led to heavily developed infrastructure areas in northwestern Europe where indigenous reserves were found and needed to be sent to shore for use compared to elsewhere on the continent. Gas trade flows in Europe remain heavily regionalised and so, therefore, are prices.

Whereas today oil is traded in a global market, with supply and demand factors reflected in the overall price development of WTI and the Brent pricing benchmarks, gas supply remains a business for natural monopolies – or single suppliers who control infrastructure and production, for example, Gazprom in Europe. This means that price volatility in the oil market becomes a global

cause for concern but is also more easily stabilised by a ramp up in production elsewhere, but for natural gas, price rises in Germany traditionally have little or no effect on trading in, say, China.

Even today, three major gas markets exist with a series of smaller sub-markets identifiable. Firstly, the US market is priced around the Henry Hub exchange benchmark with the lowest global prices, forced down by the rapid build out of shale gas over the last decade and aided by extensive private transmission infrastructure. Secondly, an Asian market which relies heavily on LNG trade due to low domestic production and high industrial consumption in stranded markets not connected to mainline pipeline infrastructure means countries like Japan pay the highest price for imports globally. Finally, the European market area has traditionally consumed gas largely priced to oil-indexed long-term contracts with three main external suppliers: Norway, North African producers and Russia. EU importers are the highest payers for pipeline supplied gas.

Even within Europe, markets are heavily fragmented. As already discussed Northwest Europe retains highly developed gas transmission infrastructure and a diversified set of import sources – including local production, good connections to the networks of neighbouring countries and access to the global LNG market. Prices are also set by hubs such as the National Balancing Point in the UK, which reflect supply and demand signals and help to facilitate competition. Conversely, the markets of Central and Eastern Europe remain largely locked into east-to-west pipeline systems which ensure dependence on politically sensitive Russian gas.

This fragmentation is a relic of the 1960s and the signing of the first long-term gas contract between the Soviet Union and a western country (Austria) in 1968 which laid the foundation stone for development of the Russian gas supply corridor through the former eastern bloc countries and into Western Europe. This has in itself set the scene for the most recent crises to affect the

European gas market – the ongoing dispute between Russia and Ukraine over gas transit terms and contract prices.

The 'gas for pipe' deal between West Germany and the Soviet Union allowed for the construction of long distance pipeline networks built with German steel and funded by German banks in return for gas. The first delivery to West Germany was made in 1973 (Stern, 2005: 2). Although controversial and without support from Washington, Austrian, German and later pan-European imports of Soviet gas continued into the 1980s with the build-out of more pipelines used today to transport gas through the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Belarus to EU member states.

As exports increased, so too has the importance of these former Soviet republics as transit spaces through which Russia's precious resource exports have been channelled. As contract disputes over the price and terms of transit continued through the 1990s and 2000s the prospect of a breakdown in the contractual terms underpinning this circuitry became more and more likely. A Swedish defence ministry report commissioned to review Russian energy policy as its state-owned monopoly Gazprom was pushing ahead with plans to build the Nord Stream pipeline that would supply roughly a half of Germany's annual demand straight to its coast circumnavigating the former Soviet space, argued that Russia had used a "coercive" energy policy at least 55 times since 1991 including incidents of cut-offs, explicit threats, coercive price policy and certain take-overs (Larsson, 2007: 80). Forty of those have come against the Baltic states or former CIS countries.

The stated aim of Nord Stream was to provide an alternative option to supply gas to its largest EU customer Germany, without the political risk factor that has dogged overland routes using Soviet era pipeline infrastructure. The long-running dispute between Russia and Ukraine has ostensibly taken place between the two gas monopolies – Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukrainy. However, the state-ownership of these operators and the political premium

attached to resource export and import means the issue is largely conducted in the political rather than corporate sphere between politicians rather than chief executives.

By late 2005 it had become clear that the circuitry underpinning the Russia-Ukraine gas transit agreement was under pressure, with an eventual disruption in supply during the first days of 2006, a warning of things to come. Disputes over unpaid debt, price re-negotiation, transit terms and the syphoning off of storage stocks led to the full suspension of supplies via Ukraine by Russia for 13 days from 7 January 2009 – deep into the winter heating season in Europe.

In addition to the impact on Ukrainian businesses and households, European consumers were affected with Bulgaria, Slovakia, Moldova and Macedonia among those completely cut-off for the two-week period. This crisis has led to the search for diversification in source which persists until today. The EU's Southern Gas Corridor initiative which aims to open a 'fourth corridor' of external pipeline supply to the 28 members of the union has been the flagship diversification policy since the 2009 crisis (EU, 2009).

Plans to build the Nabucco pipeline as the main transport link to ship Iranian, Turkmen, Azeri and Iraqi gas though Turkey and into Southeast Europe was seen by many analysts and journalists as the response to Russia's attempts – through the Nord Stream and more recently proposed South Stream project – to provide new sources of gas to captive markets like Bulgaria. Although conceived in Vienna at meeting between executives from Austria's OMV – the first Western market for Soviet gas – and others, Nabucco was quickly adopted by Brussels as a strategic project.

Its subsequent shortening and eventual cancellation as one by one potential suppliers dropped out of the running because of sanctions on Iran, conflict, lack of infrastructure or an inability to bridge the Caspian Sea by pipeline due to political wrangling means the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline will be the only

transiter of new gas when it ships 10 bcm of Azerbaijani production through Greece and over the Adriatic to Italy by 2020. Nabucco as a large-scale option to compete with Russian gas in Central Europe, meanwhile, is dead.

But as Larsson argues, concepts of energy security differ in Russia, where it prioritises a different kind of diversification - the concept of securing access to consumer markets, and maintaining state control over the reserves and infrastructure needed to ensure these sales (Larsson, 2007: 81). This provided the rationale for the massive investment in Nord Stream – eventually opened in 2011. To ensure this added annexation to the earlier definitions of energy security Gazprom and its Kremlin owners have helped the process of politicisation of energy, through issue linkage and divide and rule tactics between the diverse range of consumer clients across the EU. Alongside Iran, it has also sought to restrict the access of new Caspian region players into the European gas sales market by refusing to sanction a new pipeline across the Caspian Sea.

Today, new geopolitics in Eurasia is just one element in a globalised economic system seeing new threats to broader energy security emerge beyond traditional risks putting consumers on edge that a supply disruption could once again cripple economies. As Pflüger noted in 2013 while commemorating the centenary of energy security marked by Churchill's speech, "hardly anything is conceivable anymore without energy, be it drinking water, television, computers, or phones" (Pflüger, 2013). The vividly remembered result of a two-week cut-off to Russian gas transit via Ukraine in 2009 and the ensuing lack of heating fuel during a bitter winter in southeast Europe stands testament to the impact of disruption to supply.

Addressing the fragility of reliable and affordable energy supply in the twenty-first century, Pflüger identifies seven central risk factors to global energy security moving forward:

1. *War and conflict* in producing countries as illustrated by cuts to production in Libya and elsewhere in the MENA region caused by political turmoil and civil unrest. Libya could previously rely on large-scale oil exports that helped it sustain annual budget surpluses but protests at ports and production shut-ins meant that for months recently production stayed below 100,000 barrels per day – barely enough to supply one local refinery. Security fears at remote production installations across the region mean international energy companies operating there have also withdrawn staff and opted to shut production. Gas exports from North Africa to southern Europe via LNG and the Greenstream pipeline from Libya were also disrupted during the Arab Spring. Meanwhile, the advance of ISIS through Iraq and Syria has seen the loss of control of energy terminals.

2. *Political extortion*: as a consequence of some states finding themselves dependent on a single supplier. Gazprom's alleged use of exports as a political lever for the Russian government in its ongoing dispute with Ukraine is one example of how energy trade can be used to affect foreign policy aims. This 'energy weapon' thesis argues that producing states can enforce political objectives on captive consumers. Not only Russia, but Venezuela and Iran, can also be said to have exhibited signs of using energy as a policy tool. According to Stegen, the use of an energy weapon first dependents on the ability of a government to exercise full control over resources, transmission, and delivery assets (Stegen 2011: 6505).

3. *Energy imperialism*: with roughly four-fifths of global oil and gas reserves owned by either semi or fully-state-owned companies political leaders have access to commercially lucrative reserves. The "impending re-nationalization" of these reserves could allow states to politically extort consumers as outlined in risk number two. The race by Asia's energy intensive economies to ensure long-term offtake contracts from new LNG projects in Australia through state-owned companies backed by a state financed kitty is also evidence of the use

of a 'political passport' to stake a claim on reserves using government debt or direct funding – potentially limiting the availability of resources on the open global market. This 'hoarding' of future supplies could slim the market and push prices up in the medium term.

4. *Terrorist attacks:* recent attacks on the Amenas oil refinery complex in Algeria and the continued push by ISIS fighters in the Middle East are only the latest terrorism-related events to affect energy resource supply. The Arish-Ashkelon pipeline between Egypt and Israel – which supplies 40% of Israel's gas – was attacked 13 times in the year following the collapse of the Hosni Mubarak government, Pflüger noted, providing an example of how critical delivery infrastructure is vulnerable to disruption.

5. *Cyber security:* the potential for disruption to energy systems by attacking the computer networks and digital safeguards that make sure nuclear power stations remain stable and pipeline networks retain safe pressure levels is an increasing fear. "For decades, computation has been deeply incorporated into energy exploration, production, distribution, and consumption...Thus, cyber security is an issue for the energy industry," a Baker Institute study on the subject found (Baker Institute, 2014). The author identified three key areas of cyber security risk to energy: theft of intellectual property, disruption or destruction of a physical plant, and the compromise of communications.

6. *Natural disasters:* the effect of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on Japan's coast in which thousands died has had a profound impact on how the world views nuclear power following the previous Three Mile Island and Chernobyl incidents. The massive loss of oil production capacity in the Gulf of Mexico following Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is another example of how natural disasters can unexpectedly and devastatingly disrupt supply and force long-term changes to energy strategy. Climate change raises further questions over long-term security of supply as sea levels rise and temperatures grow warmer.

7. *Technical failures*: as typified by Chernobyl, the BP Deepwater Horizon incident and the ExxonMobil Alaskan oil spill of 1989, human and corporate error can also play a part in disruption of supply. The effect of these incidents on public opinion over the years has also shaped energy security discourse, helping to shift the debate on whether or not to build out nuclear energy plants in some countries, and whether to exploit frontier oil and gas reserves in the Arctic region.

In response to these threats, Pflüger argues that seven resilience building measures could be put in place to help counter these threats. They include de-centralisation of energy system management, increased safety checks and the ever present principle of diversification. Dialogue between importers and exporters is also key to building resilience with the understanding that both sides hold an equal stake in circuitry of energy supply.

But there remains a further risk not mentioned so far but explored by the IEA in a 2014 report, that of the need to maintain investment in a sector reliant on innovation and the increase operation of the drilling rig, pipeline or power station to meet rising demand for energy products from global industry and power from the digitalised metropolises of the modern world.

In order to meet China and India's growing demand for oil and gas, producers will have to invest more than $2 trillion leading up to 2035, the IEA said in a study on investment in energy in 2014, with the agency calculating that $1,600 billion was needed in 2013 alone to satisfy global consumption (IEA, 2014). The job of persuading "essential" private sector investors to shoulder the cost burden with public funds will be key and the sustained flow of capital into upstream work remains a challenge.

Who will pay for the continued safe supply of energy is also a key unanswered question in the European market. During the era of state ownership of integrated utilities, the ultimate responsibility lay with the single company responsible for sourcing and supplying the oil, gas or power to the end user.

But in a marketplace where companies are encouraged to compete, and where vertical ownership of assets is outlawed, cost-cutting to win business becomes the primary goal.

In the EU legislation to increase competition has created a situation where no single company is now responsible for the simple task of reliable supply to consumers. These factors in turn lead to arguments over whether the energy sector is not best catered for in state hands where regulation and price-setting can be conducted freely. The policy side of energy security often sits between the theoretical elements of supply and demand and the reality of politics. Nabucco was a perfect project for many countries politically, but its lack of suppliers and relatively low demand meant it never became a reality. Likewise, critics of contemporary EU energy policy see too much theory in the formation and not enough recognition of the practical concerns of market participants.

THEORY

Academic study of the risks to energy security in a global sense and the vulnerabilities inherent in supply networks are traditionally covered by the academic disciplines of political science and economics – the former accentuating geopolitical factors and state-to-state relations while the latter caters more for supply and demand fundamentals.

Within this the difference between the study of short-term and long-term energy security can also be defined. The 'four As' approach to energy security - availability, accessibility, affordability and acceptability (Kruyt et. Al., 2009) allow us to compartmentalise risks. These in turn allow for long-term considerations over geographic, geopolitical, economic and environmental factors, rather than catering for short-term supply questions over immediate consumption rates, pipeline flows and storage injection volumes.

A short-term approach to energy security considers the impact of supply disruptions over weeks and months, rather than factors affecting long-term production rates or the effect of regulation etc. The IEA's model of short-term energy security, or MOSES, takes an energy systems approach to identifying resilience to risks across the supply chain of different energy sources. This includes analysis of four dimensions of energy security – two risk and two resilience categories for each covering external and domestic factors.

One of MOSES's primary uses is to assess the "vulnerabilities of primary energy sources and assessing how these affect the security of secondary fuels" - for example to review risks to the sourcing of crude oil reserves and evaluating how this could impact the delivery of refined products over a short-term period (Jewell, 2011: 7).

The oil delivery framework takes into consideration the net dependence and the political stability of suppliers as the external risk factors, while the diversity of suppliers and number of port or pipeline entry points count as the external resilience factors. Proportion of offshore production, volatility of onshore production and availability of storage sites provide the domestic criteria for risk and resilience respectively.

According to MOSES, the most important indicator is the net dependence – with a 15% or less quantum meaning low dependence, and 80% or above equal to high dependence. Either at least five ports or 9 pipeline entry points would provide high level of diversity of system entry points according to the MOSES methodology (Jewell, 2011: 15). Such a system provides a useful technique to transfer the usually abstract set of risks and perceived risks of energy security into quantifiable categories which can be used to further estimate likelihood of disruption and identify system vulnerabilities. Using MOSES we can clearly see which states are vulnerable to potential supply disruptions and which states have security of supply – whether that's through domestic production or variety of import sources and routes.

Jonathan Stern's investigation into gas supply security sets forth a further theoretical framework through which to view the topic in a similarly compartmentalised fashion, although focused more on the European gas system. He identifies reserves to reserve-to-production ratios, long-term contracts and multi-billion dollar investments, import dependence and emergency supply events as key to understanding gas supply security across three distinct risk areas – source, transit area and facility (Stern, 2002).

Many further studies seek to unpack the baggage of energy security discourse, but just as new resilience measures are brought in, new harder to exploit oil reserves brought to the market, and new efficiency measures to ease competition for imports are implemented, new risks emerge to the global system just as fast. The potential for cyber conflict, the recent resurgence in resource nationalism, and increasingly fraught geopolitical conflicts will all help keep the energy element of the security dilemma at the top of policymakers' agendas.

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CYBER SECURITY

Nikola Schmidt

INTRODUCTION

The following chapter does not have an ambition to thoroughly explore all the cyber security-related topics. However, I chose a way to open the hottest topics from the national security perspective. All the parts do not have any deep conclusions, but should serve the reader as a guide for further reading. In each part I provide you with some further references that are the most discussed and cited papers in the academic debate. However, as cyber security is an explosive topic today, we can assume that considerable amount of articles are accidentally omitted. The current securitization wave of cyber threats as one of the most serious national security issue contributes to the production of a huge amount of literature, making the finding of a wisely compiled literature not an easy task. This is the reason why the articles mentioned in the following chapter are chosen from those that are the most debated ones.

Cyber security as a topic for study should be divided into several branches. Development of tools used in cyberspace (software) falls into the technical branch that is the oldest one since the Arpanet, a predecessor to Internet, was developed in the end of 60s. Moreover people well educated in software development and the related ICT security are usually very pessimistic about drawing the scenarios of national security threat emanating from cyberspace. Another important aspect, or branch, is the policy makers that see any opportunity to exploitcritical ICTas vulnerability and thus threat to national security. The third and last branch is devoted to lawyers and cyber crime investigators. This branch has had its unique path of development as plenty of activities that are illegal in the physical world are approached differently in cyberspace.[45] Sharing of intellectual property as a general right of having a

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[45] The division into three branches was introduced in cyber security debate by Myriam Dunn Cavelty (Cavelty, 2012).

direct access to information is still discussed and definitely not satisfactorily resolved.

The complexity of such environment is so huge that it demands a combination of abilities of a technician, policy maker, lawyer, scholar, investigator or military specialist, which is simply not possible and results in an inappropriate evaluation of real threats. The following chapter will introduce several dilemmas in the most discussed national security perspective.

DEFINITIONS AND TECHNICAL BACKGROUND

The most important finding in the study of the Internet is its structure and technical basis. Generally said, Internet as a network consists of nods and links between them. Core difference from previous communication methods was made by the change from *switching* to *routing*. You may remember pulse telephone lines sending pulses to relays that automatically switched call to a particular destination, whichwas previously done manually. Routing is different from switching in that there is no one way from origin to destination. Routers (or bridges, gateways, firewalls and switches) are choosing the best and the shortest way according to a traffic load and other characteristics (Ryan, 2010, p. 15). Internet and all the related technologies such as routing were developed during 50s and 60s as a request of American government to have a resilient communications network that can survive a nuclear attack of the Soviet Union. Decentralization of network along with its routing feature was the core precondition.

Nevertheless, during its development nobody was developing technology that would be secure against the future threats, which were unknown. The initial ideas and their development into working prototypes proved in and of itself an overwhelming success; hence the development of the IPv4 communication protocol was focused on its usability instead of security. The description of IPv4 was firstly published in September 1981 and since then the same protocol

has been prevalently in use as a communication protocol for the Internet. IP protocol has been designed on *best delivery principle* while TCP protocol controls the integrity of the received dataagainst the sent data; combining the two, we get TCP/IP protocols, or the basic communication language of devices that form the Internet.[46]

The cyber security essentials from the technical perspective, and based on above mentioned principles, are as follows: data *integrity*, *confidentiality* and *availability* (Geers, 2011; Graham, Olson, & Howard, 2011). These three fields of security cover all of the much more complex problems that are discussed in cyber security. Data integrity means that the data you receive from the Internet are the same as they were sent to you or that data in the database are not compromised, modified etc. Data confidentiality refers to authorized access to data; it means that every person with an access is authorized to do so. Stealing login information and its usage to get access to classified information means compromising the confidentiality. If a user is willing to connect to a particular server and the server is not available due to an attack targeting its availability, we are talking about compromising the availability. Such attack is typically DDoS attack that we know well, among others, from events in Estonia in 2007. DDoS overloads the server's capacity with huge amount of false requests to force it to shutdown, restart or simply render it unable to answer legitimate requests. DDoS is usually conducted from dozens or hundreds of thousands computers or mobile phones interconnected into a stealth "zombie" network.[47]

Other important terms that we should be aware of is *cyber threat, vulnerability and exploit*. Vulnerability is a known[48] hole to the system or software that run

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[46] More about the technical characteristics of Internet and essentials of cyber security can be found in Graham, Olson & Howard (2011).

[47] The following list of studies focuses primarily on strategy against DDoS (CHARVAT, 2009; Shackelford, 2009; Spyridopoulos, Karanikas, Tryfonas, & Oikonomou, 2013; THONNARD, MEES, & DACIER, 2009)

[48] *0-day vulnerability* is an unknown vulnerability in the system. As soon as it is discovered, it is no longer referred to as 0-day.

such system. Holes or vulnerabilities are usually unintentionally developed shortcomings of the software we use. Having totally invulnerable systems is an ideal state that would never be reached. Exploit is already the method how the vulnerability can be exploited to the *will* of the attacker. And finally, cyber *threat* is a term that is used especially by policy makers who would like to stress the probable implications of this *will* to exploit vulnerabilityas a *threat* to national security.

HOW THREATS ARE DISCLOSED AND CONSTRUCTED

It is very important how policy makers understand and absorb technical characteristics and challenges of the Internet and its improper usage against national security. One of the IPv4 characteristics is the limited capacity of available technical means to uncovera possible attacker; especially when the attacker is staying anonymous. This problem is referred to as the *attribution problem*.[49]

However, the attribution problem is not a threat itself; it deepens a temptation of exploiting such a threat. A common risk management equation in cyber security would look like this: *threat = opportunity + capability + will*. Attribution problem may increase the attacker'swill, while capability relates to the attacker's general and specific key knowledge (to be discussed later), while the *opportunity* refers to available vulnerabilities to be exploited. A condition of sufficiently developed *will* is significant, especially because some criticism of *threats* exaggerated by policy makers in cyber security is usually based on the fact that they are incorrectly equating the *opportunity* with *threat* (Erik Gartzke, 2013, p. 42). The construction of a threat environment is based on the possibilities cyberspace affords; however, it needs to be noted that comparable possibilities are available to people in

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[49] Attribution problem is a well discussed feature of cyber conflict; however, as we can see now in 2014 in Ukraine, exploiting attribution problem is not limited to cyberspace only. Some food for thought can be found in papers written by Guitton (2013; 2013).

any other domain of life, not just in cyberspace. One argument why the doom scenarios are still failing to occur is that committing such acts lacks reason.

On the other hand, when the reason is in place, some significant operation may occur. A very important example is definitely the virus Stuxnet launched within the operation Olympic games that caused a physical destructionof nuclear centrifuges in the Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz (Collins & McCombie, 2012; Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011a; Nicoll, 2011).

Construction of a threat from the perspective of critical theory has been interestingly and thoroughly analyzed by Myriam Dunn Cavelty (Cavelty, 2007). The core argument of the threat politics lies in an analysis of political reasoning for developing threats in modern times; especially of those that are less analyzed, full of novelty, and sufficiently complex that common sense is not enough to provide satisfactory threat evaluation and in the end supports private business built on securitization waves. The doom scenarios have been built-up during the 90s as cyber incidents – even less significant – skyrocketed in their numbers. A famous article by John Arquilla *cyber war is coming!* is usually understood asthe first example of threat construction into a doom scenario (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1993).

Since no doom scenario has ever been fulfilled, it seems that the whole political agenda of threat construction is self-serving. However, understanding of all the common scenarios is crucial in understanding the possibilities that await us in cyberspace. Any doom scenario may serve for a proper preparation of such tactical approach and appropriate defense (Rattray & Healey, 2010). There are completely fictitious scenarios such as the spread of virus into all major power plants around a continent and their deliberate shut down plunging the continent into darkness. On the other hand, some scenarios are plausible. Mafia boy, a fifteen-year-old kid has succeeded in 2000 in downing several big sites such as Yahoo, Amazon, eBay etc. (Barabási, 2002, p. 1). He did it just for fun, demonstrating in the process to the world how easy

it is to use DDoS attack and to commit an action that significantly impacts businesses.[50] Some other scenarios are fully possible − and Stuxnet should serve as an example − however, committing such extremely sophisticated attacks is reserved only for fully equipped intelligence agencies and might not be committed by individuals. Nevertheless, as the *will* be discussed later, also this assertion may not be so certain.

Drawing on the development of scenarios of cyber threats, one may argue that evaluating threats is a Sisyphean task. Nevertheless, policy makers have to find a way out of the mess of these exaggerated scenarios. Comprehensive cyber security policies have been developed throughout the Western world.[51] They vary from decentralized approach of whole cyber installations, to some general practices such as that all the systems have to be updated all the time, to strictly militarily defensive measures in which cyberspace is treated as the fifth domain of warfare.

DEFENCE IN SYSTEM RESILIENCE RATHER THAN IN DEFENSIVE POWER

When a state is facinga dilemma how to defend itself against possible cyber threats, several ideas may emerge. First, building strong defensive structures that would block any incoming malicious communication attempts; however, such approach would never stop an attacker (Averbuch & Siboni, 2013). Second, deceive the attacker and forward him/her to a honey net[52] where his/

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[50] A historical list of significant DDoS attack can be found at http://www.defense.net/ddos-attack-timeline.html. However, DDoS is today a very common attack. In USA banks are facing DDoS flood usually every working day since morning till the evening. The current map of ongoing attacks can be found at http://www.digitalattackmap.com.

[51] Listing only the important ones or an analysis: (R. Deibert, 2012; German Gov & Federal Ministry of Interior, 2011; Mudrinich, 2012; The White House, 2003). CCD COE, a center of excellence conducted by NATO situated in Estonian Tallinn is undergoing comparative analysis of world cyber strategies and policies. An interesting analysis can be found in a paper by Harknett and Stever(2011).

[52] Honey network (honey pot) is a network that seems to be the original functioning system, but it is a virtual copy of it and serves to deceive the attacker.

her capabilities can be thoroughly analyzed. This approach falls into a so-called Active Cyber Defense policy category[53] (Lachow, 2013) and has been extensively tested; the results show that the defender gains some time, but the attacker's *will* leads him/her to uncover the honey net in the end and to attack again and again until he/she successfully breaches the system (Heckman et al., 2013); hence, such approach is not a means of defense. Third, the unending row of vulnerabilities, and especially the unknown amount of 0-day vulnerabilities which await to be uncovered by hackers is a reality that cannot be ignored. Indeed, some measures can be taken into consideration such as common hygiene of updating the systems on the ordinary basis or systems can be somehow designed to be much more secure (McGraw, 2013); however if the attacker is determined to succeed, especially in a case of getting some confidential or classified information, it is a matter of time when the systems will be compromised (Lynn Iii, 2010). Fourth, networks tend to centralize themselves with no regard whether it is a network of computers or social network of people. The principle lies in a tendency of some nods to prefer some networks over others, which creates significant and thus vulnerable centers (Barabási, 2002). Routing is based on *best delivery principle* – each router forwarding a packet of data to a particular router to fulfill such precondition or we tend to use one search engine as we have been successful with our task before. Both examples make cyberspace vulnerable, as the attacker would focus on vulnerable sites. Mafia boy showed that this is not a doom scenario; indeed, defense is much more complex today[54] compared to before, but the above-mentioned principles still apply.

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[53] Active Cyber Defense consists of detection, deception and termination. It seems to be much more of an euphemism, because the whole active cyber defense is a mere offensive approach. On one hand, detection can be understood as a passive activity, on the other hand detection and deception usually precede termination which is nothing else than counter-attack. Microsoft together with other security and technology oriented firms is taking down botnets on a regular basis. The whole strategy was thoroughly discussed for the first time in June 2014 at a conference organized by NATO CCD COE.

[54] Banks in USA are still working despite the fact that they are under a constant DDoS attack which is in its size and overall quantity incomparable to any other attacks in other countries. Check the mentioned www.digitalattackmap.com.

A specific response to such environment can be recognized in EU cyber security policy (EU, 2013) which stresses significantly the system of resilience rather than the system of defense. Resilience refers to a capability to recover from an attack as quickly as possible with minimum consequent damage. Systems are supposed to be designed to withstand an attack; however, this can be applied to the security problem of *availability,* which has been to a degree resolved in the USA in the case of banks facing DDoS attacks on a daily basis during business hours. It cannot be applied to *confidentiality* where one unauthorized breach may lead to an access to classified information and thus pose a severe threat to the national security. In the case of data *integrity*, an attack canfocus on data modification or destruction. Such attack may lead to the wrong colors on traffic lights or wrong account numbers in bank transfers. This is similarly unresolvable by systems resilience. Modified data can be restored from a backup or the integrity can be tested by some primitive tests (wrong or unusual combination of colors on semaphore etc.); however, some simple modification may lead to the collapse of whole systems of certification as has happened to the firm DigiNotar in the Netherlands that led to a compromise of huge amount of data within governmental networks (Prins, 2011).[55] Data integration realm can be related to information operations.

CYBER SPACE, CYBER POWER, CYBER WAR AND DONFLICT ESCALATION

A long-lasting debate has been sounding through academic institutions and ministries of defense around the world about the definition and conceptualization of cyber space. On the one hand an analysis of network from its topological perspective has been undertaken extensively by (Dodge & Kitchin, 2001), on the other hand, such topological perspective does not

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[55] DigiNotar was a leading company providing certificates for secure encrypted communication (SSL) for several firms, but especially for the Dutch government. Breach into their servers and acquiring of their certification methods by unauthorized person allowed the attacker to obtain a certificate that was widely accepted. The company went bankrupt in less than a month after a disclosure of the breach.

provide us with characteristics that are important for strategic thinking and planning. Characteristics of cyberspace were briefly summarized by Choucri and are as follows:

- Temporality — replaces conventional temporality with near instantaneity

- Physicality — transcends constraints of geography and physical location

- Permeation — penetrates boundaries and jurisdictions

- Fluidity — manifests sustained shifts and reconfigurations

- Participation — reduces barriers to activism and political expression

- Attribution — obscures identities of actors and links to action

- Accountability — bypasses mechanisms of responsibility

Cited from (Choucri, 2012, p. 4).

All those characteristics can be thoroughly analyzed; the attribution problemhas already been mentioned, but let's have a closer look at temporality and fluidity. The former gives all kinds of cyber power an effect that can be instantly deployed anywhere in the world without a need for physical transportation while the latter tells us that any kind of strategy (or tactics based on developed tools) has to be tailor made for a particular situation. An idea that a particular powerful tool can be used effectively in cyber space several times is not viable.

US Department of Defense was the first such institution to call cyber space a fifth warring domain (US-DoD, 2011). Such a step certainly led to development of wide variety of powers in cyberspace. Cyber power would have several forms; however, some of them are thoroughly discussed as a kind of military power (Kramer, 2013);[56] some different powers are needed to conquest each layer of cyberspace (Libicki, 2007, p. 236).[57] The general

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[56] "Cyberpower and National Security" a book by Kramer is a thorough guide to power in cyber space. Second chapter "From Cyberspace to Cyberpower" written by Daniel T. Kuehl, one of the best pieces of its kind, a guide to cyberspace definition, conceptualization and strategic approaches.

[57] Libicki divided cyberspace into layers: 1st physical (cables, routers, processors), 2nd syntactic (firmware, conventions, protocols – how the physical layers communicate), 3rd semantic (data), 4th cognitive or pragmatic (how the data are interpreted and reflected by the user).

problem of measuring cyber power lays in its factual usage according to the targeted layer. Physical power that would be effective against physical installations seems to be completely irrelevant in the cyber realm; however, cyber power may significantly increase the effectiveness of conventional power. Joseph Nye opened a discussion on the replacement of hard power by soft power, a power especially used by European Union in countries that are on the verge of becoming a failed state, but also to influence neighboring states to avoid possible tensions that may led to a conflict. He enlarged the discussion by adding cyber power as a new kind of power that is going to be a part of several branches of national powers. In his understanding, cyber power is oriented to information and our ability to cognitively reflect it, but it is also a capability to disrupt systems of enemies to support our conventional power (Nye, 2010).

The discussion about (cyber) power leads to a debate how such a power might be used in warring. Some policy makers are calling for huge investments into cyber power as cyber war is inevitable (Clarke & Knake, 2012). Others are bringing the debate back to earth and argue that a conflict in cyber space would be more likely shaped by espionage, sabotage and propaganda (Rid, 2013), because cyber war does not possess violence and lethality. An answer to this question stirred a philosophical debate over "war" and especially shape of violence (Stone, 2013). However, it is evident that we need to conceptualize cyber conflict, cyber war and cyber space in a shape that would avoid inconsistencies and would be incorporated in international law (Schmidt, 2014).

CYBERGEDDON, PRECISE ATTACKS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

The inconsistent debate over cyber power and its possible implications to escalation of cyber warpour fuel to the fire for policy makers who have developed unprecedented doom scenarios. As already discussed, their contribution to the whole debate is not completely out of scope. Opportunities in cyber space are much closer to opportunities of using conventional equipment in any battle. Emergence of logic bombs[58] is a perfect example of how national security can be threatened when an *opportunity* is exploited. As an example, a Chinese firm Huawei is suspected of working for the Chinese government andto support such a claim some vulnerabilities have been found in their systems (Inkster, 2013) and have been evaluated as a possible threat to security of US critical infrastructure as much of the infrastructure runs on their device (Clarke & Knake, 2012).

Another example of cyber doom scenario would be a complete collapse of power grid. As world's grids are moving towards smart grids,they are going to be more vulnerable. Imagine a situation in which a switch on high-voltage network receivesa faulty information about power input/output (a problem of data integrity) and decides to inappropriately mediate the power output. Then imagine a situation when hundreds of such switches are attacked exploiting one particular vulnerability in one switch developed by one company. That situation might happen if a country decides to install one type of system to the grid, which is not unusual at all. This kind of drawing on possibilities means drawing-up doom scenarios. There are plenty of comparable possibilities in technical design of ICT and policy makers such as Clarke and Knake are exactly those in their right place to draw them for the national security policy needs. However, some calls that suchdoom scenarios are supposed to be evaluated from a historical perspective (Lawson, 2011) or built on the basis of historical evidence (Rattray & Healey, 2010). Scenarios that

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[58] A piece of code intentionally inserted into a software system that will set off a malicious function when specific conditions are met.

might happen in the near future can be divided into more or less doomed; however the most probable one seems to be status quo of the current security environment instead of cybergeddon (Healey, 2010). In addition, the situation is complicated further by cyber crime – a malicious activity in cyberspace fueled by economic motivation.

Nevertheless, developing scenarios remains an important task for a perspective what may happen if everything goes wrong. Those scenarios, if fulfilled, are pre-conditioned on specific situations. Stuxnet in Iran was a situation where an insider knowledge played a significant role (Betz, 2012, p. 695). Knowing specifics of a targeted system is a crucial knowledge, which the author of this chapter likes to call a *key knowledge.*[59] Having information about setting, configuration and models of installed systems is critical to have the attack that is successful. This is especially so in a situation like Stuxnet in which a wide variety of nuclear installations around the world were infected, but not damaged or disrupted (Reveron, 2012). The rationale to infect *all* such systems is highly dependent on intelligence gathering in the first place, but the fact that only the Natanz installation was damaged requires targeting − and that cannot be precise without deep knowledge of the systems provided by an insider (a cover agent) and preferably without a kind of remote control of those systems as it called for the testing of all the procedures before proceeding with the final attack.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS

We mentioned that cyber power could cause physical destruction; especially this assertion is one of the most dubious. However, the example of Stuxnet seems to be very close to this end result. International law works on century-long tradition and customary regimes. These regimes were prevalently developed during or after extreme events,prevalently in Europe. Sovereignty

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[59] I am explaining the term "*key knowledge*" and its consequences in unpublished article *"Cyber War, Cyber Power and the Rise of Non-State Actors in Cyberspace."*

of countries and their territory as we know it todaymay be dated to Westphalia peace of 1648, however, the current international security regimeand the Law of Armed Conflict lays on Geneva Conventions, Hague Conventions and UN Charter and the whole system that surrounds it (Kirsch, 2012, p. 630).

The first broad debate on the applicability of international law to cyber space or cyber warfare was triggered by Koh'sspeechand consequent article (Schmitt, 2012). The common problems and dilemmas in cyber warfare are:Does international law apply to cyber realm at all? Docyber activities constitute a use of force? What sovereignty states possess in cyberspace? Is cyberspace surrounded with boarders? How such borders would apply for international services with servers around the world such as clouds? The comprehensive analysis of the above-mentioned questions, and of hundreds others, have been done by world-leading international law experts under the auspices of NATO CCD COE situated in Estonian capital Tallinn in the famous Tallinn manual (CCDCOE, 2013).[60]

The most visible question in cyber warfare is definitely the use of force in cyberspace. Experts are in consent that direct consequences of use of cyber power conducted by a state or its military constitutes use of forcejust when the consequences in the physical world cause damage, destruction, injury or death. On the other hand, experts could not find consensus on whether a deliberate deployment of malicious code is a violation of sovereignty. A manual was written – to quote the editor in chief Michael Schmitt from a personal discussion – to *conservatively interpret international law to the cyber realm*; however, we cannot derive some common sense from cyber realm and bend international law. The second version of the manual supposes to address such common sense issues and develop new custom-based perspective that would significantly change the current one.

Debates over international law does not need to be limited to the interpretation of current customs and law, but might be developed from such common

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[60] Version 2 supposes to be published in 2014 or 2015.

sense. Some interesting contributions are focusing on states' sovereignty and assess that some steps forward in its recognition in cyberspace is for states inevitable (Lewis, 2010). Others are focusing on states' responsibility in cyberspace and drawing several levels of national responsibility (Healey, 2011). Problem of attribution falls into the realm of international law as well; however, several ideas concerning attribution and especially a criterion of sophistication was introduced by Clement Guitton[61] (Guitton & Korzak, 2013).

KEY EVENTS IN HISTORY

Operation Red October

The Red October[62] seems to be one of the most sophisticated and still ongoing espionage operations. The whole structure of the operation was unveiled in 2012 by Kaspersky Lab and forensic analysis showed that the operation had been in effect for at least five years by that time. On the one hand, some intercepted discussions between the operators are in Russian language; on the other hand, the operation cannot be attributed to the Russian federation. The targets of attackers are embassies, MoDs and other state institutions, but they vary across the world. Some theories point to the private business of decentralized attackers who are using Russian language maybe only because the first people who triggered the operation were Russians. Needless to say, malware is improving all the time and methods are changing. Shutting down such operation would take years and the question is whether some state can do it on a global scale, and inaccordance with international law.

Cyberattacks during the Russo-Georgian War

Cyber operations were conducted during the war between Georgia and Russia in 2008.[63] The most problematic parts of such cyber war were disruptions of

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[61] Clement Guitton wrote a whole PhD dissertation about possibilities of attribution in cyberspace which is still not published by the date of writing this chapter, but some related articles could be found at http://clement-guitton.eu/thesis

[62] Further reading: (Gomez, 2013; GReAT, 2013)

[63] Further reading: (R. J. Deibert, Rohozinski, & Crete-Nishihata, 2012)

news servers that were used to inform the Georgian nation about ongoing Russian activity on their territory. The attacks started weeks before the conventional invasion of Russian forces to South Ossetia. Focus of the attacks was prevalently on the information published on several web sites, which were shut down or defaced, by alternative and more pro-Russian information. After couple of weeks Germany provided the capacity for governmental and key news servers on their own territory to override the attacks; moreover, some Azerbaijani servers were attacked as well, because they covered the Russian operations thoroughly. The reaction of free journalists was very quick as they in couple of days set up blogs on global servers to cover the unfolding event on the ground. These cyber attacks showed for the first time how an operation similar to the one in Estonia in 2007 would serve as a part of conventional invasion.

Stuxnet – operation Olympic Games

Stuxnet[64] is no doubt the most sophisticated operation ever. The piece of code thatwas lauded as the most brilliant piece of code ever developed was due to its sophistication highly probably an action of state. In 2010 CrySys Lab from Budapest University of Technology unveiled a worm that was capable of controlling industrial PLC (programmable logic controller). However, Stuxnet is way more complex than that, an operation on several levels. There is no one code, but several layers for different environments that communicate between each other. At the beginning a virus was sneaking around and looking for common Windows systems, but was active only in systems that were in the nuclear installation of Natanz. The second layer was also running on Windows but controlling Siemens S7 PCS, Win CC. This layer was "airgaped" meaning that no wire was between the first and second layer in Natanz and the virus made such a jump onto the USB stick unnoticed. What's more, it had to make the jump several times, because information gathered on the second layer was sent to the command and control center of

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[64] Further reading: (Boldizsár Bencsáth, Gábor Pék, Levente Buttyán, 2011; Falkenrath, n.d.; Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011b; Nicolas Falliere & Chien, 2012; Nicoll, 2011; Roessel, 2011)

Stuxnet. The third layer consisted of the direct controllers (PLCs) of nuclear centrifuges. Virus changed the spin speed of centrifuges and destroyed several of them – the numbers vary from dozens to thousands. Some sources estimate that the whole nuclear program was rolled back up to two years; however, as we already know today, Iran started to discuss its nuclear program with the international community and toned down its rhetoric about nuclear weapons development. Who was behind the attack is unknown or at least it is unclear. USA and Israel are suspected of being the originators, but they have never officially confirmed that; on the other hand US diplomats are usually open about it (Sanger, 2012).

CONCLUSION

This chapter aims to provide avery brief introduction to the cyber security agenda. As discussed above, it is debatable whether cyber threats are in fact threatening national security or whether they serve to increase the advantage of those who use conventional warfare. Policy makers tend to overestimate the possible impacts of cyber operations and thus exaggerate their impact on national security. On the other hand, the so-called doom scenarios offer a glimpse into possible catastrophe outcomes if everything goes wrong. Stuxnet is a great example that shows that influencing a nuclear program of a country willing to threaten its neighbors is possible by cyber power, resulting in a viable political impact. Nevertheless, the required sophistication, key knowledge, intelligence capability and uncertain targeting makes of such a power a highly specific tool that's very much different than a nuclear/ dirty bomb in the hands of terrorists. On the other hand, the mentioned key knowledge and centralization of systems may be an Achilles heel of every nation as the example of Huawei has shown. We definitely stand at the beginning of cyber age, but the real threats that lurk in connection with willingness of using cyberspace to cause harm remain to be seen.

Abbreviations:

CCDCOE	– Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence
DDoS	– Distributed Denial of Service
ICT	– Information and Communication Technology
IPv4	– Internet Protocol version 4
NATO	– North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PLC	– Programmable Logic Controller
TCP	– Transmission Control Protocol
UN	– United Nations

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THE SOUTH CAUCASUS SECURITY – GENERAL OVERVIEW

Tornike Sharashenidze

FOREWORD

The South Caucasus remains one of the most complex regions in the world in terms of security and political stability. The variety of conflicts, historical enmity, clash of great power interests – all are creating the situation that is unique even for the former Soviet Union. Two of the South Caucasus states – Armenia and Azerbaijan – have stayed at odds since the collapse of the Soviet Union over the Nagorno Karabagh region. For about 20 years the full-scale conflict has not renewed but the situation remains tense. As for Georgia, it enjoys good relations with both of those countries but has suffered quite a lot in Abkhazia and South Osetia – the rebel regions that have posed a severe threat to Georgia's territorial integrity since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia unofficially always backed these regions and after the 2008 war officially became their military protector, thus further strengthening its position in the South Caucasus – the area Russia always considered as crucial for its imperial ambitions.

The security picture is further complicated by the fact that all three regional states differ not only in terms of ethnicity and culture but also foreign policy stance and state governance model. Unlike the three Baltic states (that have moved along a single path since the collapse of the Soviet Union and joined efforts to enter NATO and the EU), the three South Caucasus states do not enjoy similar values and aspirations. Low level of democratic development, weakness of state institutions, and dependence on external forces – are all making the future of the South Caucasus quite obscure. Too many internal and external factors are influencing the security picture of this region, making

it very difficult to make even mid-term predictions since the change of even one of the factors can throw the region into turmoil.

Understanding the South Caucasus region will take more than the analysis of these factors, and will have to encompass also overview of historical development – and traditional interests of great powers (like Russia), ethnic enmities, and local models of searching for security and protection. These are   some of the key elements that contributed to the creation of the South Caucasus as we know it - with the precarious military balance and complicated political/social realities.

THE SOUTH CAUCASUS – ROAD TO THE CURRENT STATUS QUO

The South Caucasus has for centuries remained a place of fierce enmity between Iran and Turkey until Russia became strong enough to challenge these traditional regional powers. From late 18th century Russia fought successfully against Turkey, managed to oust it from the Black Sea basin and soon started to look toward the Straits – the territory Russian rulers coveted since the 17th century. The Balkans served as a theater of war between Russia and Turkey at that time and quite soon the Russians realized the importance of the South Caucasus – if they managed to gain foothold in this region, then they would open a second front against Turkey. In the late 18th century only Georgia remained as somewhat independent player in the South Caucasus and Russia decided to reach out to its small neighbor. The interest in Georgia was also due to the fact that Georgia controlled the Caucasus Mountains – a passage to the South Caucasus.

Georgia tried to exploit the Russian interest for its own benefit but in the end failed. After masterfully playing on Georgia's internal weaknesses and appealing to common religious faith (orthodox Christianity) Russia managed to subdue the Georgian kingdom and fully annex it in the early 19th century.

After accomplishing this task Russia successfully suppressed the resistance in the North Caucasus attacking it from both the north and the south. It also continued in its military campaigns against Turkey (and in addition started wars against Iran), seizing the territories belonging to modern Armenia and Azerbaijan (and also parts of Georgia's territories).

Russia's debacle in WW1 (brought about by the Bolshevik revolution and a separate peace with Germany) resulted in three independent South Caucasus states in 1918. However, after Germany's defeat the Soviet Russia soon regained control first over Armenia and Azerbaijan and later over Georgia as well in 1921. The brief period of independence was far from ideal for the three countries – Turkey attempted to regain control over its former territories, while Armenians and Georgians fought a short war over disputed territories. The Armenian-Georgian squabble was overshadowed by Armenian-Azerbaijani enmity that was already gaining momentum, with its roots in the complicated relationship between Armenians and Turks that reached its apex in mass killings and deportations of Armenians living in Turkey during WW1. Being culturally close to Turks, Azerbaijan was viewed by Armenians as Turkey's natural ally.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani tension were not eased even when the borders of these two Soviet republics were formed in 1936 (before that both were integrated into the Soviet Union as parts of so-called Trans-Caucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic). Nagorno Karabagh – the region Armenians considered their own – was given to Azerbaijan under the status of the autonomous district that was established. This status turned out to be crucial since Nagorno Karabagh had its administrative border within the Soviet Azerbaijan and this very fact would later enable Nagorno Karabagh to claim independence within those very borders. Georgia was destined to suffer from similar problem as it received Abkhazian Autonomous Republic and South Osetian Autonomous District as part of its territory. Later those rebel

regions would claim independence within their respective administrative borders as well.

After defeating Germany in WW2 the Soviet leadership was considering annexation of the neighboring Turkish and Iranian territories. Had it succeeded, the South Caucasus region would be quite different today (all three countries would be larger and they would have much more complicated relations with Turkey and Iran). Nevertheless, the Soviet plans were thwarted by the US which was finally becoming wary of Stalin's aggressive foreign policy.

During the Soviet period Azerbaijan remained one of the very few republics that did not have to be subsidized from Moscow (thanks to its oil and gas resources), however Azerbaijani people lived in poverty whereas Armenia and especially Georgia enjoyed a much better living standard thanks to adjusting to Soviet model of corruption. As the Soviet Union started to crumble in the late 80s Georgia was one of the first (along with the Baltic States) to join anti-Soviet, nationalistic movement. Armenia followed suit while Azerbaijan was more reversed. According to some analysts Armenians were motivated not so much by seeking independence but by their desire to "liberate Karabagh."[1] By that time Armenians had realized that under the Soviet regime Karabagh would always remain within Azerbaijan (the Soviet elite simply would not alter the status quo) and so the "liberation" of this territory would mean the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is not as straight forward when it comes to the "Karabagh motivation" but one thing is clear – Karabagh was almost as important for Armenian national identity as the memory of massacres committed by Turkey (which Armenians, along with a number of states, consider genocide).

The Soviet leadership naturally was alarmed by the nationalistic movement in the country. According to the latest revelations the right wing of the Soviet political elite decided to counter this problem through a simple but very effective strategy - instigating separatism within those Soviet republics that

tried to break away from Moscow's control. Georgia was the republic that had suffered the most from this strategy: first South Osetia and then Abkhazia exploded in turmoil. South Osetia turned out to be the easier problem – as this region is located within the Eastern Georgia and is connected to Russia only by a single tunnel under the Caucasus Mountains. Therefore the rebel districts in South Osetia were encircled (parts of the region populated by ethnic Georgians supported Georgia's central government and fought against separatists themselves). In June 1992 ceasefire was signed under Russian mediation, and OSCE peace-monitoring mission was deployed to monitor the situation and the peace was jointly protected by Georgian, Russian and Osetian peacekeepers. However later that year conflict in Abkhaiza started that became a true disaster for Georgia. Despite the fact that ethnic Georgians accounted for majority in Abkhazia, Georgia still lost the war in September 1993. Russia was the primary reason for Georgia's crushing defeat as it was openly supporting the Abkhaz separatists (providing both arms and manpower).

Russia had reasons to stage a campaign against Georgia: first, it had military bases and even secret military laboratory in Abkhazia; second, in general Abkhazia was much more interesting than South Osetia because of its location and potential; second, finally, Georgia had to be punished for its for its independence movement, especially after its government refused to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (launched by Moscow as some kind of a substitute for the Soviet Union). After losing the war in Abkhazia Georgia was engulfed in civil war. The first president of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia (who was overthrown in a coup) returned to Georgia and challenged Georgia's new ruler, former Soviet minister of foreign affairs Edward Shevardnadze whose position was weakened after losing Abkhazia. In order to save himself and to end the civil war, Shevardnadze decided to enter the Commonwealth of Independent States and turn Georgia into Russia's informal satellite. This status would continue until late 90s when Georgia took advantage of increased American interest toward the South Caucasus and Russia's economic turmoil

and, assumed more independent, pro-Western stance. As for the peace in Abkhazia, it was provided by the Russian peacekeepers.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict was developing in quite a different way with Moscow from the beginning supporting Azerbaijan since it proved less nationalistic than Armenia. But when the Soviet Union collapsed the situation started to change. In February 1992 Armenia joined the Commonwealth of Independent States whereas the government of Azerbaijan was demanding the withdrawal of Russian military bases from the country in return for joining the Commonwealth of Independent States. While Azerbaijan resisted the Russian overtures, Armenia was leaning further toward Russia. In March 1992 Armenia and Russia signed the agreement that ensured Russia's further military presence in Armenia (in Gyumri military base). Later, in May Armenia along with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the collective security treaty establishing the quasi-alliance called Collective Security Treaty Organization. In return Russians changed their Karabagh policy and their support for the Armenian side definitely contributed to Azerbaijan's disastrous defeat. Armenians managed to seize not only Karabagh but also other territories belonging to Azerbaijan, which ensured Armenia's safe access to Karabagh (located inside Azerbaijani territory). Azerbaijan was heading towards the abyss – apart from losing territories it underwent a coup and an overthrow of democratically elected government (the same scenario as in Georgia).

Azerbaijan looked doomed due to destabilization and turmoil that ensued, but luckily the coup resulted in the return of Heydar Aliev, former leader of Soviet Azerbaijan and a prominent Soviet official, a charismatic and strong leader who was to play a big role not only in the history of modern Azerbaijan but of the whole region. Namely, Aliev decided to end the war, temporarily yield the lost territories (which were already under Armenian control) and concentrate on domestic development. This turned out to be a shrewd strategy since in a few years the US attracted by the prospects of transporting Caspian

oil to world markets from Azerbaijan bypassing Russia (and thus lessening the Western energy dependence on Moscow) started the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which had drastically changed the situation in the region. Thanks to the historical pipeline project Azerbaijan and Georgia (which became part of the new energy corridor) received not only economic but also political support from the West.

Armenia on the other hand had to pay a price for Karabagh. It was left out of the energy corridor and regional projects. At the same time Armenian-Russian ties were intensified still further when in 1997 the two countries signed an agreement on friendship, cooperation and mutual support. This landmark document made Armenia de-facto a military protectorate of Russia. Even though the text did not openly guarantee military support for Armenia, at the same time it obligated both sides to consult with each other if threatened. Besides, the agreement allowed Russia to protect Armenia's borders with Turkey and Iran.

With time, the Armenian dependence on Russia gradually increased whereas Georgia was leaning more to the West. As for Azerbaijan, it started to enjoy the windfall from oil dollars and gradually adopted a more independent (from both Russia and the West) policy, developing a close relationship with Turkey. Russia was watching the developments in the region closely, especially alarmed by developments in Georgia. For some time this small but crucially important country looked to be under Moscow's control, especially after Georgians were forced to join the Commonwealth of Independent States. Even after Georgia attracted interest form the West and became a part of alternative energy corridor, the situation still did not look dangerous for Russia since the Georgian state was weak and extremely ill-governed under President Shevardnadze. Real trouble began after 2003 when the so-called Rose Revolution overthrew Shevardnadze and opened a way for young and ambitious politicians led by Mikhail Saakashvili.

The developments that followed made Moscow even more insecure – in one year the democratic revolution took place in the Ukraine too and soon both Georgia and the Ukraine became NATO membership candidates. Such a scenario was totally unacceptable for Russia and very soon it responded by crushing Georgia (the weaker link in the Tbilisi-Kyiv connection) in August 2008. This resulted in ethnic cleansing of South Osetia and the recognition of South Osetia and Abkhazia as independent states by Russia. The latter implied the establishment of Russian military bases on the two territories and their isolation from the rest of Georgia.

Armenia and Azerbaijan managed to negotiate a road map to resolving the Karabagh conflict. Namely they have agreed on the following: withdrawal of Armenian troops from five Azerbaijani territories bordering Nagorno-Karabakh (the corridor that connects Armenia with Karabagh); the demilitarization of those territories; the deployment of an international peacekeeping force; the return to those Azerbaijani districts of the population who were forced to flee during hostilities in 1992-93; finally, at some unspecified future date, a referendum or popular vote on the final legal status of Karabagh. These points, named the Madrid Principles, were revealed in the Spanish capital in 2007 based on the proposal made by OSCE Minsk Group (the body that facilitates a peaceful resolution of Karabagh conflict and is co-chaired by France, Russia and the US). However the implementation of these principles never got underway as the conflicting sides could not agree how to start. Namely, Armenia remains reluctant to abandon the corridor before the status of Karabagh is defined. The failure of the Madrid principles has demonstrated Armenia's unwillingness to give up peacefully the territories it seized in the war.

MILITARY BALANCE IN THE REGION

According to data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (one of the most trustworthy sources) Azerbaijan is the biggest military

spender in the region. In 2013 its military budget equaled 2.701 billion USD. Georgia according to the same source has spent 736 million, and Armenia just 175 million. However, even if these figures are accurate, they do not exactly reflect the reality. There's no data on Karabagh which has turned into a true military fortress. Besides, Armenian-Russian military cooperation or rather Russia's clandestine military assistance to Armenia (which easily can be provided from the Gyumri base) is not included in this data. Thus, an analysis has to be made based more on common sense than statistics.

Common sense tells us that the military balance in the region is preserved, however precarious it may be. That means no matter how big the military budget of Azerbaijan is (and in reality it may be even bigger than on paper) it still cannot launch a successful offensive against Karabagh for various reasons. First of all, Armenia informally remains under Russia's military protection. This became even more obvious in late 2013 after Armenia yielded to the Russian pressure and instead of initiating the association agreement with the EU, it declared its intention to join the Russia-led Customs Union. It was generally understood that Armenia was simply blackmailed by Russia that if it did not comply Russia would sell arms to Azerbaijan and no longer guarantee Armenia's security (indeed, before Armenia announced the shift in its priorities, Russia's president Putin visited Baku where among other things "growing military cooperation" was discussed). Soon after successfully accomplishing this task Russia deployed some new forces to the base in Gyumri. On this occasion, Putin commented this development by declaring that "Russia is not going to leave the Caucasus."

By joining the Customs Union Yerevan secured Russia's military assistance. But even if minimal in scope, Azerbaijan may not find it that easy to militarily overcome Karabagh and Armenia. This despite that the military potential of Karabagh remains obscure, nevertheless this territory is definitely militarized and its population (according to the local authorities numbering 145 000) is not only used to local warfare but also very much motivated. This given that

the local armed forces (as well as Armenian ones) should have received not only valuable experience but also significant training and technical assistance from Russia. In case of war Armenia and Karabagh will have the luxury of defending their positions which takes much less resources than it does for launching an offensive.

Still taking into consideration Azerbaijan's rapidly growing GDP and population (9.686 million with 0.99% growth rate compared to Armenia's 3.060 million and growth rate of -0.13% according to the CIA world factbook) the balance is going to change quite soon and Russia will remain the only obstacle in the way for Azerbaijan's ambitions. This fact is no doubt well acknowledged by the Azerbaijani leadership and is the reason why Baku maintains quite a constructive relationship with Russia.

The situation is much simpler when it comes to Georgia. Its two regions host Russian military bases. Understandably all the information about the Russian strongholds in Abkhazia and South Osetia is not available but it is clear that Russia enjoys overwhelming superiority over Georgian armed forces. Thanks to South Osetia's geography, local Russian base is located some 40 kilometers from Tbilisi and in a few hundred meters from the main Georgian highway connecting the capital with the western part of the country. Georgia has lived with this situation since the 2008 war. On top of that, Georgia has no security guarantees and no mechanisms for preventing another war except the EU monitoring mission that was deployed after the war. The mission is not allowed to enter Abkhazia and South Osetia and operates on Georgian controlled territories only, making it hard to report anything about Russia's activities. Nevertheless, it can protect Georgia from false accusations, namely, after the war when Russia tried to accuse Georgia of "provocations" and "aggressive behavior." Each time it was denied by the monitoring mission.

ARMENIA'S SECURITY POLICY

As was already mentioned, Karabagh is an important element of Armenian national identity, not just a piece of territory. The new Armenian nation was formed in the 90s when it fought for Karabagh and when it had to undergo severe hardship due to the war. Azerbaijan imposed total blockade on Armenia which included cutting gas and electricity supplies. On the whole the decade of the nineties was not an easy period for the former Soviet republics, Armenia was definitely the one that suffered most, yet the Armenian nation endured and managed to score a rather unexpected victory. However a price had to be paid – Armenia is still blockaded by Azerbaijan and also Turkey. As for the Russian support it also came with a price. Russia took over the Armenian energy network and most of Armenia's major economic assets. Interestingly, Russia and Armenia do not have a common border and Armenia's foreign trade depends mainly on Georgia for transit. Moreover, Georgia also serves as a transit route for Russian gas supplies to Armenia too.

 Let us mention yet another one of Armenia's neighbor – Iran which is friendly toward Armenia but due to the fact that it has also suffered from isolation, it hardly could offer any significant assistance to Armenia.

The dependence on Russia was the choice Armenia made, and it was not made in 90-ies. Armenians had viewed Russia as their protector for centuries since Russia was a main foe to Turkey – Armenians' historical enemy. Thus, Armenians welcomed Russia's expansion in the South Caucasus since it was their chance to get rid of the Turkish domination and rebuild their ancient state. As we have mentioned above Armenians shifted toward Russia (their historical ally) almost immediately after the Soviet Union collapsed and when it became clear that Moscow would not create any more problems with Karabagh. Since then Armenia's security policy can be formulated in very simple terms: preserving Karabagh with Russia's help and to some extent balance the Russian influence by the US. Balancing Russia by the US was

called policy of "complementarism" And by it Armenia was trying its best not to fall fully into the Russian sphere of influence. It started to cooperate with NATO and became part of NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (2005). The powerful Armenian lobby provided considerable assistance with with "complementarism" and despite its allegiance to Russia, the country received significant assistance from the US. However playing this game proved to be quite difficult as Russia under Putin's presidency became more assertive. The events of 2013 (when Armenia was blackmailed by Russia) demonstrated one simple truth – "complementarism" has its strict limits. As for the cooperation with NATO, it never went beyond partnership plans. What's more, even cooperation with the EU (much more harmless than NATO) depends on Russia's goodwill.

Still, Armenia on some occasions managed to protect its national interests. After the 2008 war Moscow pressed its most loyal post-Soviet allies (Armenia and Belorussia) to recognize Abkhazia and South Osetia. But Armenians obviously realized that such an action would have very severe consequences not only for Georgia but for Armenia as well. There were two possible scenarios: either Georgia would join the blockade of Armenia and thus Armenia would be completely isolated, or the Georgian state would collapse. The latter scenario was no less dangerous because the balance in the South Caucasus would be destroyed, making Armenia even more dependent on Russia (in absence of independent Georgia which to a degree balances the Russian influence in the region).

That is why Armenia not only did not recognize Abkhazia and South Osetia as independent states but soon after the war it hosted Georgia's president Saakashvili with honors. This was a demonstrative gesture that infuriated Moscow. The Armenian message was very clear – Russian expansionism had its limit too.

No doubt Armenians realize the dangerous situation they have been in since 90s. Russia is a dominant regional power but at the same time history has shown that Russia is never as strong as it looks. In the 20th century Russian empire collapsed twice (after the WW1 and after the end of the Cold War) and there is no guarantee that this will not happen in the 21st century as well. As a result, Russia will be ousted from the South Caucasus leaving Armenia unprotected. Even if this scenario does not happen, Armenia is already finding its position too vulnerable because of Russia's overwhelming influence. This influence became all too obvious after the 2008 war and that's when Armenia made an extremely bold decision – it started a dialog with Turkey. Already in September 2008 presidents of Armenia and Turkey met at a football game in Yerevan. The following negotiations (nicknamed "football diplomacy") sparked hopes that Armenia would manage to break its isolation and become a more independent player. The Armenian-Turkish dialog was supported by Russians who needed to demonstrate some goodwill and constructiveness after invading Georgia. After the war, Russians felt as strong as never since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which made them believe that Armenian foreign policy could be kept in check and Turkey, while normalizing its relations with Armenia would accept Russia as the region's most important player. The Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was also in the interest of the West. This was because the EU was not ready to accept Turkey until it solved its issues with Armenia and the US wanted its crucial NATO ally to reconcile with this small nation with a powerful lobby in Washington DC.

As for Turkey, the country was seriously challenged by the August 2008 events. Moscow made everyone understand that it not only was ready to resort to war if its regional interests were at stake but also that it still enjoyed a predominant position in the South Caucasus – something Turkey could not match no matter how close its ties were with Azerbaijan and how much effort and resources it spent on strengthening its influence in the region. Moscow could instantly turn everything upside down and render Turkey's efforts innefective. So Turkey had to somehow accommodate Russia, get it

involved in some kind of a constructive dialog and make it follow common rules of the game. Apparently this is why the right after ceasing of hostilities in August 2008 Turkey's then Prime Minister Recep Tayyp Erdogan launched the so-called Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform. It was aiming to preserve peace (or rather avoid a new war) in the region. The platform itself did not have any serious follow-up but it demonstrated Turkey's willingness to maintain stability in the region at any costs. Engaging in a dialog with Yerevan served this purpose as well.

In 2009 bilateral negotiations between the two historical enemies seemed to gain momentum and in October respective foreign ministers signed an accord that looked to be of historical importance. Turkey and Armenia were to establish diplomatic relations and reopen their common border. However the accord was never ratified. Armenia blamed Turkey and explained everything by the unwillingness of Ankara to ratify the accord without solving the Karabagh issue first. However, the majority of Armenian society hardly looked unhappy with this failure because Turkey was still refusing to recognize the genocide – something that Armenian diplomats could condone, but not the public opinion. The negotiations collapsed and it became obvious that Turkey would not abandon Azerbaijan while the Armenian public opinion hardly tolerated any negotiations with a country that was portrayed by the state propaganda as the enemy number one (along with Azerbaijan).

Armenia's intransigence can be also explained by the simple fact that the country has been ruled by Karabagh Armenians since late 90s. Current President Serge Sargsyan (at the time of this writing) and his predecessor Robert Kocharyan understandably regard Karabagh not just as the most important issue in their policy agenda buy also something that cannot be negotiated. However, the historical inclinations of the Armenian elite should not be of the same importance as the balance of power in the region. The balance can be shaken in favor of Azerbaijan if Russia enters a decline. In such a case Armenia definitely will have to seek alternatives and become

more flexible toward Azerbaijan and Turkey. In order to be able to engage in a dialog with its foes, Armenia will have to continue in the line of complicated diplomatic games on all fronts. First of all, it should not relax its powerful lobby in the US. At the same time it should make the very best in order to maintain good relations with Iran – the country that has remained friendly toward Armenia mainly due to the fact that it did not want to have a strong Azerbaijan as a neighbor. That would mean strengthening Turkey's (Iran's historical enemy) positions and stirring secessionist sentiment among the strong Azerbaijani minority within Iran. Armenia and Iran developed close economic relationship since 90s as both have suffered from isolation. Now when the US-Iranian rapprochement provides a chance for Iran to become a much more influential player and its support could be crucial for Armenia.

Another challenge for Armenia is related to domestic politics. The Armenian government is viewed as corrupt and rather ineffective. What's more, Armenians hardly can be happy with the fact that their country is not only very poor compared to Azerbaijan but also that they have fallen behind in terms of democratic development compared to Georgia (According to the latest data provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, Armenia ranks last in the category of hybrid regimes while Georgia tops the list and is only one rank behind the category of flawed democracies).

In early 2008 Armenians challenged the results of the presidential elections, with tens of thousands rallying in Yerevan, which made the government look doomed until it resorted to violence. Finally, everything ended in killings and arrests that shocked the whole region but saved the incumbent government. Since these events nothing has been done to address the wide-spread discontent and there is always danger of new protest manifestations and political turmoil. Such developments will hardly make Russia happy since it needs stability in Armenia and since it has been wary of popular revolutions in the former Soviet Union since 2003. So in case of such scenario, Russia should support the Armenian government.

AZERBAIJAN'S SECURITY POLICY

Azerbaijan has enjoyed rapid economic growth for the last decade and nowadays has developed as one of the leaders of not only the South Caucasus but also the Caspian basin. Azerbaijan's position is strengthened not only by its oil income but by the fact that the country is less dependent on external assistance (unlike Armenia that heavily depends on Russia and Georgia, which significantly depends on the West). Besides, Azerbaijan's political system notwithstanding its striking flaws (high level of corruption, problems with freedom of media and so on) has one advantage over the systems of both Georgia and Armenia: it is more stable, at least in the short term. As we have already seen, Georgia and Armenia are both considered hybrid regimes, Georgia is quite advanced in terms of development while Armenia is only a point away from authoritarian regimes. But no matter how big the difference is between them, they remain quite unstable in short-term since they are still in transition and are much more vulnerable to political turbulences. Azerbaijan on the other hand suffers from low level of democracy but is stable as are most of the typical Muslim oil rich countries.

The Azerbaijani people enjoying the benefits of oil windfall definitely feel much more self-assured than was the case sin the 90-ies after losing territories to Armenia. The country is getting richer by the year , the state propaganda praises its leadership and (unsurprisingly) portrays Armenia as number one enemy. The identity of modern Azerbaijan is definitely built on bitter rivalry with Armenia and a desire to regain the lost territories. The loss of Karabagh is almost as important to Azerbaijani national identity as the genocide is to the Armenian. Azerbaijan's authorities have capitalized on these popular sentiments. Critics of Azerbaijan's democracy are constantly reminded of the lost territories and the enemy - Armenia. As long as there is an external enemy and the country's budget is sustained by high oil prices, Azerbaijan's regime can hardly be challenged by anyone.

The richer and the more self-assured Azerbaijan gets the less tolerant it will become toward the current status quo. Azerbaijan simply cannot tolerate the existence of a hostile enclave on its territory. This enclave is a source of very unpleasant memories that are an affront to the young and ambitious nation.

But still it is obvious that no matter how strong and rich Azerbaijan gets, it still cannot solve its territorial problem through war. The Russian presence notwithstanding, it is hardly conceivable that Azerbaijan's political and military elite will risk a war since it can threaten economic stability and well-being of the country (and that of the elite in the first place). Moreover, a conflict with Armenia may endanger Azerbaijan's oil exports (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was attacked during the 2008 war and something similar can always happen in case of a new regional conflict). A peaceful solution would be much more acceptable for Baku. If the current trend continues – Azerbaijan gets stronger while Armenia falls progressively behind – such a scenario could become quite real. Armenians cannot watch forever how their country lags behind its neighbors and remains isolated. At some point – when Azerbaijan becomes powerful enough for Russia to take note– Armenia will also have to make some concessions. This would be almost an ideal scenario for Baku. By that time Azerbaijani authorities will likely seek to maintain calm relations with Russia. If Heydar Aliev was openly pro-Western, under his heir's rule (Ilham Aliev) Azerbaijan's foreign policy became more balanced and Baku started to buy arms from Russia. To continue down the path of good relations with its big neighbor, Ilham Aliev has met several times with Putin. It is difficult to say whether or not Azerbaijani authorities believe that they can split the Russian-Armenian connection. Most probably they have no such illusions, and are simply trying to accommodate Russia and avoid unnecessary complications and troubles with the belligerent and erratic Northern neighbor. This means that Azerbaijan continues along the lines of Heydar Aliev's grand strategy – of focusing on development, strengthening the armed forces and waiting for the right moment to regain control over lost territories – with a slight alteration: engage Russia.

Improving relations with Russia makes sense also because Azerbaijan faces trouble from Iran. As we already mentioned above the latter is not interested in the stronger Azerbaijan. Iran with its development stalling because of isolation can only warily watch as Azerbaijan gets stronger and one day may attract the Azerbaijani minority on its side of the border. Iran got especially anxious with regards to Azerbaijan after 2003 when the news spread that the US was going to deploy troops on Azerbaijani soil. Speculations on this topic continued for years until it became clear that Washington had no such intentions (or that it had changed its mind). Tehran replied using a variety of means, including demonstrative flights within Azerbaijani air space. Baku apparently realized that since it managed to normalize relations with its big northern neighbor, the same could be accomplished also with the big southern neighbor. In 2013 the Azerbaijani side   announced that the country's territory would not be used for strikes against Iran. This statement apparently was a follow-up of difficult bilateral negotiations finally ending (or at least relieving) the tension that has built up back in 90s. Now as sanctions on Iran are suspended, Azerbaijan should feel more comfortable as Tehran is expected to become a more predictable and constructive player.

We mentioned above that Armenia is interested in having a strong and independent Georgia. Actually, this is one of the few common interests Yerevan and Baku share. Azerbaijan needs a strong Georgia even more. Georgia is a vital link for Azerbaijan that connects it with the world markets. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline go through Georgian territory and should Georgia suffer some ill fate, Azerbaijan will become isolated. If Georgia is overrun by Russia then both pipelines will fall under Russia's control, leaving Baku at Moscow's mercy. More than that – Georgia connects Azerbaijan with Turkey, its most loyal ally.

In fact, Azerbaijani-Georgian connection would be nothing if it wasn't for Turkey. The latter has developed into a strong regional power that promotes the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey triangle. In June 2012 the three countries

made an important declaration in Trabzon on intensifying their economic and political ties. The Trabzon Declaration set a new agenda highlighting Turkey's ambitions and role in the region. Turkey is the country to see that Azerbaijani oil is delivered to world markets (from Ceyhan Mediterranean port) and soon is to become a distributor of Azerbaijani gas to European markets, not to mention the political and technical support that Azerbaijan has received from Turkey after restoring its independence. Moreover, Turkey has always unequivocally supported Azerbaijan's territorial integrity and joined in its embargo against Armenia. Most likely it was because of Turkey that Armenia never stirred up problems in Nakhichevan – Azerbaijani territory that is squeezed between Armenia, Iran and Turkey. In some way, Turkey is of same importance for Azerbaijan as Russia is for Armenia – with the difference that it never tried to take advantage of Azerbaijan's vulnerable position. Of course such generosity can be explained by the simple fact that Turkey regards Azerbaijan as a kin nation. This attitude has been strongly supported in Baku as well. Heydar Aliev characterized the special relationship in a historical speech as "one nation with two states." One thing is certain, no matter how strong and influential Azerbaijan becomes, it will always need a strong ally in Turkey.

GEORGIA'S SECURITY POLICY

Georgia arguably is the most complicated case in the region. If Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war against each other, Georgia has fought a war with Russia. Azerbaijan does not control Karabagh but even Armenia does not recognize Karabagh's independence, whereas Russia recognizes Abkhazia and South Osetia as independent states (and has elicited such recognition from a handful of other countries, most notably Venezuela and Nicaragua). Unlike Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia has no protector in the region. It has been heavily dependent on the Western support that could not contain Russia in 2008 (although still managed to save the Georgian state from full

annihilation). Turkey, as a NATO member has been quite helpful, but of course Georgia is of lower priority to Turkey compared to Azerbaijan. Since 2008 Georgia is at a mercy of Russia which has stationed its troops next to Tbilisi. In 2008 it took Russia several days to overcome the resistance of Georgian armed forces and approach Tbilisi. Now they are able to launch an offensive on Tbilisi at any moment.

The 2008 war had plenty of negative consequences for Georgia. One of them buried Georgia's NATO aspirations. Just before the war, NATO summit decided not to invite Georgia to be part of its Membership Action Plan. The main reason for this decision – not revealed officially but tacitly understood – was the problem of Georgia's territorial integrity, or more precisely Russia's military presence in Georgia's break-away regions. After the war this problem became even more severe and thus chances for Georgia's NATO integration became even slimmer. Russia's then President Dmitry Medvedev later admitted that the war "stopped NATO expansion." Since then Georgia somehow managed to stay on NATO enlargement agenda (mainly thanks to its active participation in NATO peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan and proactive foreign policy) but as the problem of territorial integrity remained unsolved it was clear that any real progress on the way to NATO – the only military alliance that could neutralize the Russian threat and the one Georgia chose because of its pro-Western stance and values – would prove to be extremely difficult. No doubt Moscow, that has always understood this simple truth, will do its best not to help Georgia solve this conundrum.

Georgia's foreign policy has slightly changed after the 2012 parliamentary elections which ended in a dramatic defeat of Saakashvili's party. The new authorities declared normalization of relations with Russia as one of their main priorities. This decision was welcomed by Georgia's western partners who did not need any more troubles in the region. Diplomatic relations with Russia were not restored (and hardly can be restored until Russia recognizes Abkhazia and South Osetia as independent states), but a special envoy was

appointed to negotiate with Russia on matters concerning trade, cultural and humanitarian affairs. Despite the fact that this format did not cover (at least officially) security affairs, it still contributed to relieving the tensions. Russia started to gradually lift the trade embargo it imposed on Georgia in 2006. Also, more Russian tourists started to visit Georgia.

This was an important achievement first of all because Georgia, still being at Russia's mercy, needed first of all to accommodate both the Russian political elite and public opinion (which considered Saakashvili's Georgia one of Russia's top enemies). The security affairs were (and still are) discussed within the so-called Geneva format that was initiated after the war and which includes representatives from the US, UN, OSCE, EU and also Abkhazia and South Osetia (unofficially). As expected, this format did not bring any tangible results but it still remains of very high priority for Georgia because of the involvement of its western partners and allies. Under Saakashvili Russia used to insist that Georgia sign non use of force agreements with Abkhazia and South Osetia. Georgia rejected such an offer (signing any such document with break-away regions would mean their de-facto recognition) and instead made a unilateral pledge not to use force for solving its territorial problems. After the 2012 elections, the Geneva talks became more constructive but brought no tangible results, which is not surprising given that Georgia is not going to recognize the rebel regions of Abkhazia and South Osetia as independent units and Russia is hardly ready to abandon its protectorates.

Georgia's new Russia policy has been widely criticized by the opposition (Saakashvili-led party) citing concerns that Tbilisi is giving up too much in return for reopening the Russian market – namely, that Russian TV stations are allowed to broadcast in Georgia again, and that Georgia's new authorities immediately shut down Russian language TV station that criticized Putin's Russia, thatpro-Russian non-governmental organizations have appeared in Georgia (something that hardly would be tolerated under Saakashvili). Also speculations have surfaced about re-opening of the Russian-Georgian-

Armenian railway connection that goes through Abkhazian territory. This railway has been out of operation since the war in Abkhazia. Despite the fact that Armenia never made it a secret that it was interested in re-opening this connection, previous Georgian authorities treated this question with caution since it could pose various risks – such as alienating Azerbaijan, Georgia's strategic regional partner (Russia could use this connection for supplying its Gyumri base, or the fact that Armenia would come out of its isolation). Thanks to this partnership, Georgia has not only become more interesting for the west but also has managed to get rid of its energy dependence on Russia. This has manifested itself after the completion of Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum pipeline (2006) as Georgia has received gas from Azerbaijan, becoming immune to Gazprom's price manipulations (something Ukraine has suffered from).

It still remains to be seen whether this criticism is justified. Georgia's new authorities sometimes seem too reserved when it comes to dealing with Russia, but at the same time managed to intensify ties with the EU. As NATO integration process still stalls, it was decided to focus instead on the EU which resulted in the signing of the Association Agreement. Needless to say, Moscow definitely was not happy with such developments but it hardly could do anything to prevent it – when Georgia initiated the agreement Russia was too busy preventing Armenia from following suit; when Georgia was signing its agreement, Russia was too busy with the Ukraine. Apart from that Georgia's new authorities still cooperate with Azerbaijan and Turkey within the Trabzon Declaration format – something they inherited from the former government. So at the moment it could be said that Georgia's foreign policy stance remains without change.. The country has made strides to meet NATO standards, having undertaken a range of necessary reforms under the partnership programs with NATO. Now its chances for integration with NATO and the EU depend to a great extent on the regional and international context – as soon as an opportunity presents itself, Georgia's aspirations should be satisfied. And this opportunity has a lot to do with Russia and its position in the South Caucasus and the Russia-West relations.

Georgia is maintaining good relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even since the Karabagh war started, Tbilisi has remained strictly neutral and supported the peaceful resolution of the conflict. In fact peace in the region remains one Georgia's vital interests. If the conflict is renewed, Georgia would find itself in an extremely dangerous situation. First of all, there is a threat of the spill-over effects, disruption of energy supplies, and more. But, above all, the greatest threat is Russia that may demand a passage through Georgia's territory for land access to its military base in Armenia. In such a scenario, not only Georgia's neutrality will be breached but Georgia's sovereignty will be further violated by Russia.

Another security challenge for Georgia is the North Caucasus. In case Russia loses control over this region, Georgia will be threatened by radical Islamists – arguably even more unpredictable and dangerous than Putin's Russia. Georgia has quite uneasy memories of the North Caucasus, namely Dagestan and Chechnya. In 18th century Georgians had to carry out raids from Dagestan and in 90s, during the war in Abkhazia Chechens fought against Georgia. Since then, Georgia has tried to befriend the North Caucasus peoples, but no matter how hard Georgia tries, for the North Caucasus Muslim peoples it still will remain a secular, pro-Western, Christian country, quite an alien entity. That's why a strong Russia the region is not in Georgia's interest. Paradoxically, Georgia – the country that has suffered a lot from Russian hostility – is interested in keeping the status quo as far as Russia is concerned.

But on the other hand if Russia's positions shift, it may weaken its positions n the South Caucasus Under such circumstances, Georgia finally may realize its aspirations and enter NATO – the alliance that can provide it with security it seeks so much and repel the challenges it may face from the north.

Still, the best scenario for Georgia would be the democratization of Russia and Russia's integration with NATO and the EU. That would end all the conflicts in the region and ensure peace and economic development. But of course

such a scenario (which would suit most of the international community) looks too unrealistic and obscure at the moment.

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ESSENCE AND FUNDAMENTALS OF DEFENSE REFORM

Nodar Kharshilazde - Zurab Agladze

INTRODUCTION: REFORM AND DEFENSE FIELD

Reform notion (contemporary understanding of this term) has established in the second part of the 20th century. At that time the big American companies on a board scale started implementation of reforms, which purposes were reducing expenses and increasing incomes. Intersest in reforms were gradually increasing and at the end of the 20th century private sector was embraced with real boom. The term `reform` which direct translation means change of the form, became the modern term (today we also have term transformation, which means the same but sounds more beautifully). It is obvious, that alongside requirement there appeared vocation – A great number of larger and smaller consultation companies, which gives advice how to do this or that business and how to implement reform in your own organization which nobody knows better then you. Reform was successfuly and actively accepted by the state sactor, especially American military structures and department of defense. After the World War II notion of reform in defense sector was established on a board scale. At the same time there were accepted European nations and US models of MOD, which substituted pre-war war ministries. The first and widely known reform patern in the US defense department is the change made by secretery of defense McNamara, as a result in the most conservative and closed military department there were established civil office `Office of Secretary of Defense`and which became one of the important cell of defense department.

Naturally there emerged a question – Why were reforms implemented especilly in military sector and how the succession was reached? This is traditionally closed and conservative department and its reformation is not an easy matter.

But the main point is that after the Second World War scientific progress significantly changed traditional military vision and forced the militaries and especially civil politicians to reevaluate everything. Actually, after the World War II military-political situation was based on nuclear weapon phenomenon, which during military confrontation became the most important factor for balancing. Even not before and after (untill today) any other weapon has played such greater role in the changes of military-political balance. This caused natural change in the military-political thinking and there was need for carrying out new approaches, which would support implimentation of new missions.

Word reform became special actual term not only for USA, but for NATO. Many NATO member countries realized the need for changes--later executed successfully, but in some case unsuccessfully. The mentioned process was unequivocally progress for the West. The plain example of this emerged from NATO soldiers being superior to Soviet soldiers, as for technologically so the intellectually, mentally and professionally.

Russia, Army legal successor of Soviet Union, was successor of Soviet doctrine. But as for Western Sergeants and officers are modern military managers with strategic thinking and proficiency level.

Besides this progress it is difficult to appreciate the capabilities of armed forces. As a matter of fact the product of armed forces, the security, is difficult to assess especially nowadays in the 21st of century when global conflicts don't exist. Nowadays the main challenge for huge part of world represents unconventional threats, according to this, the assessment of army efficiency is difficult. Emerging from this great number of countries spend huge sum of money on the agency which success rate definition is difficult. It is not easy to define how the states military forces will conduct the war, in case of engagement and addressing the unconventional threats. There is no warranty for readiness against all emerging threats and problems.

Moreover challenges against the security , which shaped differently from the challenges of 20 of century, was clear example that reform and development of armed forces and security sector is the most important end continuous mission of the state. No matter how improved the armed forces of state is (as in West), their improvement process should be permanent, as the risk of falling behind is high and can't follow the ongoing changes, however it will have a lack of readiness for threats, which were changed and became more stable for developed technologies and doctrine. It is obvious that war is full of surprise and full readiness for addressing all problems the no armed forces is capable. but implementation of adequate and effective reforms is the mean for addressing all problem and for minimization of risks. There is no way besides the reforms.

We can talk more about the reasons and results of the military reform, but in this paper we will discuss more the philosophical essence of the reform, taking into account examples of security and defense.

As we know, historically the Armed Forces were one of the biggest and the most expensive organizations in the state that is still true. Nowadays the world spends 1.75 trillion dollars in total on the Armed Forces that is approximately 2.5% of the world's inner product. This is much more than the sums spent in fields such as education, science, culture and so on.

In spite of large-scale costs, every year any military agency requests more and more finances comparing to the previous years. From military servicemen's point of view, there is always new technology or equipment that they must have. „Insufficient budget" is probable the most favorite term for the Armed Forces. On the other hand, based on development and increase of population the world has more shortage of resources and these resources are more and more difficult to obtain. According to this emphasis is made on spending resources effectively in the field of defense. As we mentioned above, the aims of the reform are nothing else, but the reduction of costs and maximization

of result. During the budget cut successful reform allows to reduce the costs relatively painless (to maintain the same capabilities is desired), but during the budget increase it allows to increase current capabilities and add new ones.

The main philosophical essence of the reform relates to these two precepts _ capability and costs _ its aim is to achieve more capabilities with less resources. However, reform/transformation may include much more pragmatic aim in practical dimensions and may be divided into various components:

- Improve management system;
- Save time;
- Increase efficiency coefficient of personnel;
- Modernize/automatize some capabilities;
- Introduce new systems;
- Abolish/liquidate old systems.

Several main factors are required to carry out the reform successfully, such as political will, stability, human resource, organizational will and localization.

POLITICAL WILL AND STABILITY

This is a desire of political authorities to make changes and support activities needed for success. Political will is essential to start reform and complete the process successfully. It protects the process of reform from external adverse effects. Some types of reform requires to make painful decisions, such as complete abolition of certain services or radical discharge that results in loss of jobs by some personnel or most of them and causes their displeasure. Otherwise this may include stoppage or complete elimination of current projects that may drive the need to revise the assumed financial responsibilities toward implementing/contracting organizations. In both cases personnel and organizations will complain about the changes of status and

they will often try to regain their rights. The political will is needed to continue making the painful but essential for reform changes despite the legal, social or financial pressure. Stability is also very significant factor. If the political will protects the process from external factors, stability protects it from internal ones. When higher echelons of organizations are changed, the new authorities have their imagination how to guide and operate the organization, that may be cardinally different from their predecessors' ideas. At certain stages this is acceptable and essential as well, but during frequent changes, the agency cannot afford too many new ideas and it happens that it transits from one incomplete reform to another. As a result the direction of reform may change frequently, the activities may be incompatible and the reform will be completed unsuccessfully. Sometimes it happens that the leader of certain agency initiates a reform, but he/she has to leave the position (discharge) during the reform (without completing it) and as the replacing leader has other views toward certain issues, he/she simply stops the reform or doesn't complete it, or isn't concerned about it. In order to avoid such cases certain security measures should be implemented that will ensure the successful completion of the reform. For example, monitoring of reform should be performed by „higher echelons". That is, if the reform is implemented in the Ministry, the head of the government or deputies should monitor it and avoid the failure of reform due to changes in personnel. Special committee may also be established in the organization that will supervise the progress of the reform and ensure its completion. This way it would be able to avoid the risk of reform interruption by one person.

HUMAN RESOURCES

Human Resources are necessary and probably the most important. Initiating and implementing the reform need not only creative people, but also personnel that own appropriate expertise and can project future results with great accuracy; also diagnose positive and negative lateral effects of this reform on

the agency. That's why it's necessary for the personnel to have rich experience in agency work. It's important to group these people in a team, in which every gamer has his/her own role based on his/her experience and proficiency.

Establishing a reform group in the governmental structure is a difficult task. Due to specific governmental bureaucracy, generally personnel have to perform routine, in a better case, planned work. Therefore, they have less time and energy to generate ideas. Herewith, there is another factor: majority of employees get accustomed to the existing system, are aware of the characteristics of management and execution, and feel comfortable in this environment. As a result, a person is oriented to better performance and career advancement rather than implementation of drastic changes in the system.

In spite of those obstacles and difficulties, it is possible to develop reformers inside the agency. To achieve this, we need to define particular criteria according to which we can identify creative persons. Besides main specialists working in the agency, the reformers should be representatives from different fields (lawyer, financial expert, specialist of human resources and others). After this it is necessary to establish a special agency/bureau manned with this personnel. It's important for this bureau not to be assigned with routine work; otherwise it will turn into a typical bureaucratic unit.

This type of agency must inspect the institution periodically in order to identify shortfalls inside the institution and find the solutions. However, we should not allow the institution to have a feeling that the agency is conducting investigative or punitive actions. The result of this will be total internal isolation, while the process of planning reforms and their implementation require close cooperation inside the institution.

This is quite difficult process, which often does not conduct not only in the state agency, but also in the private companies. Accordingly, such kind of places hiring consultation firms (consulting) to carry out reforms. Often,

agency does not know what kind of reform needs to carry out, so it entrusts to consulting to make decision. Consulting may well knows special references, documentations and registers, but at this same time he/she may does not have clear imagining about on this concrete organizational culture and dynamics of the agency. The result is that, consulting represents the conclusion, which is too expensive for agency and nothing brings for it really. For today, the same practice is accepted and very popular, because many minister and director tries to keep up with time requirements and trends.

  Sometimes, the reason of failure of consulting is that, employees of the agency without enthusiasm show visitors theirs work specification. This is not happening because they do not want to work with consulting, but agency may work on sensitive issues, which for outsiders is desirable be closed. This is particularly for agencies of the security sectors. There are a lot of sums, when hired did not have chance to realize the specificity of the agency on security issues and finally their recommendations do not came closer to reality.

There are productive and effective reforms, that are implemented by consultation firms but this is rarity. As a rule, without knowing of inside specificity and organizational dynamics, consulting has less and negative effect. Employees of the agency only officially collaborates, but in really does not have desire and will to work with hired persons, which are paid much more, when conducting quite easy works (and quite unusable).   In case of absence of organizational will archiving success is eliminated at the beginning.

Inner of the agency possibilities always is much better, than hired force. Inner resource is an integral part of the agency. Sometimes, it is possible to invite consulting to support such kind of resources, but in this case internal group of reformist must manage process and establish missions and tasks, where consulting will conduct useful and assistant functions.

ORGANIZATIONAL WILL AND LOCALIZATION

During the implementation of reforms, in every agency we come across to a phenomena, which is referred to as an organizational will (as we already mentioned above). Contrary to the political will, this is an in-official phenomena and it's difficult to identify it on one sight. Successful implementation of the reform is the will of the organization, basically, of the majority of its personnel. As a rule, it involves the intermediate and lower levels of command and performers, that forms 95% of the personnel. The implementation of the reform is agreed to the higher authorities; sometimes it's even initiated by them; however the development of reforms depends upon the ordinary employees. So, the will of these people is an important factor to achieve success.

Generally, you can distinguish three main groups in the personnel. The percentage of these groups in the majority of agencies is 20/60/20. These numbers are not accidental.

The first 20% is referred to as Pareto's 20% in honor of Italian sociologist, who defined it. It's long established, that achieving success in any job does not dependent on the active work and involvement of the whole organization but the effective use of this 20% of the organization. In every organization, in every group (weather it's a ministry, a private company or the group of students) the leading force is the active part of it, which does nearly 80% of the work.

This 20% is shaped by the group of ambitious, creative and intelligent people. These people are the main supporting power of the reform; cooperation with them will create the main incentive. These people must believe that the reform is not only a good thing but they will have the opportunity to promote their own carrier and professional level. After this, they will get actively involved in the implementing of reforms and moreover, they will introduce lots of

improvements. Basically, the reform group of the organization personnel can be formed by the representatives of the above mentioned 20%, if we consider to implement reforms on the expense of internal resources only.

The second group (60%) is the main body, which is generally interested in the development of the agency, but their main interest is to preserve a job and get higher salaries. The most important thing for these people is that reform must not touch their work and agenda; besides, they must be sure that the new initiative will not be a threat for them. Considering the huge number of it's members, this group is very important and it's necessary to work with them and explain that the reforms are profitable to them or, in the worst case, it will not damage them. It's not recommended to frighten or threaten the employees or dismiss the from jobs etc. This may have a good result in the nearest future but in the long-term perspective it will definitely have a negative effect.

We must know, that it's difficult and almost impossible to involve a major part of this group in active group. It is more important that they shouldn't hinder but just follow trough the current changes.

Third and the last group has the most negative and dangerous attitude to reforms. This group is complete with skeptics. As usually people like that are unconfident in new initiatives and prefer old methods. These people work routinely and are often qualified specialists, who think that they are very experienced in their job and every new initiate is a waste of time and money. We need to use a strict and direct attitude to this group, because sometimes it is impossible to make them sure. We must be very attentive and don't let them to harm the process. For this case they must know that otherwise their job and status will not be safe. It is not necessary to threaten them with it, but just send a corresponding message.

Besides it is important to identify these groups (20\60\20) correctly, before begin to work with them.

As for localization, it addresses the issue like considering local specifications during the reform. It isn't only about organizational culture but about the characteristics of that country in which the reforms must be implemented – the political model, traditions, the working culture of population of the country and so on. There has no sense without considering it. Very often we see some organizations trying to implement American models and attitudes in such countries which have very little common with USA. This happens not only when they hire American consulting but when the head of the agency fascinates with American model and tries to instill this by using of local assets.

It's clear, that the successful implementation of a reform is not easy. Successful implementation of a reform needs strengths mobilization, working out and implementing of reform set. In regard to consulting, their help may be necessary in some conditions. We need find a company, which is staffed with experienced practitioners, which had already implemented similar reforms in their agencies. These practitioners must have experience of working with different consulting while implementing a reform.

Although, the most important is still own personnel and knowledge to work with the stuff. The nepotism must be minimized and each person should have equal rights of showing itself in the agencies, that have to implement the reforms. Otherwise, there will be impossible to identify 20% of active part, which is always reliable for any organization, especially in the period of reform. Elimination of the nepotism is minor issue – most important is the issue of working with the multicomponent stuff that is an individual area of discussion.

We have to realize, that it's very risky to interrupt the process of completing the reform. It may have much worse result than non-implementing it at all. That's the reason why the strict political will must be revealed and the reform implementation must be constantly controlled. Political leaders of the

government and the officials of appropriate agencies should be well informed about the reforms and they must be interested in successful implementation.

That's all we have to know before implementing the reforms, especially when it regards to Defense (military) sphere. We can understand the needs of our armed forces and know the appropriate direction of working, but in case we do not decide all these issues beforehand, do not support the exist of political will and stability and management of human resources and organization will – the implementation probably will not be positive.

The reform in the field of defense is an aggregate of politics, plans, programs and their implementation, in the process of which the authorities take a responsibility to improve the national defense capabilities. The main purpose of the reform is to establish effective, legal, transparent and responsible structure, ready to operate in compliance with the national interests.

For different people the military reform has different meanings. I'd like to remind you the words of the famous American military serviceman and reformer John Boyd: "decisions without action have no sense, but the action without decision is irrational." Thus, during the reform process, decisions and action must be synchronized. Of course we all agree that the purpose of the reform is to change not only the structure, but also peoples approach to what they do.

Before we start to talk about the practical part of the reform, I'd like to make a short review of the civilian-military relationships. The civilian-military relationships play an important role in the reform implementation process. The reform implementing depends on the interaction of the civilian-military leadership and the personnel. Of course these two groups have different characters. They differ from each other by their opinions and decision making rights on the issues regarding budget or personnel. On one hand, military leadership always demand more money from the state budget than it's

possible, on the other hand, civilian authorities have different arguments – political or economical, to justify reducing or not increasing outgoings of state defense, though, at the same time, they demand from the military leaders successful reforms to be implemented in terms of the limited resources and other hindrances.

How to start the reform? What steps should be undertaken? These are the most important questions. As soon as the team, willing to implement the reform, overcomes all mentioned above obstacles, it's time to establish the sequence of actions for the successful implementation of the reform. Conventionally, the reform can be divided into two main components: 1 – sequence of actions, 2 – what should be done in each structural unit.

At first, workshops are established and the members will be the representatives from all structural units. In order to avoid negligence of any structural unit in the workshops the balance should be maintained. Also, workshops should be established at the different levels of the management and directions, where it is planned to implement the reform -including personnel, logistics, education or procurement.

The teams themselves are divided into two parts: One part is responsible for the initiation of the changes and the other one - for their approval. The second team must include the members, who have decision-making authorities – like deputy ministers and the heads of the departments. After establishing teams, a work plan is created, which includes the following steps:

- Assessment of the primary/initial situation
- Planning
- Exercise/education/training
- Implementation
- Monitoring
- Assessment of the implemented reform

Assessment of the primary/initial situation should be conducted at the first step, in order to identify current situation and establish directions and sequences of the actions, concerning the activities to be done at the first time. As a rule, the assessment of the primary/initial situation is conducted by the decision-making team. During the assessment of the primary/initial situation, coordinated action is necessary between all directions, because separate structural unit's efficiency assessment doesn't give a common picture. During assessment, linkage and interrelationship between structural unit and other elements should be considered. Correct assessment is the basis of the successful reform. Any mistakes during assessment will appear during reform implementation, which causes reform plan changes itself.

Coordinated planning has critical importance to make simultaneous and logical reforms in the field of defense organizations. Otherwise duplication or omission of an important element is possible, which in long-run perspective may act a negative role in the course of reforming.

Exercises, education and training are the guarantees of a successful reform, which let the organization to develop continuously and coherently. In the beginning it's important to define requests, criteria and competences, which is essential for civilian and military personnel. Human resources and its quality has critical importance to implement a reform successfully.

Synchronizing implementation is one of the most important among structural organizations. Reform should be balanced among structural units for making reforms only in separate organizations would have no results. In the field of defense as well as in every other organizations the relationship among structural units is very close and should not be omitted any element without taking other units' interests into account. Maintaining a relationship is essential so as not to collapse the system. E.g. the reform of education system should have a close relationship with the reform of personnel management system,

otherwise it won't be effective. Personnel training is possible but if personnel is not selected correctly achieving desired effects will be impossible.

Constant monitoring of reforms allows to observe, examine and have continuous information about the process of reforming to change plans easily if necessary and also minimize the negative effects of reform if it was originated at any stage of reforming.

Evaluation of implemented reform allows to define efficiency of completed work and to compare it with the purposes and results which were considered before initiating the reform. Evaluation also allows to make conclusions and to take them into account in the future.

Now it is time to discuss the sequence of actions that are necessary to implement a reform successfully. A strategy gives directions to all types of reforms, which define those complex actions that are necessary to achieve success. Before we initiate a reform, we are supposed to answer the questions that will dictate the direction of the reform. Here, we suggest brief list of issues that play significant role in initiating reforms and implementing them. These include to:

-   define what strategic requirements should be developed towards the Armed Forces;
-   define the aim of the reform (why we carry out it). Note: (it may be one or several aims listed below) It should be determined how to use defense resources effectively;
-   define how to improve defense management;
-   define the sequence of reforms in such areas as personnel management,education and logistics;
-   define the essential activities in order to address the challenges that hinder combat readiness and capability building;
-   identify the unnecessary expenditure in the defense budget;

- inspect and identify the needs for deployment and infrastructure;

- define and establish the role of allies in the field of Defense (in case of existence of them)

- define the volume of critical investments and the ways to maintain them;

Since all questions are answered, implementation of the reforms can be started, which itself includes the sequence of actions, such as:

- strategy and force planning;

- capability-based planning;

- capability improvement;

- training and readiness;

Now, let us try to discuss each of these points. After discussion a reader will have more clear idea about this step of the reform.

Strategy and Force Planning: The challenges of National Security determine the requirements of force planning. The requirements themselves define capabilities that are necessary to protect national interests. As a result of operational planning, it should be defined the task force that will enable the Armed Forces to complete the assigned tasks in order to defend the country (this gives us a clear picture about how many brigades, air squadrons or maritime combat teams are necessary; where they should be emplaced and how they should be used in order to enable the military armed forces to protect national security and sovereignty.

Capability-based planning: Capabilities are more than individual platform. For example: combat aircraft, combat helicopter and combat ship. It also includes transportation, supporting, intelligence and other kind of capabilities, that are necessary for support of combat elements. Precise determination of training and readiness level is also important. It is necessary for the relevance of quantity and quality of the Armed Forces to the assigned mission. Modernization is also important during capability-based planning. Introduce

of competing new technologies and their advantage may be one of the most important factors, though it influences on other factors.

Maintenance and Development of modernization programs are useful for three reasons: (1) if country made investment in new technologies, it may cause improvement of capabilities of the Armed Forces. This will make the Armed Forces more effective. (2) Maintenance and Development of the new systems is also financially beneficial. For example: new American combat aircrafts- F-35 demands less than 30 percent technical personnel than the old ones. (3) The Armed Forces get rid of less effective and large equipments. Capability-based planning does not only includes equipment and arming. It also involves financial support of the personnel.

IMPROVEMENT OF CAPABILITIES

The correct determination of role of Armed forces, outlined missions and aims in matter of national defense, helps to define those capabilities that are critical for implementation of the missions and achievement of the aims. Prioritize of these capabilities and definition of the most important ones will be possible after this process. The ways of capability building and improvement must be defined with the help of different models (for example DOTML-PF-doctrine, organization, trainings, materials, authorities). The ways of reasonably and effective use of existing resources must be determined. The concept of „smart defense" represented by NATO may be considered during the improvement of security capabilities of individual countries. For example, if capabilities of the Armed Forces will be improved so , that it will also be beneficial for other agencies or on the contrary, It will give the chance of saving and reasonably using of the resources. Finally it will give way of more capability building.

Train and Readiness. Personnel, equipment and training must be balanced. Even the armed forces equipped with the most modern technical equipment is the useless and ineffective without the highly qualified (skilled) personnel.

On the other hand, having the old or unreliable equipment may cause the most motivated and qualified personnel the less effective. In order, that the personnel were able to execute the mission, their training must be conducted using the combat equipment in terms of realistic combat requirement. Qualified personnel, equipment and trains define the level of combat readiness. The reform must provide the readiness of the armed forces, in order to achieve the mission success.

CONCLUSION

As a conclusion, it is necessary to implement the effective reform in order to establish the armed forces, which will be able to respond effectively to all security challenges of the 21 st century in terms of the restricted recourses.

It is obvious that the reform implementation is not easy and it is a combination of complex efforts with the risk of failure. In order to implement the reform successfully and achieve the mission success, it is necessary to take in considerations some different issues. For example:

1) Clear definition of the reform aim (what must be improved according the reform).

2) Other considerations:

- Political will
- Stability
- Human recourse
- Organizational will and
- Correct localization.

3) For implementing the reform, it is necessary to have the working plan including the following steps::

- initial situation assessment
- planning

- exercise/education/training
- implementing
- monitoring
- assessment of the implemented reform.

4) Even it is very essential to take in consideration such issues that play an important role at the beginning of the reform implementation and its execution process;

- Define the strategic requirements for the armed forces;
- Define the aim of the reform (why we implement the reform). Comment:
- (It must be one of the items or some of them given below) Define how to use the recourses effectively, which belong to Defense. Define how to improve the defense management;
- Define the reform sequence in such spheres, as personnel management, education and logistic management;
- Define the efforts, that are essential in response of those challenges, which interdict the development of combat readiness and capability.
- Demonstrate all unnecessary expenses in the defense budget.
- Check and define the requirements for deployment and infrastructure.
- Explain and define the role of allied forces in the sphere of defense sustainment; (in the case of allied forces).
- Define the critical investment amount and the ways of their keeping.

5) When all the answers related to these questions are clear, it will be able to implement the reform, including the sequence of special efforts:

- Strategy and force planning:
- planning based on capability:
- capability development:
- training and readiness:

The reform is a complex, long-term process and in most cases its implementation is very difficult. But in case of existing of all components, a motivated team, political will, organizational concept and the right approach, everything is possible. The reform is a change of a form or a policy. This is an essential mental transformation, which in case of success, opens the gate for the innovative and creative processes and will transform any agency into a successful and effective institution.

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ABOUT CENAA

Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA) is an independent non-governmental organization dealing with foreign policy and security. We pursue a range of projects, including research, events and publications with partners from Slovakia and abroad. Other important activities include transition projects with the countries and regions not only neighbouring the EU and NATO. CENAA aims to contribute to the strategic level discussion in Slovakia and the Euro-Atlantic area, to shape policies, and to bring new ideas and recommendations to decision-makers. In addition, we actively engage with the younger generation through education projects to prepare them for a career in the area of foreign affairs and security.

Our key activities are divided into four programmes: **Transatlantic Security Programme, Transition Programme, Emerging Threats Programme, Publications and Education.**

The main aim of the Transatlantic Security Programme is to contribute to the development of new concepts, solutions or ideas in the area of Transatlantic Security, NATO Partnership and Enlargement Policy. Our Transition Programme champions the successful transition, stability and sustainable development in all regions and countries where we are present with our projects (South Caucasus, Ukraine, East and Southeast Europe, Afghanistan and Tunisia) in capacity-building, institutional development, education and training. Emerging Threats Programme addresses new security threats, including cyber security, issues related to energy security and internal security threats such as extremism and radicalism. Within this programme, CENAA launched several research and advocacy activities to define the most important challenges, in the field of cyber security and right-wing extremist movements. Publication Programme includes topical publications related to CENAAs activities as well as our flagship project Panorama of the global security environment which engages Central European security and foreign

policy community in a strategic level discussion on security in world. We also publish brief policy analyses on current issues in the foreign affairs and security called Policy Papers.

Our flagship projects include unique international conferences - NATO 2020 which is organized every year in Bratislava, and South Caucasus Security Forum which is organised every year in Tbilisi, Georgia.